



ADVENTURES  
OF  
THE CONNAUGHT RANGERS.  
—  
VOL. I.

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ADVENTURES

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OF

THE CONNAUGHT RANGERS.

SECOND SERIES.

BY

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

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## P R E F A C E.

IN consequence of the very flattering manner in which the first series of these "Adventures," published in August, 1847, was received by the public, and the marked approbation of no inconsiderable portion of the Press, which thought my little work worthy of notice, I am induced once more to commit myself to the judgment of both. Besides this, many of my friends say there is an *hiatus* in the "Adventures of the Connaught Rangers" in Spain, and the South of France, and so in truth there is; but when I thought of publishing the first series, it was by the advice of a friend, to whom I recounted several scenes I had witnessed in Portugal, Spain, and Lower Canada:

and although there was much to be told upon the best authority to which I had access, I decided not to enter on interesting events, comprising, amongst others, the occupation of the French territory by the allied armies in the spring of 1814, and therefore confined my narrative to scenes that occurred under my own immediate observation only, or nearly so. I shall now, however, avail myself of the descriptions of others, whenever I may have occasion to make use of them, extending my present narrative over a longer period than I at first contemplated—that is to say, from the first formation of the “Connaught Rangers,” up to our occupation of Paris and other towns in France.

W. G.

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ADVENTURES  
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CHAPTER I.

EARLY CAMPAIGNS.

WHEN the breaking out of the war with France, in 1793, occasioned considerable additions to be made to the British army, the regiment in which I served, the "Connaught Rangers," was raised in Ireland under commission, bearing date of 25th September, 1793, by Colonel the Honourable Thomas de Burgh (afterwards Earl of Clanricarde), and being



recruited chiefly from the province of Connaught, it assumed, as its distinctive appellation, the name of “Connaught Rangers;” and when the new levied regiments were numbered from 78th upwards, received for its number 88th : its facings were yellow, and it bore on its colours and appointments a harp and crown, with the motto “*Quis seperabit.*”

It was not long before the active services of the new regiment were called for in the field. In the summer of 1794, a reinforcement of seven thousand men, under the command of Major-general the Earl of Moira, was sent to join the army of the Duke of York, in Flanders, and of this force the 88th regiment, one thousand strong, and commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Keppel, formed part.

The expedition landed at Ostend on the 26th of June, at which time the Duke of York, pressed by superior numbers, was retiring upon Antwerp, and the Earl of Moira resolved not to attempt the defence of Ostend, but to endeavour to join his Royal Highness. After a tedious and difficult march in the face of a victorious enemy, whose troops

were already overrunning the country in all directions, his Lordship arrived at Alost, where he was attacked by the French, on the 6th of July, with great fury. The enemy was, however, repulsed; the steadiness and valour of the troops, with the skill of their leader, overcame all difficulties; and the junction between Lord Moira's corps and the army under his Royal Highness the Duke of York was accomplished at Malines, on the 9th of July, when the 88th was formed in brigade with the 15th, 53rd and 54th regiments.

In the harassing operations of the autumn of 1794, and in the disastrous winter campaign and retreat which followed, the 88th had a full share. For some time it formed part of the garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom, where it was reviewed by the Prince of Orange, and some Hessian officers of high rank, and received much commendation for its appearance and efficiency.

When Bergen-op-Zoom was considered no longer tenable, the 88th was withdrawn in the night by boats, under the command of Lieutenant (afterwards Admiral) Sir Home

Popham, and proceeded to join the army near Nimeguen, in which fortress it was also subsequently placed in garrison, but was withdrawn a few nights before the surrender. It was then formed in brigade with the 8th, 37th, 44th and 57th regiments, under the command of Major-general de Burgh, and stationed near the Waal to defend the passage of that river.

On the 27th of November, 1794, General John Reid was appointed Colonel of the regiment, in succession to Major-general de Burgh, who was removed to the 66th regiment. The ditch, having become frozen, was to bear an army with its *matériel*. The 88th retired across the lake, and the men, being exposed to the storms of a severe winter, endured great hardships.

Robert Brown states in his journal (7th of January, 1795): "Nearly half the army are sick, and the other half much fatigued with hard duty: this is now the tenth night since any of us had a night's rest."

The enemy continuing to advance in overwhelming numbers, the army retreated during

the night of the 14th of January, through a country covered with ice and snow. On the subsequent days numbers of the men, exhausted with fatigue and want of food, were unable to proceed, and many were frozen to death by the roadside.

The 88th proceeded to Desenter, the capital of a district in the province of Overysse, from whence the regiment marched on the 27th of January, and continuing its route for several days across a region of ice and snow, arrived in the Duchy of Bremen. In April the regiment embarked for England. After its arrival it went into quarters at Norwich, and proceeded to fill up its thinned ranks with recruits from Ireland.

In the autumn of 1795, the 88th was ordered to form a part of the expedition under Major-general Sir Ralph Abercrombie, destined for the reduction of the French West India Islands, and accordingly embarked under the command of Lieutenant-colonel (now Viscount) Beresford.

The disasters which attended the sailing of this expedition form a sad page in the naval

history of England, and were not easily obliterated from the memory of the survivors. Various circumstances co-operated to delay the fleet, under Admiral Christian, till a very late period of the year, and it had scarcely quitted port when it encountered a hurricane by which it was completely dispersed. Many of the ships foundered at sea ; some returned disabled into English ports, some were taken by the enemy, and a small part only were able to weather the storm, and proceed to their original destination.

The dispersion of the 88th regiment, was as complete as that of the fleet : two companies, commanded by Captain Trotter, were all that reached the West Indies ; of the others, some were in the captured ships, some in those which put back to England ; and a crazy transport, in which one division, under Captain Vandeleur, was embarked, was actually blown through the Straits of Gibraltar, as far into the Mediterranean as Carthage. Here the vessel was frapped together, and with great difficulty navigated back to Gibraltar, where the men were removed out of her. And on

loosening the frapping, the transport fell to pieces.

The two companies which reached the West Indies, after being employed in the reduction of Grenada and the siege of St. Lucie, returned to England in the autumn of 1796, when the whole battalion was again assembled and embarked under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Beresford for Jersey, where its numbers were once more completed to a full establishment by recruits from Ireland.

On the 1st of January, 1799, it sailed from Portsmouth for the East Indies, still commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Beresford, and arrived at Bombay the 10th of June.

The next active service of the 88th, was with the expedition which the government of India fitted out, under the command of Major-general Sir David Baird, in 1800, to co-operate with the army under Lieutenant-general Sir Ralph Abercrombie, in the expulsion of the French from Egypt.

The troops sailed from India in December, 1800, and arrived at Cosseir, on the Red Sea, in June, 1801. On this occasion, in the fourteen

days' march across what is called the Long Desert, from Cosseir on the Red Sea to Kenna on the Nile, the 88th formed the van of Sir David Baird's army, preceding the rest of the troops a day's march; and it was thus the first British regiment to tread this dangerous route.

From Kenna it sailed in boats down the Nile, and reached Grand Cairo on the day on which that fortress surrendered to the British troops, under Major-general (afterwards) Lord Hutchinson. On the final evacuation of Egypt by the English, the 88th, instead of returning to India, as had been originally intended, proceeded to England in order to be reduced; but arrived at Portsmouth on the very day that the war with France was renewed, the 5th of May, 1803, and was consequently saved from that fate, its numbers being then much weakened by time and casualties, and its effective strength still more so by the ophthalmia, which the soldiers had contracted in Egypt. The corps was ordered into quarters in Kent and Sussex, where it remained three years.

Amongst the measures of defence taken at this time by the government, to secure the country against the invasion with which it was threatened by Bonaparte, a general order was issued from the Horse Guards, on the 2nd of December, 1803—commanding that (in case of the enemy's effecting a landing in any part of the United Kingdom) all officers below the rank of general officers, and not attached to any particular regiment, should report themselves in person to the general officer commanding the district in which they might happen to reside; and requesting all general officers, not employed on the staff, to transmit immediately their addresses to the Adjutant-general.

The colonel of the 88th, the veteran General Reid, was then in his eighty-second year, yet he immediately obeyed the summons, and transmitted his address in a letter so spirited, as to deserve a place in this history of the "Connaught Rangers," which he commanded, and upon which his gallantry reflected honour.



“ London, December 6th, 1803.

“ Sir,

“ In obedience to the order of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief, expressed in the ‘ London Gazette’ of Saturday last, for all general officers, not employed on the staff, to report to you their addresses, I have the honour to inform you that I am to be found at No. 7, Woodstock Street, near Oxford Street ; that I am an old man, in the eighty-second year of my age, and have become very deaf and infirm ; but I am still ready, if my services be accepted, to use my feeble arm in defence of my King and country, having had the good fortune on former occasions to have been repeatedly successful in action against our perfidious enemies, on whom, I thank God, I never turned my back.

“ I have, &c. &c.,

(Signed) JOHN REID,

“ General-colonel of the 88th regiment.

“ To the Adjutant-general.”

A second battalion was formed in 1804, and a statement of its services is given at the end of

this work. In 1805, the regiment being then quartered in Eastbourne barracks, together with the Derby Militia, and a detachment of the 10th Hussars, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-colonel the Honourable Alexander Duff, of the 88th, a quarrel unfortunately occurred between the soldiers of the two corps, which might have led to very serious results; but which that officer, with a degree of tact and knowledge of the nature and feelings of a British soldier, that was highly creditable to him, not only rendered innoxious, but converted into a source of essential benefit to the regiment.

The result of this conduct on the part of the commanding officer, was the making of the two regiments such attached friends, that when a short time after the Derby Militia was permitted to furnish three hundred and fifty men to regiments of the line, more than two hundred of the number volunteered for the "Connaught Rangers," although they were beset by the officers and recruiting parties of many English regiments, who naturally, but vainly, hoped to gain the preference over a corps then exclusively

Irish. The volunteers from the Derby Militia proved as good and gallant soldiers as any in the army, and a very large portion of them were killed in the various actions in which the regiment was afterwards engaged.

## CHAPTER II.

## SOUTH AMERICA.

It was about this period that his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief ordered Sir John Moore's improved system of drill to be adopted throughout the army. Under the active superintendence of Lieutenant-colonel Duff, the 88th was quickly perfected in the new system, and was in all respects in the highest state of discipline.

The Commander of the district, Major-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, was reviewing Major-general Sir Brent Spencer's brigade, to which the 88th belonged, in Crouhurst Park, near Hastings, when he received an express

for the regiment to march on the following day to Portsmouth, and join the expedition under Brigadier-general Robert Crawford.

When the review was over, Sir Arthur made known the orders he had received, and addressed the regiment in very flattering terms, concluding a short and animated speech with these words: "I wish to God I was going with you! I am sure you will do your duty, ay, and distinguish yourselves too." He then took leave, amidst the loud cheers of the corps.

The expedition, consisting of the first battalions of the 5th, 36th, 45th, and the "Connaught Rangers," five companies of the Rifle corps, two squadrons of the 6th Dragoon Guards, and two companies of artillery, sailed from Falmouth on the 12th of November, 1806, and after remaining at St. Jago in the Cape de Verde Islands from the 14th of December, 1806, to the 11th of January, 1807, arrived in Table Bay, Cape of Good Hope, on the 22nd of March following. Here the 88th landed in marching order, and was for the first time inspected by Brigadier-general Crawford, who

expressed himself in terms of approbation of its general appearance.

From the Cape, the expedition sailed again on the 6th of April; called at St. Helena on the 21st to complete its stock of water and provisions; and quitting that island on the 26th, arrived on the 14th of June at Monte Video, then occupied by the British troops under Lieutenant-general Whitelock, who had arrived there in May preceding, and now assumed the command of the whole British force in South America.

On the 26th of June the army arrived off Ensenada da Baragon, a port on the river Plata, about thirty-two miles from Buenos Ayres, and landed on the 28th without firing a shot. The 36th and the "Connaught Rangers" were brigaded together under the orders of Brigadier-general the Honourable W. Lumley.

On the 29th the troops moved forward; the light brigade, composed of the Rifle corps and nine light infantry companies, formed the advance, which was supported by Brigadier-general Lumley's brigade, and followed by the other corps in succession.

On the 1st of July the army was concentrated near the village of Reduction, about seven miles from Buenos Ayres, from whence it again advanced on the following day, crossed the Chuclo, a rivulet, by a ford called the Chico, and traversed the low ground on the opposite bank, at the extremity of which stands the city of Buenos Ayres.

Hitherto the enemy had offered only a very feeble resistance, which the discharge of a few round-shot was sufficient to overcome; but when the right column commanded by Major-general Leveson Gower arrived near the Coral de Miserere, the Spaniards displayed a formidable body of infantry and cavalry, supported by a brigade of guns, with others in reserve. Brigadier-general Robert Crawford, placing himself at the head of his brigade, consisting of the 95th Rifles and light battalion, immediately made a vigorous charge, drove the enemy back in confusion, captured nine guns and a howitzer, and profiting by the panic which had seized his opponents, pursued them into the very suburbs of the city, where his career of victory terminated.

Major-general Leveson Gower ordered the troops first, to halt, and then to take up a position for the night about a mile in the rear, near the principal slaughtering-place of the town. During the advance into the town, Captain William Parker Caroll with his company of the "Connaught Rangers," took a tilted waggon loaded with bread, and an eight-pounder brass gun, on which 88th was immediately scored, with the point of a soldier's bayonet, to mark it as a regimental prize.

The troops remained under arms during the night, exposed to heavy and incessant torrents of rains ; in the morning Lieutenant-general Whitelock summoned the Governor to surrender. The Spaniards, however, made an attack upon the piquets, in which the "Connaught Rangers," which had relieved the Rifle corps, lost about twenty men killed and wounded.

The assault of the town was now determined upon, and the morning of the 5th fixed for carrying it into execution. For this service the "Connaught Rangers" was divided into wings, the right being commanded by



Lieutenant-colonel Duff, and the left by Major Vandeleur, who were directed to enter the town, separately by two different streets, and having gained the banks of the river, on the opposite side of the city, to possess themselves of the houses, and form on the flat roofs ; but what further steps they were to take or what they were to do, after so forming, was not stated.

At half-past six o'clock in the morning of the 5th of July the attack commenced ; the right wing of the 88th, formed in sections, advanced at a rapid pace through several streets unmolested, and indeed without encountering or even seeing a single human being. A death-like silence reigned throughout the town, or was interrupted only by the measured tread of those who were most at a loss to comprehend the meaning of the apparent solitude and desertion that surrounded them. At length a few detached shots seemed to give a pre-arranged signal, at which the entire population of a vast town was to burst from its concealment, and in an instant the flat roofs of the houses swarmed with a mass of musqueteers, who poured a deadly and almost unerring fire upon the British soldiers.

Under any circumstances the combat between men exposed in an open street, and adversaries ensconced behind the parapets of the houses on each side, must have been an unequal one ; but the British troops were for some time absolutely defenceless in the midst of their enemies, having been positively ordered to advance with unloaded arms.\*

Lieutenant-colonel Duff, however, penetrated as far as a church on the right-hand side of the street in which his column had been directed to

\* It may not be improper in this place to notice and correct an erroneous report which became prevalent in England, that the troops engaged in the assault at Buenos Ayres, were ordered not only to advance unloaded, but actually to take the flints out of their muskets. The fact is, that two companies of the 88th only were thus deprived of every means of offence or defence, except their bayonets. They had been on a piquet the night before at White's house, and consequently joined their corps in the morning with loaded arms : the order to draw their charge occasioning some delay, General Gower, who was present, became impatient, and directed those who had not drawn to take their flints out. The consequence was that several of these men were killed in the streets while in the act of screwing in new flints.

establish itself; but the strength of the barricaded doors defied all attempts to force an entrance. His situation now became desperate; to remain stationary was to expose himself and his little band to certain massacre, unmitigated even by the being able to sell their lives dearly; to advance was nearly as pregnant with destruction; and even returning, independent of the repugnance every British officer feels to the idea of retreat, "was as bad as to go on."

Colonel Duff's resolution was as prompt as the necessity was urgent, he made up his mind on the instant to hazard everything while there was the most distant chance of success, and determined to push on, a determination which was received by his men with shouts, and seconded by them as if every individual soldier had felt himself personally responsible for the issue of the contest; with the few brave companions that survived, he succeeded in making his way into a cross street, and forcing open two houses, the doors of which were not so ponderous or so well secured as those of the church.

The houses, however, were not carried till

after a severe struggle, in which all the men that defended them were put to death ; and even when taken, they afforded the captors but little shelter, being lower than the surrounding buildings, and consequently commanded on every side. At length, after a vain and murderous contest of four hours' duration, but not until the last round of ammunition was expended, Lieutenant-colonel Duff and his few remaining men were reduced to the necessity of surrendering prisoners of war.

The left wing of the regiment under Major Vandeleur had been in the meantime engaged in a contest equally murderous, equally hopeless, and equally unfortunate. It had penetrated a considerable way into one of the main streets of the town before a single enemy appeared ; two mounted videttes were at length observed retiring slowly, and, as they retired, constantly looking up to the tops of the houses, evidently giving directions to the armed men, who were as yet concealed behind the parapets.

Major Vandeleur ordered his men to advance in double quick time ; a terrific shout now burst from behind the parapet, and in an in-

stant a dreadful fire of musketry, accompanied by hand-grenades and other missiles, carried death through the British ranks. Revenge, or even resistance, was out of the question; nevertheless the men remained undismayed, and continued to press on.

A deep trench, with a parapet cut across the street, stopped them but for a moment; they carried it at the point of the bayonet, though with immense loss; and finally surmounting every obstacle, succeeded in reaching the river, where they found themselves exposed to an enfilading fire from the guns of the citadel, at about three hundred yards' distance. They broke open a house, but it afforded no protection, the yard being surrounded by other parapetted houses, from whence an incessant and destructive fire was poured upon them. Artillery was brought against them, and a large body of troops surrounded them in a *cul de sac*, from which either advance or retreat was impracticable.

For three hours and a half did this devoted little band protract the hopeless struggle, and not until they were annihilated, and until

the firing had ceased on every other point, and until, like their comrades under Colonel Duff, they had expended the last ball-cartridge that could be found, even in the pouches of their dead or dying companions, did they adopt the sad alternative of surrender.

Thus ended the fatal 5th of July, 1807, the first and *only* occasion on which the 88th sustained a defeat. They had the consolation, however, of knowing that all that men could do they had done, and of reflecting on many individual acts of devoted bravery highly honourable to the corps. Lieutenant Robert Nickle (late Lieutenant-colonel of the 36th) led the advance of Brigadier-general Crawford's division-column into the town, and fell dangerously wounded, after having given repeated proofs of cool intrepidity, united with the most daring courage.

Lieutenant William Mackie, the discountenanced leader of the forlorn hope at Rodrigo (afterwards captain in the 94th regiment, and subsequently major) was severely wounded in the thigh; but although fainting from loss of blood, continued at the head of his men, until a

second bullet struck him across the spine, and stretched him, to all appearance dead, upon the ground. Contrary to every expectation, however, though to the unfeigned delight of his comrades in arms, he survived, to gather fresh laurels in the Peninsula.

Lieutenant George Bury also distinguished himself by vanquishing, in single combat, a Spanish officer of Grenadiers; Serjeant-Major William Bone, for his gallant conduct on the same occasion, was recommended by Lieutenant-colonel Duff for an ensigncy, to which he was promoted, and died a captain in the Royal African regiment. But Bury was nearly as unfortunate as Bone, for the Spaniard bit Bury's middle finger off, "bone and all!"

When the regiment was ordered for embarkation, Captain Oates, who was doing duty with the 1st, though in fact belonging to the 2nd battalion, volunteered and received the permission of his Royal Highness the Duke of York to accompany the regiment; being a supernumerary he was attached to the 38th, a company of which he commanded in the attack on the Plaza de Toros.

Some of the other divisions of the army had met with less opposition than this regiment ; the Plaza de Toros, a strong post on the enemy's right, and the Residencia, a good post on their left were taken ; at the same time part of the army had gained an advanced position opposite the enemy's centre, but these advantages had cost two thousand five hundred men in killed, wounded and prisoners.



## CHAPTER III.

## BUENOS AYRES.

THE loss of the "Connaught Rangers" on this occasion amounted to twenty officers, and two hundred and twenty non-commissioned officers and privates killed and wounded.

## OFFICERS KILLED.

Lieutenant Thompson.

" Hale.

Ensign McGregor.

Assistant-surgeon Ferguson.

## OFFICERS WOUNDED.

Major Iremonger.

Captain McPherson.

Captain Dunne.

“ Chisholme.

“ Seton.

“ Peshall.

Lieutenant Adair.

“ R. Nickle.

“ Graydon.

“ Whittle.

“ Stewart.

“ Buller.

“ Mackie.

“ Gregg.

“ Bury.

Adjutant Robertson.

The following letter from General Whitelock will best explain the fatal issue of this disastrous affair.

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of His Majesty, that upon being joined at Monte Video on the 15th of June by the corps under Brigadier-general Crawford, not one moment was lost by Rear-admiral Murray and myself in making every necessary arrange-

ment for the attack of Buenos Ayres. A landing was effected without opposition on the 28th of the same month at the Ensinada de Barragon, a small bay about thirty miles to the eastward of the town.

“ The corps employed on this expedition were three brigades of light artillery under Captain Fraser, the 5th, 38th, and 87th regiments of foot under Brigadier-general Sir S. Achmuty, the 17th Light Dragoons, 36th and 88th regiments, under Brigadier-general the Honourable W. Lumley, eight companies of the 95th regiment, and nine light infantry companies under Brigadier-general Crawford, four troops of the 6th Dragoon Guards, the 9th Light Dragoons, 40th and 45th regiments of foot, under Colonel the Honourable T. Mahon.

“ All the dragoons being dismounted, except four troops of the 17th under Lieutenant-colonel Lloyd, after some fatiguing marches through a country much intersected by swamps and deep, muddy rivulets, the army reached Reduction, a village about nine miles distant from the bridge over the Rio Chuclo, on the opposite bank of which the enemy had constructed batteries and

established a formidable line of defence ; I resolved, therefore, to turn this position by marching in two columns from my left, and crossing the river higher up, where it was represented fordable, to unite my force in the suburbs of Buenos Ayres. I sent directions at the same time to Colonel Mahon, who was bringing up the greater part of the artillery under the protection of the 17th Light Dragoons and 40th regiment, to wait for further orders at Reduction.

“ Major-general Leveson Gower having the command of the right column, crossed the river at a pass called the Passo Chico, and falling in with a corps of the enemy, gallantly attacked and defeated it, for the particulars of which action I beg to refer you to the annexed report. Owing to the ignorance of my guide, it was not until the next day that I joined the main body of the army, when I formed my line by placing Brigadier-general Sir S. Achmuty's brigade upon the left, extending it towards the Convent of the Recoleta, from which it was distant two miles, the 36th and 38th regiments being on its right, Brigadier-general Crawford's

brigade occupying the central and principal avenues of the town, being distant about three miles from the great square and fort, and the 6th Dragoon Guards, 9th Light Dragoons, and 45th regiment being upon his right and extending towards the Residencia.

“The town was thus nearly invested, and this disposition of the army, and the circumstances of the town and suburbs being divided into squares of one hundred and forty yards each side, together with the knowledge that the enemy meant to occupy the flat roofs of the houses,” gave rise to the following plan of attack.

“Brigadier-general Sir S. Achmuty was directed to detach the 38th regiment to possess itself of the Plaza de Toros, and the adjacent strong ground, and there take post; the 87th, 5th, 36th and 38th regiments were each divided into wings, and each wing ordered to penetrate into the street directly in its front. The light battalion divided into wings, and each, followed by a wing of the 95th regiment and a three-pounder, was ordered to proceed down the two streets on the right of the central one; and

the 45th regiment down the two adjoining, and after clearing the streets of the enemy, this latter regiment was to take post at the Residencia.

“Two 6-pounders were ordered along the central street, covered by the carabineers and three troops of the 9th Light Dragoons, the remainder of which was posted as a reserve in the centre; each division was ordered to proceed along the street directly in its front, till it arrived at the last square of houses next the river Plata, of which it was to possess itself, forming on the flat roofs, and there wait for further orders; the 95th regiment was to occupy two of the most commanding situations from which it could annoy the enemy.

“Two corporals with tools were ordered to march at the head of each column, for the purpose of breaking open the doors. The whole were unloaded, and no firing was to be permitted until the columns had reached their final points and formed. A cannonade in the central street was the signal for the whole to come forward.

“In conformity to this arrangement, at half-

past six o'clock of the morning of the 5th instant, the 38th regiment moving towards its left, and the 87th straight to its front, approached the strong post of the Retiro and Plaza de Toros ; and after a most vigorous and spirited attack, in which these regiments suffered from grape-shot and musketry, their gallant commander, Brigadier-general Sir S. Achmuty, possessed himself of the post, taking thirty-two pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and six hundred prisoners. The 5th regiment, meeting with but little opposition, proceeded to the river and took possession of the church and convent of St. Catalina.

“ The 36th and 38th regiments, under Brigadier-general Lumley, moving in the appointed order, were soon opposed by a heavy and continued fire of musketry from the tops of the windows of the houses, the doors of which were barricaded in so strong a manner as to render them almost impossible to force. The streets were intersected by deep ditches, in the inside of which were planted cannon, pouring showers of grape on the advancing columns. In defiance, however, of this opposition the 36th

regiment, headed by the gallant General, reached its final destination ; but the 88th being nearer to the fort and principal defence of the enemy, were so weakened by his fire as to be totally overpowered and taken.

“The flank of the 36th being thus exposed, this regiment together with the 5th retired upon Sir S. Achmuty’s post at the Plaza de Toros, not, however, before Lieutenant-colonel Borne, and the grenadier company of the 36th regiment had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves by charging about eight hundred of the enemy, and taking and spiking two guns.

“The two 6-pounders moving up the central streets, meeting with a very superior fire, the four troops of the Carabineers, led on by Lieutenant-colonel Kingston, advanced to take the battery opposed to them ; but this gallant officer being unfortunately wounded, as well as Captain Burrell next in command, and the fire both from the battery and houses proving very destructive they retreated to a short distance, but continued to occupy a position in front of the enemy’s principal



defences and considerably in advance of that which they had taken in the morning.

“The left division of Brigadier-general Crawford’s brigade, under Lieutenant-colonel Pack, passed on nearly to the river, and moving to the left approached the great square with the intention of possessing itself of the Jesuit’s College, a situation which commanded the enemy’s principal line of defence; but from the very destructive nature of his fire this was found impracticable; and after sustaining a heavy loss, one part of the division throwing itself into a house which was afterwards not found tenable was shortly obliged to surrender, whilst the remaining part after enduring a dreadful fire with the greatest intrepidity, Lieutenant-colonel Pack, its commander, being wounded, retired upon the right division commanded by Brigadier-general Crawford himself.

“This division, having passed quite through to the river Plata, turned also to the left to approach the great square and fort, from the north-east bastion of which it was distant about four hundred yards; when Brigadier-general Crawford learning the fate of his left

division, thought it most advisable to take possession of the convent of St. Domingo, near which he then was intending to proceed onward to the Franciscan Church, which lay still nearer to the fort, if the attack or success of any other of our columns should free him in some measure from the host of enemies which surrounded him.

“The 45th regiment being further from the enemy’s centre had gained the Residencia without much opposition, and Lieutenant-colonel Guard leaving it in possession of his battalion companies moved down with the grenadier company towards the centre of the town, and joined Brigadier-general Crawford.

“The enemy who now surrounded the convent on all sides attempting to take a 3-pounder which lay in the street, the Lieutenant-colonel with his company and a few light infantry under Major Trotter charged them with great spirit. In an instant the greater part of his company and Major Trotter (an officer of great merit) were killed, but the gun was saved.

“The Brigadier-general was now obliged to confine himself to the defence of the convent,

from which the Riflemen kept up a well-directed fire upon such of the enemy as approached the post ; but the quantity of round-shot, grape and musketry to which they were exposed, at last obliged them to quit the top of the building, and the enemy, to the number of six thousand, bringing up cannon to force the wooden gates which fronted the fort. The Brigadier-general having no communication with any other column, and judging from the cessation of firing that those next him had not been successful, surrendered at four o'clock in the afternoon.

“ The result of this day's action had left me in possession of the Plaza de Toros, a strong post of the enemy's right, and the Residencia, another strong post on his left, whilst I occupied an advanced position opposite his centre ; but these advantages had cost about two thousand and five hundred men in killed and wounded and prisoners ! The nature of the fire to which the troops were exposed was violent in the extreme ; grape-shot at the corners of all the streets, musketry, hand-grenades, bricks and stones from the tops of

all the houses ; every householder with his negroes, defended his dwelling, each of which was in itself a fortress, and it is not perhaps too much to say that the whole male population of Buenos Ayres was employed in its defence.

“ This was the situation of the army on the morning of the 6th instant when General Liniers addressed a letter to me, offering to give up all his prisoners taken in the late affair, together with the 71st regiment and others taken with Brigadier-general Beresford, if I desisted from any further attack on the town and withdrew His Majesty’s forces from the river Plata ; intimating at the same time, from the exasperated state of the populace, he could not answer for the safety of the prisoners if I persisted in offensive measures. Influenced by this consideration (which I knew from better authority to be founded in fact), and reflecting of how little advantage would be the possession of the country, the inhabitants of which were so absolutely hostile, I resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of the troops had obtained, and acceded to

the annexed treaty, which I trust will meet the approbation of His Majesty. I have nothing further to add, except to mention in terms of highest praise, the conduct of Rear-admiral Murray, whose cordial co-operation has never been wanting whenever the army could be benefited by his exertions. Captain Rowley, of the Royal Navy, commanding the seamen on shore; Captain Baynton, of His Majesty's ship 'Africa,' who superintended the disembarkation, and Captain Thompson, of the 'Fly,' who had the direction of the gun-boats, and had previously rendered me much service by reconnoitring the river, are all entitled to my best thanks; as his character already stands so high, it is almost unnecessary to state, that from my second in command, Major-general Leveson Gower, I have experienced every zealous and useful assistance. My thanks are likewise due to Brigadier-generals Sir S. Auchmuty and Lumley, and to Colonel Mahon and Brigadier-general Crawford, commanding brigades. I cannot sufficiently bring to notice the uncommon exertions of Captain Fraser, commanding the Royal Artillery, the fertility

of whose mind, zeal, and animation, in all cases left difficulties behind. Captain Squires of the Royal Engineers, is also entitled to my best thanks ; nor should I omit the gallant conduct of Major Nicolls, of the 45th regiment ; who, on the morning of the 6th instant, being pressed by the enemy near the Residencia, charged them with great spirit, and took two howitzers and many prisoners. Lieutenant-colonel Bradford, Deputy-adjutant-general, has likewise great claim to my approbation as a gallant and promising officer.

“ The officers of my personal staff, Lieutenant-colonel Torrens, Military Secretary ; Captains Brown, Foster, Douglas, and Whittingham, aides-de-camp, must also be mentioned by me in terms of just regard ; the knowledge which the latter possesses of the Spanish language has been eminently useful to me.

“ This despatch will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-colonel Bourke, Deputy-quarter-master-general, who has afforded me that assistance which might be looked for from an officer of his military talents and attachment to the service,

to whom I beg to refer you for any further particulars respecting the military operations in this part of the world,

“ I have the honour to be, &c.,

“ J. WHITELOCK,

“ Lieutenant-general.”

“ Return of the killed and wounded and missing of the troops under the command of Lieutenant-general Whitelock, between the 28th of June, the day of landing at Ensinada, to the 4th of July, 1807, inclusive :

“ Light battalion ; 1 lieutenant wounded. 87th regiment : 5 rank and file killed. 88th regiment ; 8 rank and file killed, 8 rank and file wounded. 95th regiment ; 1 sergeant, 1 rank and file killed, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 2 sergeants, 10 rank and file wounded. Total : 1 sergeant, 14 rank and file killed ; 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 2 sergeants, 18 rank and file wounded.

“ Officers of the light battalions severely wounded. 87th regiment ; Lieutenant Crow. 88th regiment ; Lieutenant Thompson. 95th

regiment ; Captain Elder, Lieutenants Noble and Coane.

(Signed)           “ THOMAS BRADFORD,  
                          “ Adjutant-general.”

“ Return of killed, wounded and missing, on the attack of the city of Buenos Ayres, on the 5th of July, 1807 :

“ Royal Navy : 1 lieutenant wounded, 2 seamen missing.

“ Royal Horse Artillery : 3 rank and file killed, 1 sergeant, 1 drummer, 6 rank and file wounded, 3 rank and file missing.

“ Royal Foot Artillery : 1 lieutenant, 2 rank and file wounded. Gunner-drivers, 3 rank and file killed.

“ 6th Dragoon Guards : 1 captain, 1 sergeant, 13 rank and file killed. 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 sergeant, 19 rank and file wounded. 1 quartermaster, 2 rank and file missing.

“ 9th Light Dragoons : 1 staff, 3 rank and file killed. 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, 13 rank and file wounded. 1 rank and file missing.

“ Light battalion : 1 major, 1 lieutenant,



3 sergeants, 24 rank and file killed. 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 1 drummer, 57 rank and file wounded. 62 rank and file missing.

“ 5th regiment : 1 sergeant, 1 drummer, 12 rank and file killed. 1 major, 1 sergeant, 2 drummers, 43 rank and file wounded. 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, 21 rank and file missing.

“ 36th regiment : 2 captains, 25 rank and file killed. 3 captains, 4 lieutenants, 3 sergeants, 2 drummers, 39 rank and file wounded. 2 staff, 11 rank and file missing.

“ 38th regiment : 1 lieutenant, 8 rank and file killed. 1 ensign, 1 volunteer, 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, 38 rank and file wounded. 1 rank and file missing.

“ 40th regiment : 2 rank and file killed. 1 rank and file wounded.

“ 45th regiment : 14 rank and file killed. 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 4 sergeants, 41 rank and file wounded. 1 rank and file missing.

“ 47th regiment : 1 rank and file killed. 1 lieutenant, 2 rank and file wounded. 1 rank and file missing.

“ 87th regiment : 2 captains, 1 lieutenant,

1 staff, 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, 51 rank and file killed. 1 major, 4 captains, 5 lieutenants, 1 staff, 8 sergeants, 1 drummer, 108 rank and file wounded. 14 rank and file missing.

“88th regiment: 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 staff, 8 sergeants, 70 rank and file killed. 1 major, 4 captains, 6 lieutenants, 1 staff, 7 sergeants, 98 rank and file wounded. 2 drummers, 38 rank and file missing.

“95th regiment: 1 captain, 2 sergeants, 2 drummers, 36 rank and file killed. 2 majors, 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, 8 sergeants, 2 drummers, 73 rank and file wounded. 2 sergeants, 2 drummers, 39 rank and file missing.

“Total: 1 major, 6 captains, 4 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 3 staff, 17 sergeants, 4 drummers, 65 rank and file killed. 3 lieutenant-colonels, 5 majors, 15 captains, 30 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 2 staff, 1 volunteer, 41 sergeants, 11 drummers, 540 rank and file wounded. 2 staff, 1 quartermaster, 4 sergeants, 5 drummers, 196 rank and file missing.

“Names of officers killed: Light battalion, Major Trotter of the 87th regiment. Lieutenant Hamilton of ditto. 6th Dragoon Guards:

Captain Burrell. 9th Light Dragoons: Veterinary surgeon Landers. 36th regiment: Captains Williamson and Johnson. 38th regiment: Lieutenant Fallon. 87th regiment: Captains Confidine and Johnson, Lieutenant Barry, Quarter-master Buchanan. 88th regiment: Lieutenant Hall, Ensign McGregor, Assistant-surgeon Ferguson. 95th regiment: Captain Jenkinson.

“Names of officers wounded: Lieutenant Squarry of the Royal Navy, slightly. Lieutenant Maconochie, Royal Artillery, ditto. Lieutenant-colonel Kingston, 6th Dragoon Guards, severely. Lieutenant Cowdale, 9th Light Dragoons, slightly. Light battalion: Lieutenant-colonel Pack, 71st regiment, slightly. Lieutenant-colonel Cadogan, 18th regiment, ditto. Lieutenant Smith, 40th regiment, severely. Captain Greenwell, 45th regiment, ditto. Lieutenant Cox, 87th regiment, slightly. Lieutenant Nickle, 88th regiment, ditto. Lieutenant Bury, of ditto, slightly. Captain Brookman, 71st regiment, dangerously. Lieutenant Adamson, of ditto, severely. 5th regiment, Honourable Major King, slightly. 36th regiment, Captain

Swain, severely. Captain Vernon, slightly. Captain Wingfield, severely. Lieutenant Cotton, ditto. Lieutenant Challoner, slightly. Lieutenant White, severely. Lieutenant Whittel, ditto. 38th regiment: Ensign Wiltshire, severely. Volunteer Henry de Wall, ditto. 45th regiment: Captain Payne, severely. Lieutenant Moore, ditto. 47th regiment: Lieutenant Rutledge, severely.

“ 87th regiment: Major Miller severely, Captain Rose dangerously, Captain Blake slightly, Captain Des Barros ditto, Captain Gordon severely, Lieutenant Love, slightly, Lieutenant Hill ditto, Lieutenant O'Brien severely, Lieutenant Budd slightly, Lieutenant Fitzgerald and Assistant-surgeon Buxton dangerously.

“ 88th regiment: Major Iremonger slightly, Captain McPherson ditto, Captain Chisholm ditto, Captain Dunn ditto, Captain Thompson ditto, Lieutenant Adair severely, Lieutenant Graydon ditto, Lieutenant Whittle ditto, Lieutenant Buller ditto, Lieutenant Mackie slightly,\*

\* He was shot through the leg and through the body.—*Author*.

Lieutenant Gregg ditto, Adjutant Robertson ditto.

“75th regiment: Major McLeod slightly, Major Travers ditto, Captain O’Hara severely, Lieutenant Cardoux ditto, Lieutenant McLeod ditto, Lieutenant Scott ditto, Lieutenant Turner ditto, Lieutenant McCulloch slightly.

“Names officers missing. 36th regiment: Surgeon Boyce, Assistant-surgeon Read.

“Recapitulation. Killed: 1 major, 6 captains, 4 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 3 staff, 18 serjeants, 4 drummers, 279 rank and file; 316 wounded, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 5 majors, 16 captains, 33 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 2 staff, 1 volunteer, 43 serjeants, 11 drummers, 558 rank and file. Missing: 2 staff, 1 quartermaster, 4 serjeants, 5 drummers, 196 rank and file—208. Total, 316 killed, 674 wounded, 208 missing, 1198. The light company of the 71st regiment attached to the light battalion suffered severely, but no correct return of their loss has been received. The prisoners have all been exchanged.”

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“A definitive treaty between the General-in-

chief of His Britannic Majesty and His Catholic Majesty as per the following articles :

“ 1. There shall be from this time a cessation of hostilities on both sides of the river Plata.

“ 2. The troops of His Britannic Majesty shall retain for the period of two months the fortress and place of Monte Video, and as a neutral country there shall be considered a line drawn from San Carlos on the west to Pando on the east, and there shall not be on any part of that line hostilities committed on any side, the neutrality being understood only that the individuals of both nations may live freely under their respective laws, the Spanish subjects being judged by theirs as the English by those of their nation.

“ 3. There shall be on both sides a mutual restitution of prisoners, including not only those which have been taken since the arrival of the troops under Major-general Whitelock, but also those His Britannic Majesty's subjects captured in South America since the commencement of the war.

“ 4. That for the promptest dispatch of the

vessels and troops of His Britannic Majesty, there shall be no impediment thrown in the way of the supplies of provisions which may be requested for Monte Video.

“ 5. A period of ten days from this time is given for the re-embarkation of His Britannic Majesty's troops, to pass to the north side of the river La Plata, with the arms which may actually be in their power, stores and equipage at the most convenient points which may be selected, and during this time provisions may be sold to them.

“ 6. That at the time of the delivery of the place and fortress of Monte Video, which shall take place at the end of the two months fixed in the second article, the delivery will be made in the terms it was found, and with the artillery it had when it was taken.

“ 7. Three officers of rank shall be delivered for and until the fulfilment of the above articles by both parties, being well understood that His Britannic Majesty's officers who have been on their parole cannot serve against South America until their arrival in Europe.

“ Done at the port of Buenos Ayres, the 7th day of July, 1807, signing two of one tenor.

“ JOHN WHITELOCK, Lt.-Gen.

“ SANTIACO LINIERS,

“ CESAR BALBIANI,

“ BERNARD VELASCO.”

“ Canal of Miserala, July 3rd, 1807.

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lieutenant-general Whitelock, that the advanced corps under my command, consisting of three companies of the 95th light battalion, 36th and 88th regiments, with two 3- and two 6-pounders, advanced from the position I had taken up in front of the village of Reduction, and after making a considerable *détour*, from the badness of the roads, I crossed the Chuelo at the Chico pass ; from thence I continued my route through very strongly inclosed and difficult ground, till the head of the column arrived at the junction of two roads, about five hundred yards from the Canal of Miserala. At the same moment that we discovered the enemy they commenced a heavy,



though after the first round not well-directed, fire of shot and shells. My artillery having been left in the rear, under the protection of three companies of Brigadier-general Lumley's brigade, owing to the inability of the horses to bring it up at the same rate at which the infantry marched, I directed immediate attack to be made on their left flank, with the bayonet, which was executed by Brigadier-general Crawford in the most perfect manner with his brigade; and he was so well seconded by the gallantry of Lieutenant-colonel Pack, and Major Traverse, the officers and men of the 95th, and light battalion, that in five minutes the enemy's force, though strongly posted behind hedges and embankments, gave way; leaving about sixty killed and seventy prisoners, with all their artillery, consisting of nine guns, one howitzer, three tumblers with limbers complete.

"I beg to state that the conduct of every officer and soldier engaged was admirable, and that I am also under great obligations to Brigadier-general Lumley for his exertions to take a share in the action, but which alone the very exhausted state of his regiment, from

the severity of the march, prevented. Immediately after I formed, I found that he had a good position on the right of the light brigade to support it in case of re-attack. I am happy to add, our loss has been but trifling, not exceeding fourteen rank and file, killed, five officers, and twenty-five rank and file wounded. The exact returns I have not been able to obtain.

“I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “J. LEVESON GOWER,  
“Major-general.

“Lieutenant-colonel Torrens, Military Secretary.”

On the following morning Lieutenant-general Whitelock consented, at the instance of the Spanish commander, to desist from further hostilities, and to evacuate the place, on condition of having the captured regiments released.

The conduct of the Spanish towards the “Connaught Rangers,” after its surrender, was marked by much kindness, and few instances occurred of officers being plundered. Captain M’Gregor was robbed of his gold watch by a black soldier, but recovered it again three days

afterwards, upon pointing out the man to a Spanish officer. The same officer was afterwards introduced by Captain Parker Carroll, who remained in the country as one of the British hostages, to General Liniers, and invited by the General to breakfast. The room in which he was received was decorated with coloured drawings of the different corps of militia and volunteers, which had been raised within the last few months, and whose officers appeared to be of all hues and colours, from the real jet black to the mulatto, tawny, and even the pale mestee.

The General, who entered freely into conversation with his guest, asked Captain M'Gregor what he thought of the troops by whose portraitures he was surrounded? Receiving, of course, a complimentary answer, he replied, "Ay, it is I who have done all this for them, those Spaniards knew nothing of military tactics until I arrived amongst them." He spoke in terms of high praise of Brigadier-general Beresford, and said they were indebted to that officer for teaching them how to defend the town.

On the 10th of July, the "Connaught Rangers" re-embarked at Buenos Ayres, and descended the river Plate, to Monte Video, at which place it arrived on the 18th; on the 8th of August, it sailed with the first division of the army for England, and after a tedious and boisterous passage, made Spithead on the 5th, and landed at Portsmouth on the 8th of November, 1807. During the voyage it lost two officers by death: Lieutenant Lawson and Ensign Jackson.

In February, 1807, while the regiment was abroad, engaged in the arduous services just detailed, its Colonel, General John Reid,\* died.

\* General Reid was head of an ancient Scotch family, and served as Lieutenant in Loudon's Highlanders in 1745. In 1759, he was appointed Major of the 42nd, in which regiment he continued until 1771. In 1780, he was appointed Colonel of the 95th Foot, a newly-raised regiment, and continued to command it until it was disbanded in 1783. In 1794, as stated in the text, he became Colonel of the "Connaught Rangers." His commissions as general officer were, Major-general, October 19th, 1781, Lieutenant-general, October 12th, 1793, and General, January 1st, 1798.

He was succeeded in the command by W. Carr Beresford, at that time senior Lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, with the rank of Colonel in the army. Such an instance of promotion is unusual in the service at the present period, and must be considered, therefore, as highly complimentary, not only to Colonel Beresford, but also to the "Connaught Rangers," of which he had been for so many years the acting commander.

Soon after its arrival in England the battalion was marched into Sussex, and from thence to Ashford, in Kent. From Ashford it was moved, in the spring of 1808, to Maldon, in Essex, where it received a draft of four hundred men from the second battalion. This detachment had unfortunately contracted the ophthalmia in Hilsea barracks; and notwithstanding all the precautions that were taken to prevent the contagion spreading, upwards of two hundred men were in a short time afflicted with the disease, nor was it until towards October that the battalion again became quite effective.

"On the 28th of December the "Connaught Rangers" sailed from Falmouth for the Peninsula, but encountered in the Bay of Biscay a gale of

three weeks' duration, by which the transports, on board which it was embarked, were at length forced into Cork, and detained there until the 21st of February following. While at Cork, Colonel Duff, to the great regret both of officers and soldiers, quitted the regiment, in consequence of the death of his uncle, the Earl of Fife, and the command devolved on Major Vandeleur.

The original destination of the 88th was Cadiz, off which city it arrived on the 6th of March, 1809; but the Spanish government refusing to receive any British troops into the fortress, it was ordered to Lisbon, where it landed on the 13th, and being brigaded with the 87th, was marched early in April to Coimbra.

About this time, two of its non-commissioned officers, Sergeant-major Nicolas Torrence, and Quarter-master-sergeant William Hill, were promoted to commissions in the Portuguese army, of which the Colonel of the 88th (Lieutenant-general Beresford) was Commander-in-chief, with the rank of Field-marshal.

When the combined British and Portuguese army moved from Lisbon to the north of Portugal, to expel Marshal Soult from Oporto,

the 88th was one of the regiments attached to the Portuguese army, under Marshal Beresford, destined to act upon the Upper Douro, and in the province of Tras los Montes, and intercept the retreat of the French.

The march upon Amarante, the passage of the Douro, and the occupation of Oporto, are justly ranked high among the many brilliant achievements of the Duke of Wellington; nevertheless, the very nature of the service in which the 88th was engaged unquestionably tended to put to severe trial the discipline of every corps employed in it: the rapidity and length of the marches; the very unfavourable state of the weather; the obstacles presented by the nature of the country in the Tras los Montes, where the men were frequently obliged to use torch-light, to avoid the risk of being dashed to pieces in the craggy paths they were forced to traverse; the hospitality of the peasantry, who, totally ignorant of the imperious demands of military duty, were loud in commiserating, and anxious to alleviate the hard fate of their deliverers, thus compelled to march through their country in such inclement weather, and at

such unseasonable hours ; all offered temptation to straggling, which it is not at all wonderful that the men in many instances yielded to.

The best regulated army during a campaign, even if carried on under the most favourable circumstances, always becomes more or less relaxed in its discipline ; and when it is considered that the wreck of the "Connaught Rangers," after its capture at Buenos Ayres, was made up by drafts from the second battalion, that a few short months only were allowed it to recruit and re-organize before it was again employed in Portugal, it may be matter of regret, but certainly not of surprise, that it did not form an exception to the general rule.

In fact, many men were left behind, and some period of repose was necessary to remedy the irregularities ; but that repose could not be obtained, for towards the close of June the whole disposable British force was marched into Spain, and on the 27th and 28th of July was fought the battle of Talavera de la Reyna, to which I shall devote a new chapter.

A laughable circumstance took place about this time with a regiment that had been unsuc-



cessful on a few occasions ; but in crossing a river, under a heavy fire, it behaved admirably, and carried all obstacles opposed to it. The old Serjeant-major (an Irishman) was so delighted with the conduct of his corps, that he took off his cap and shouted : “ Well done, —th ; for once in your lives, forget yourselves ! ”

There was a general feeling of discontent in England against the Commandant of the troops (General Whitelock) that fought at Buenos Ayres, and several violent paragraphs against him appeared in the newspapers of the day ; amongst them were the following lines :

“ My first is an emblem of purity,  
My second 'gainst thieves a security,  
My *tout* is a name, which if yours was the same,  
You'd blush to hand down to futurity.”

## CHAPTER IV.

## COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH.

THE hill on the left of the British army was the key of the whole position. It was steep and rugged on the side towards the French, and it was rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom ; but towards the English side it was of a smoother ascent.

Victor, however, observing that the extreme summit was unoccupied, and that Donkin's brigade was feeble, conceived the design of seizing it by a sudden assault.

The sun was sinking ; and the twilight and the confusion among the Spaniards on the right, appeared so favourable to his project that, with-

out communicating with the King, he immediately directed Ruffin's division to attack, Villatte to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German Legion, so as to create a diversion for Ruffin, but without engaging seriously himself.

The assault was quick and vigorous ; Colonel Donkin beat back the enemy in his front, but his force was too weak to defend every part ; and many of the French turned his left, and mounted to the summit behind him.

At this moment, General Hill was ordered to reinforce him, and it was not yet dark when that officer, while giving orders to the Colonel of the 48th regiment, was fired at by some troops from the highest point. Thinking they were stragglers from his own ranks, firing at the enemy, he rode quickly up to them, followed by his Brigade-major, Fordyce ; and in a moment was in the midst of the French.

Fordyce was killed, and Hill's own horse was wounded by a grenadier, who immediately seized the bridle ; but the General, spurring the animal hard, broke the man's hold, and galloping down the descent met the 29th regiment, and, without

an instant's delay, led them up with such a fierce charge, that the enemy could not sustain the shock.

The summit was thus recovered ; and the 48th regiment, and the first battalion of detachments, were immediately brought forward, and, in conjunction with the 29th and Colonel Donkin's brigade, presented a formidable front of defence ; and in good time, for the troops just beaten back were only a part of the 9th French regiment, forming the advance of Ruffin's division ; but the two other regiments of that division had lost their way in the ravine ; hence the attack had not ceased, but only subsided for a time.

Lapisse was in motion, and soon after opened his fire against the German Legion ; and all the battalions of the 9th being re-formed in one mass, again advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled vigour. The fighting then became vehement, and in the darkness the opposing flashes of the musketry showed with what a resolute spirit the struggle was maintained, for the combatants were scarcely twenty yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed

doubtful ; but soon the well-known shout of the British soldier was heard rising above the din of arms, and the enemy's broken troops were driven once more into the ravine below.

Lapisse, who had made some impression on the German Legion, immediately abandoned his false attack, and the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost about eight hundred men, and the French about a thousand on that day.

The bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, and the French and British soldiers became quiet ; but about twelve o'clock, the Spaniards on the right being alarmed at some horse in their front, opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which continued for twenty minutes, without any object ; and during the night the whole line was frequently disturbed by desultory firing from both the Spanish and English troops, by which several men and officers were unfortunately slain.

The Duke of Belluno, who had learned from the prisoners the exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown to the French generals, now reported his own failure to the

King, and proposed that a second attempt should be made in the morning at daylight; but Marshal Jourdan opposed this as being a partial enterprize, which could not lead to any great result.

Victor, however, was earnest for a trial; and, resting his representation on his intimate knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so home, that he won Joseph's assent, and immediately made dispositions for the attack. The guns of the first corps being formed in one mass on the height corresponding to that on which the English left was posted, were enabled to command the great valley on their own right, to range the summit of the hill in their front, and obliquely to search the whole of the British line to the left, as far as the great redoubt between the allied armies.

Ruffin's division was placed in advance, and Villatte's in rear, of the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine.

Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrook's division.

Latour Maubourg's cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and General Beaumont's cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin.

On the English side, General Hill's division was concentrated ; the cavalry was massed behind the left ; and the park of artillery, and hospitals, established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry and Hill's division.

## CHAPTER V.

## COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.

ABOUT daybreak Ruffin's troops were drawn up, two regiments abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions ; and in this order went forth against the left of the British, a part directly against the front and a part from the valley on the right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid and steady.

They were followed by Villatte's division, and their assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, that rattled round the height, and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The sharp clattering of the musketry succeeded. The French guns were then pointed towards the



British centre and right, the grenadiers instantly closed upon General Hill's division, and the height sparkled with fire.

The inequalities of the ground broke the compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers were overthrown at once; in others, they would not be denied, and reached the summit; but the reserves were always ready to vindicate their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained.

Still the conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy. Hill himself was wounded, and his men were falling fast; but the enemy suffered more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover the retreat of their wounded; but finally, unable to sustain the increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by the reserved play of their powerful artillery.

To this destructive fire no adequate answer

could be made, for the English guns were few, and of small calibre; and when Sir Arthur Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly.

The principal line of the enemy's retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a charge of horse occurred; but the English cavalry, having retired during the night for water and forage, were yet too distant to be of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the mountain, beyond the left, taught the English General that he had committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley, and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose he placed the principal mass of his cavalry there, with the leading squadrons looking into the valley, and having obtained from Cuesta General Bassecour's division of infantry, posted it on the mountain itself, in observation of the French light troops.

Meanwhile the Duke of Albuquerque, discon-

tented with Cuesta's arrangements, came with his division to Sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen six lines in depth.

Immediately after the failure of Ruffin's attack, King Joseph, having in person examined the whole position of the allies from left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a general battle. The former replied, that the great valley and the mountain being unoccupied on the 27th, Sir Arthur Wellesley's attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the Spaniards ; that during the night the whole army should have been silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley, ready, at daybreak, to form a line of battle on the left to a new front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been twice repulsed.

Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the allies to change their front also, and during this operation they might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project could not now be executed ; the English,

aware of their mistake, had secured their left flank, by occupying the valley and the mountain, and their front was unattackable. Hence, the only prudent line was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of Soult's operations on the English rear.

Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided the fourth corps would attack the right and centre at the same moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a combination failed, "It was time to renounce making war."

The King was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan's, but he feared that Victor would cause the Emperor to believe a great opportunity had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared that his force could only reach Placentia between the 3rd and 5th of August. Now, a detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared near Toledo, and that General's advance-guard was approaching Aranjuez.

The King was troubled by the danger thus threatening Madrid, because all the stores, the reserve artillery, and the general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there ; and, moreover, the tolls received at the gates of that town formed almost the only pecuniary resource of his court—so narrowly did Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war.

These considerations overpowered his judgment, and, adopting the worse and rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succour the capital ; but before separating the army, he determined to try the chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war.

Joseph should have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult ; the advantages were obvious, the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid was nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary ; but if the King thought otherwise, he should have decided to fight for it at once. He should have drawn the fifth corps to him, prepared his plans, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon Cuesta ; the 26th, his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening, and before twelve

o'clock on the 27th, the English army would have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier.

But after neglecting the most favourable opportunity when his army was full of ardour, he now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give battle when his enemies were completely prepared, strongly posted, and in the pride of success, and when the confidence of his own troops was shaken by the partial action of the morning.

While the French Generals were engaged in council, the troops on both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger, the regular service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces of wheat, in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly.

The Spanish camp was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror, but no confidence; and Albuquerque, whether from conviction, or instigated by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final

attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that Cuesta was betraying him. The aide-de-camp charged with this message delivered it to Colonel Donkin, and that officer carried it to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

The latter, seated on the summit of the hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching the movements of the advancing enemy ; he listened to this somewhat startling message without so much as turning his head, and then drily answering, " Very well ; you may return to your brigade," continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of the man ; and, indeed, Sir Arthur's conduct was, throughout that day, such as became a General upon whose vigilance and intrepidity the fate of fifty thousand men depended.

## CHAPTER VI.

## BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

THE dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin's division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley, and moving by the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left.

Villatte's orders were to menace the contested height with one brigade, and to guard the valley with another, which, being strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, connected Ruffin's movement with the main attack.

Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg's dragoons, and by the King's reserve, was instructed to pass the ravine in front of the



English centre, and to fall with half his infantry upon Sherbrook's division ; while the other half, connecting its attack with Villatte's brigade, mounted the hill and made a third effort to master that important point.

Milhaud's dragoons were left on the main road opposite Talavera, to keep the Spaniards in check ; but the rest of the heavy cavalry was brought into the centre behind General Sebastiani, who, with the fourth corps, was to assail the right of the British army. A part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte's brigade in the valley, and a part remained in reserve.

A number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the principal mass remained on the hill, with the reserve of light cavalry ; where also the Duke of Belluno stationed himself, to direct the movements of the first corps.

From nine o'clock in the morning until mid-day, the field of battle offered no appearance of hostility. The weather was intensely hot, and the troops on both sides descended and mingled, without fear or suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook which divided the positions ; but at one o'clock in the afternoon, the French

soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the rolling of drums was heard along the whole line.

Half an hour later, the King's Guards, the reserve, and the fourth corps were descried, near the centre of the enemy's position, marching to join the first corps; and, at two o'clock, the table-land and the height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered with the dark and lowering masses.

At this moment, some hundreds of British soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear, returned in one body, and were, by the French, supposed to be Sir Robert Wilson's corps joining the army; nevertheless, the Duke of Belluno, whose arrangements were now completed, gave the signal for battle, and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest of bullets before the light troops, who, coming on swiftly and with the violence of a hail-storm, were closely followed by the broad, black columns, in all the majesty of war.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear view of the whole field of battle; and first he saw the fourth corps rush

forwards with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, and clearing the intersected ground in their front, falling upon Campbell's division with infinite fury ; but that General, assisted by Mackenzie's brigade and by two Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost efforts.

The English regiments, putting the French skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, and breaking in on their front, and lapping their flanks with fire, and giving no respite, pushed them back with a terrible carnage.

Ten guns were taken ; but, as General Campbell prudently forbore pursuit, the French rallied on their supports, and made a show of attacking again—vain attempt ! The British artillery and musketry played too vehemently upon their masses, and a Spanish regiment of cavalry charging on their flank at the same time, the whole retired in disorder, and the victory was secured in that quarter.

But while this was passing on the right, Villatte's division, preceded by the grenadiers, and supported by two regiments of light cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley, against

the left, and beyond Villatte's, Ruffin was discovered marching towards the mountain.

Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson's brigade of cavalry, composed of the 23rd Light Dragoons and the 1st German Hussars, to charge the head of these columns ; and this brigade coming on at a canter, and increasing its speed as it advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but in a few moments came upon the brink of a hollow cliff, which was not perceptible at a distance. The French, throwing themselves into squares, opened their fire ; and Colonel Arentschild, commanding the hussars, an officer whom forty years' experience had made a master in his art, promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in his broken phrase : " I will not kill my young mens."

The English blood was hotter. The 23rd, under Colonel Seymour, rode wildly down into the hollow, and men and horses fell over each other in dreadful confusion. The survivors, still untamed, mounted the opposite bank by twos and threes. Seymour was wounded ; but Major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, rallying all who came up, passed through the

midst of Villatte's columns, and, reckless of the musketry from each side, fell, with inexpressible violence, upon a brigade of French Chasseurs in the rear.

The combat was fierce but short. Victor had perceived the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish Lancers, and Westphalian light horse, to the support of Villatte; and these fresh troops coming up when the 23rd, already overmatched, could scarcely hold up against the Chasseurs, entirely broke them. Those who were not killed or taken, made for Bassecour's Spanish division, and so escaped, leaving behind two hundred and seven men and officers, or about half the number that went into action.

During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the English centre. His own artillery, aided by the great battery on his right, opened large gaps in Sherbrook's ranks, and the French columns came close up to the British line, in the resolution to win; but they were received with a general discharge of all arms, and so

vigorously encountered, that they gave back in disorder; and, in the excitement of the moment, the brigade of English Guards, quitting the line, followed up their success with inconsiderate ardour. The enemy's supporting columns and dragoons advanced, the men who had been repulsed turned again, and the French batteries pounded the flank and front of the guards.

Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at the same moment, the German Legion, being sorely pressed, got into confusion. Hill's and Campbell's divisions, on the extremities of the line, still held fast; but the centre of the British was absolutely broken, and the fate of the day seemed to incline in favour of the French, when suddenly Colonel Donnellan, with the 48th regiment, was seen advancing through the midst of the disordered masses.

At first, it seemed as if this regiment must be carried away by the retiring crowds; but wheeling back by companies, it let them pass through the intervals, and then resuming its proud and beautiful line, marched against the right of the pursuing columns, and plied them

with such a destructive musketry, and closed upon them with such a firm and regular pace, that the forward movement of the French was checked.

The guards and the Germans immediately rallied; a brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot; the artillery battered the enemy's flanks without intermission; and the French, beginning to waver, soon lost their advantage, and the battle was restored.

In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment which will give the victory to the General who knows how to seize it. When the guards first made their rash charge, Sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the 48th down from the hill, although a rough battle was going on there; and, at the same time, he directed Cotton's light cavalry to advance. These dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed their efforts by degrees; the fire of the English grew hotter, and their loud and confident shouts—sure augury of success—were heard along the whole line.

In the hands of a great General, Joseph's

guards and the reserve, which were yet entire, might have restored the combat ; but all combination was at an end on the French side. The fourth corps, beaten back on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in confusion : the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed at the furious charge of the 23rd, and awed by the sight of four distinct lines of cavalry still in reserve, remained stationary.

No impression had been made on the hill. Lapisse himself was mortally wounded ; and, at last, his division giving way, the whole army retired to its position from whence it had descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by skirmishers, and an increasing fire of artillery ; and the British, reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, and exhausted by toil and the want of food, could not pursue.

The Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o'clock all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the morning. But the battle was scarcely over, when the dry grass and shrubs taking fire. a volume of flames passed with inconceivable



rapidity across a part of the field, scorching in its course both the dead and the wounded.

On the British side two generals (Mackenzie and Langworth), thirty-one officers of inferior rank, and seven hundred and sixty-seven serjeants and soldiers were killed upon the spot ; and three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three thousand seven hundred and eighteen serjeants and privates wounded ; nine officers, six hundred and forty-three serjeants and soldiers were missing : thus making a total loss of six thousand two hundred and sixty-eight in the two days' fighting, of which five thousand four hundred and twenty-two fell on the 28th.

The French suffered more severely. Two generals and nine hundred and forty-four killed, six thousand two hundred and ninety-four wounded, and one hundred and fifty-six prisoners, furnishing a total of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers, of which four thousand were of the first corps. Of seventeen guns captured, ten were taken by General Campbell's division, and seven were left in the woods by the French.

The Spaniards returned above twelve hundred men, killed and wounded, but the correctness of the report was very much doubted at the time.

The 29th, at daybreak, the French army quitted its position, and before six o'clock was in order of battle on the heights of Salinas, behind the Alberche. That day, also, General Robert Crauford reached the English camp, with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th, or Rifle regiment, and immediately took charge of the outposts.

These troops, after a march of twenty miles, were in bivouac near Malpartida de Placentia, when the alarm, caused by the fugitive Spanish, spread to that post. Crauford allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the field of battle.

As the brigade advanced, crowds of the run-aways were met with, and those not all Spaniards, propagating the vilest falsehoods: "The army was defeated!" "Sir Arthur

Wellesley was killed !" "The French were only a few miles distant !" and some, blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy's advanced posts on the nearest hills.

Indignant at this shameful scene, the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity of their pace ; and leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours they had crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body, having in that time passed over sixty-two English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the "delicacy of modern soldiers !"

## CHAPTER VII.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1. THE moral courage evinced by Sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less remarkable than the judicious disposition which finally rendered him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of the 28th.

A pitched battle is a great affair. A good General will endeavour to bring all the moral,

as well as the physical force of his army into play at the same time, if he means to win ; and all may be too little.

Marshal Victor's project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy of his reputation ; and it is possible that he might have placed his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and by a sudden and general attack have carried the key of the position, and so commenced his battle well ; but Sir Arthur Wellesley's resources would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such a movement, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy in check with his left wing and cavalry ; while the right, marching upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been reinforced by Wilson's corps, which was near Cazolegas, and the contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation.

The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a complete victory ; but the allies would, even though defeated, have ensured their junction with Venegas. Madrid

and Toledo would have fallen, and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of operations through the fertile country of La Mancha would have been obtained. But these matters are only speculative.

2. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a single division, was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be seen in the valley ; how then could a single division hope to develop its attack upon the hill, when five thousand horsemen were hanging upon its flank ? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin's, and the half of Villatte's division, were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment.

To have rendered this movement formidable, the principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march of the infantry ; but the great error was fighting at all before Soult reached Placentia.

3. It has been said, that to complete the victory Sir Arthur Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance ; but this would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta

nor his troops were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of the first and fourth corps were still above twenty thousand strong, and although repulsed, by no means a discomfited force.

The cavalry, the King's guards, and Desolle's division, had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat the Spaniards. A second panic, such as that of the 27th, would have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those, who know with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse, will readily acknowledge.

This battle was one of hard, honest fighting, and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honoured the nation to which they belonged. The English owed much to the General's dispositions, and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to their commander. But when it is considered that only the reserve of their infantry was withheld from the great attack on the 28th, and that, consequently, above thirty thousand men were closely and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand British, it must be confessed

that the latter proved themselves to be truly formidable soldiers ; yet the greatest part were raw men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments, that many of them still bore the number of their former regiments on their accoutrements \*

\* Napier.



## CHAPTER VIII.

## REMARKS BY THE AUTHOR.

A CURIOUS and laughable circumstance occurred at one portion of the battle. Ten thousand Spaniards, who were posted on the right near Talavera, were menaced by a small body of French troops ; the entire ten thousand Spaniards discharged a volley from every musket they carried, and having done so without the least effect, took to their heels as if frightened by their own fire. One of Lord Wellington's staff rode up to him and said :  
“ My Lord, do you see that ? ”

“ I do,” replied his Lordship, “ and I have seen many curious things during my sojourn in

this world, but it is the first time I ever saw ten thousand men running a *race* together."

The loss of the "Connaught Rangers" in this battle, amounted to six officers and one hundred and thirty non-commissioned officers and privates. The officers were Captains Blake, Graydon, and Whittle, and Lieutenant McCarthy killed; and Captain Browne and Lieutenant Whitelow wounded.

On the day of the battle (28th July, 1809), the "Connaught Rangers" did not discharge one musket-shot; and their loss was chiefly, if not altogether, caused by the heavy cannonade they were obliged to receive. This was a severe trial to a regiment, the greater portion of which had but lately joined from the militia; but those men were as steady as the oldest veteran.

The grenadiers, commanded by Captain Dunne, suffered a severe loss; but he, with immovable coolness, walked up and down in front of his company. When a man fell, he would turn round and ask his serjeant the name of the soldier struck down. At last a

round-shot passed through the ranks, and carried off the heads of two of the grenadiers.

“Who is that now?” asked Dunne.

“Casey and Dumphy,” was the reply of the serjeant.

“I am sorry for both, but particularly for Dumphy: he was in debt to the amount of four pounds, fifteen shillings, and ten pence.”

Had General Cuesta followed the advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley, it is probable this battle would never have been fought. Sir Arthur wished that a combined attack should be made before the reinforcements expected by Victor arrived, but the old Spanish General was deaf to all remonstrance on the part of Sir Arthur, alleging, amongst other reasons, that he did not wish to “fight on a Sunday.”

“But,” said he, “why need we be in such a hurry? Surely Monday or Tuesday will answer as well!”

The General then took leave of Sir Arthur in the same manner he had arrived—that is to say, in his carriage drawn by four mules, and supported on each side by a feather bed!

Victor's advance retreated in the night, and thus was lost the fair prospect of cutting off this advanced corps to a man.

After the battle, Sir Arthur determined on making a rapid march upon Almaraz, which pass he only gained by a few minutes before the arrival of the advance of the army of the Duke of Dalmatia. This army counted thirty thousand men, and was composed of some of the best troops in the Imperial army. Had Sir Arthur been less prompt in his march upon this important point, he and his army would have been destroyed; because Soult, with thirty thousand men, was in his front, while the Duke of Belluno, with an army of forty thousand men, was in his rear. Cuesta and his army fled from Talavera, contrary to his promise of defending that post; and the Spanish army and their General dispersed, and never rendered the British General the least support. On the contrary, they scattered themselves over the country, laying waste everything they met with, and even plundered the baggage of the British army.

While Sir Arthur maintained his post at

Almaraz, his troops were nearly famished. For several days after the battle of Talavera, their daily rations were half-a-pound of wheat in the grain, a few ounces of flour twice in the week, and a quarter of a pound of goat's flesh; and regiments, which a few weeks before were capable of exertions that were never equalled during the remainder of the Peninsula contest, were now unable to get through an ordinary march!

After some days' stay at Almaraz, Sir Arthur made his contemplated march, and crossing the Tagus, established his army in the neighbourhood of Campo Mayor, Badajoz, and other towns. The head-quarters of Sir Arthur was Badajoz.

The sickness in the army increased considerably, particularly among the officers, who fared no better than the soldiers, and had frequently nothing but water to drink, and nothing but meat, without salt, to eat, and seldom any bread for the last month. "Indeed there are few, if any, officers or soldiers of the army, who, though doing their duty, are not more or less affected by dysentery, and the whole lie out; and nothing can be got for them in

this part of the country." (Despatch, dated Truxhillo, 21st August, 1809.)

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The "Connaught Rangers" were stationed at Campo Mayor, where Colonel Alexander Wallace joined, and took the command of the battalion. He here set the example of forming a regimental mess, which was followed by other regiments; but the "Connaught Rangers" were ever remarkable for the friendliness and cordiality that reigned throughout the corps.

About this time Colonel Donkin, who commanded the brigade, quitted the army, addressing a letter, previously to his departure, to Colonel Wallace, from which I extract the following passages :

"The distinguished bravery of the 88th regiment at Talavera, I shall ever reflect upon with admiration. And this splendid quality has been set off, first, by the utmost patience under the greatest fatigues and privations, and latterly, by the most exemplary behaviour, while in a state of repose.

“ I request you will be pleased to accept for yourself and your gallant corps, my warmest acknowledgments and best wishes, and convey to it my sincere assurance that should the chance of service ever place it again under my command, it will be one of the highest gratifications that I can receive,” &c., &c.

Now this letter of Colonel Donkin (afterwards Sir Rufane Donkin) gives a far different account of the “ Connaught Rangers” than does the biographer of the late Sir Thomas Picton ; and I am of opinion that the Colonel knew more about the merits of that corps than either the “ biographer ” or his “ informants,” whose names he has hidden from the readers of his work.

I will here give an extract from the brigade orders of Sir T. Brisbane, who commanded the brigade of which the “ Connaught Rangers ” formed a portion, for several years ; it is dated upwards of five years subsequently to the letter of Sir R. Donkin, which is a strong proof that the “ Connaught Rangers” were thought as highly of by Sir T. Brisbane in 1815, as they were by Sir R. Donkin in 1809 :

“ St. John’s, May 19, 1815.

“ No men having deserted from the 88th regiment, they will not be required to attend at Chambly for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the sentence of a general court-martial on several deserters.”

And again, on the 26th of May, 1815, we have the following brigade order :

“ Major-general Sir Thomas Brisbane was much pleased this day with the general appearance and movements of the 88th regiment. He cannot refrain from expressing how much and how sincerely he regrets losing a regiment with which he has so long served, and which has conducted itself so creditably since its arrival in this country ; but he confidently looks forward to have it again in his brigade. The circumstance of the regiment *never having lost a man by desertion* is highly honourable to it, and can never be forgotten by the Major-general.”

(Signed)

“ J. CAMBELL, ;

“ Brigade-major.

“ St. John’s, May 26, 1815.”



I wonder what will the biographer of the late Sir Thomas Picton say should he ever throw his eye over those two documents I have quoted ?

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

ON the 16th of May, 1813, the splendid Peninsular army broke up from its cantonments and left — and for ever—those provinces in which they had been everywhere victorious. The morning was fine, and a bright sun cast its rays on one hundred thousand firelocks and fifteen thousand sabres. The ground shook under the weight of one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon ; and it was a fine and dazzling sight ! But the Portuguese people, although they were delighted and shed tears of joy at the prospect of their country being for ever freed from French rule, also shed tears, and bitter ones too, at the certainty that many of their husbands, sons,

brothers, and friends, would never return to give a detail of the glorious exploits they were about to perform.

I say this was a trying scene, and though a glorious one in some respects, was a heart-rending one in others. However, we parted, and never saw those good people or their country again.

On the 27th of May, the army under Lord Wellington entered Spain, and on the 20th of June it was posted near the river Bayas ; this brought his army within a short distance from the town of Vittoria, where, on the following day, that great and signal battle was fought, and like all those that had preceded it—won !

#### BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

At daybreak on the 21st, the weather being rainy, with a thick vapour, the troops moved from their camps on the Bayas, and the centre of the army, advancing by columns from the right and left of the line, passed the ridges in front, and entering the basin of Vittoria slowly approached the Zadora.

The left-hand column pointed to Mendoza, the right-hand column skirted the ridge of Morillas, on the other side of which Hill was marching ; and that General having seized the village of Puebla about ten o'clock, commenced passing the river there.

Morillo's Spaniards led, and their first brigade moving on a by-way, assailed the mountain to the right of the great road. The ascent was so steep, that the soldiers appeared to climb rather than to walk up ; and the second Spanish brigade, being to connect the first with the British troops below, ascended only half-way. Little or no opposition was made until the first brigade was near the summit, when a sharp skirmishing commenced, and Morillo was wounded, but would not quit the field ; his second brigade joined him, and the French, feeling the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin with a fresh regiment.

Then Hill succoured Morillo with the 71st regiment and a battalion of light infantry, both under Colonel Cadogan ; yet the fight was doubtful, for though the British secured the summit, and gained ground along the side of the moun-

tain, Cadogan, a brave officer and of high promise, fell; and Gazan calling Villatte's division from behind Ariñez, sent it to the succour of his side; and so strongly did these troops fight, that the battle remained stationary, the allies being scarcely able to hold their ground.

Hill, however again sent fresh troops to their assistance, and with the remainder of his corps passing the Zadora, threaded the long defile of Puebla and fiercely issuing forth on the other side won the village of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan's line; he thus connected his own right with the troops on the mountain, and maintained this forward position in despite of the enemy's vigorous efforts to dislodge him.

Meanwhile Wellington had brought the fourth and light divisions, the heavy cavalry, the hussars, and D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, from Subijana, Morillas and Montevite, down by Ollabarre to the Zadora. The fourth division was placed opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the light division opposite the bridge of Villados, both well covered by rugged ground and wood; and the light division was so close to the water, that their skirmishers could, with

ease have killed the French gunners of the advanced post in the loop of the river at Villados.

The weather had cleared up ; and when Hill's battle began, the riflemen of the light division, spreading along the bank, exchanged a biting fire with the enemy's skirmishers ; but no serious effort was made, because the third and seventh divisions, meeting with rough ground, had not reached their point of attack ; and it would have been imprudent to push the fourth division and the cavalry over the bridge of Nanclares, and thus crowd a great body of troops in front of the Puebla defile before the other divisions were ready to attack the right and centre of the enemy.

While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington that the bridge of Tres Puentes, on the left of the light division, was unguarded, and offered to guide the troops over it. Kempt's brigade of the light division was instantly directed towards this point, and being concealed by some rocks from the French, and well led by the brave peasant, they passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a steep

curving rise of ground, and halted close under the crest on the enemy's side of the river, being then actually behind the King's advanced post, and within a few hundred yards of his line of battle.

Some French cavalry immediately approached, and two round-shots were fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted; but as no movement of attack was made, Kempt called the 15th Hussars over the river, and they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge one by one, horseman after horseman; and still the French remained torpid, showing there was an army there, but no General.

It was now one o'clock. Hill's assault on the village of Subijana de Alava was developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up the Zadora, on the enemy's extreme right, being followed by the dull sound of distant guns, showed that Graham's attack had also commenced. Then the King, finding both his flanks in danger, caused his reserve about Gomecha to file off towards Vittoria, and

gave Gazan orders to retire by successive masses with the army of the south.

But at that moment the third and seventh divisions having reached their ground, were seen moving rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza, the enemy's artillery opened upon them, a body of cavalry drew near the bridge, and the French light troops, which were very strong, then commenced a vigorous musketry.

Some British guns replied to the French cannon from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt's forward position was instantly made manifest ; for Colonel Andrew Barnard, springing forward, led the riflemen of the light division, in the most daring manner, between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely, that the English artillery men, thinking his darkly-clothed troops were enemies, played upon both alike.

This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass the bridge of Mendoza without opposition ; the other brigade forded the river higher up, and the seventh division and Vandeleur's brigade of the light division



followed. The French advanced post immediately abandoned the ground in front of Villados, and the battle which had before somewhat slackened, revived with extreme violence.

Hill pressed the enemy harder, the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, the smoke and sound of Graham's attack became more distinct, and the banks of the Zadora presented a continuous line of fire.

However, the French, weakened in the centre by the draft made of Villatte's division, and having their confidence shaken by the King's order to retreat, were in evident perplexity; and no regular retrograde movement could be made, the allies were too close.

The seventh division, and Colville's brigade of the third division, which had forded the river, formed the left of the British, and they were immediately engaged with the French right in front of Margarita and Hermandad. Almost at the same time, Lord Wellington, seeing the hill in front of Ariñez nearly denuded of troops, by the withdrawal of Villatte's troops, carried Picton and the rest of the third division in

close columns of regiments, at a running pace, diagonally across the front of both armies, towards that central point. This attack was headed by Barnard's riflemen, and followed by the remainder of Kempt's brigade, and the hussars, but the other brigade of the light division acted in support of the seventh division.

At the same time General Cole advanced with the fourth division from the bridge of Nanclares; and the heavy cavalry—a splendid body—also passing the river, galloped up, squadron after squadron, into the plain ground, between Cole's right and Hill's left.

The French, thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for a retreat, threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, and fifty pieces of artillery played with astonishing activity. To answer this fire, Wellington brought over several brigades of British guns, and both sides were shrouded by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under cover of which the French retired by degrees to the second range of heights in front of Gomecha, on which their reserve had been posted, but they still held the village of Ariñez, on the main road.

Picton's troops, headed by the riflemen, plunged into that village, amidst a heavy fire of muskets and artillery, and in an instant three guns were captured : but the post was unimportant. Fresh French troops came down, and for some time the smoke, and dust, and clamour, the flashing of the fire-arms, and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed with the thundering of the guns, were terrible ; yet finally the British troops issued forth victorious on the other side.

During this conflict the seventh division, reinforced by Vandeleur's brigade of the light division, was heavily raked by a battery at the village of Margarita, until the 52nd regiment, led by Colonel Gibbs, with an impetuous charge drove the French guns away and carried the village, and at the same time the 87th, under Colonel Gough, won the village of Hermandad.

Then the whole advanced, fighting on the left of Picton's attack, and on the right hand of that General the fourth division also made way, though more slowly, because of the rugged ground.

When Picton and Kempt's brigade had car-

ried the village of Aríñez and gained the main road, the French troops near Subijana de Alava were turned, and being hard pressed on their front and on their left flank by the troops on the summit of the mountain, fell back for two miles in a disordered mass, striving to regain the great line of retreat to Vittoria.

It was thought that some cavalry launched against them at the moment would have totally disorganized the whole French battle, and secured several thousand prisoners, but this was not done. The confused multitude shooting ahead of the advancing British lines recovered order, and as the ground was exceedingly diversified, being in some places wooded, in others open, here covered with high corn, there broken by ditches, vineyards and hamlets, the action for six miles resolved itself into a running fight and cannonade, the dust and smoke and tumult of which filled all the basin, passing onwards towards Vittoria.

Many guns were taken as the army advanced ; and at six o'clock the French reached the last defensible height, one mile in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the city

stood, and beyond the city thousands of carriages and animals and non-combatants, men, women and children, were crowding together, in all the madness of terror; and as the English shot went booming overhead, the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay for army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation.

However, the courage of the French soldier was not yet quelled. Reille, on whom everything now depended, maintained his post on the Upper Zadora, and the armies of the south and centre drawing up on their last heights, between the villages of Ali and Armentia, made their muskets flash like lightning, while more than eighty pieces of artillery, massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen, bounding with a frantic energy.

This terrible cannonade and musketry kept the allies in check, and scarcely could the third

division, which was still the foremost, and bore the brunt of this storm, maintain its advanced position.

Again the battle became stationary, and the French generals had commenced drawing off their infantry in succession from the right wing, when suddenly the fourth division rushing forward, carried the hill on the French left, and the heights were at once abandoned.

It was at this very moment that Joseph, finding the royal road so completely blocked by carriages that the artillery could not pass, indicated the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat, and the army went off in a confused yet compact body on that side, leaving Vittoria on its left.

The British infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped through the town to intercept the new line of retreat, which was through a marsh; but this road also was choked with carriages and fugitive people, while on each side there were deep drains.

Thus all became disorder and mischief; the guns were left on the edge of the marsh, the artillerymen and drivers fled with the horses,

and breaking through the miserable multitude, the vanquished troops went off by Metanco towards Salvatierra; however, their cavalry still covered the retreat with some vigour, and many of those generous horsemen were seen taking up children and women to carry off from the dreadful scene.

The result of the last attack had placed Reille, of whose battle it is now time to treat, in great danger. His advanced troops under Sarrut had been placed at the village of Arangens, and they also occupied some heights on their right, which covered both the bridges of Ariaga and Gumara Mayor; but they had been driven from both the village and the height a little after twelve o'clock by General Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham's column, consisting of the fifth division, Longa's Spaniards, and Pack's Portuguese.

Longa then seized Gumara Mayor on the Durango road, while another detachment gained the royal road still further on the left, and forced the Franco-Spaniards to retire from Durana.

Thus the first blow on this side had deprived

the King of his best line of retreat, and confined him to the road of Pampeluna. However, Sarrut re-crossed the river in good order, and a new disposition was made by Reille.

One of Sarrut's brigades defended the bridge of Ariaga and the village of Aluchuco beyond it; the other was in reserve, equally supporting Sarrut and La Martiniere, who defended the bridge of Gumara Mayor and the village of that name beyond the river.

Didgeon's dragoons were formed behind the village of Ariaga, and Reille's own dragoons being called up from Hermandad and Zuayo, took post behind the bridge of Gumara; a brigade of light cavalry was placed on the extreme right to sustain the Franco-Spanish troops, who were now on the Upper Zadora in front of Betonia, and the remainder of the light cavalry, under General Cuesta, was on the French left, extending down the Zadora between Ariaga and Govea.

Oswald commenced the attack at Gumara with some guns and Robinson's brigade of the fifth division. Longa's Spaniards were to have led, and at an early hour when Gumara was



feebly occupied ; but they did not stir, and the village was meanwhile reinforced.

However, Robinson's brigade being formed in three columns made the assault at a running pace. At first the fire of artillery and musketry was so heavy that the British troops stopped and commenced firing also, and the three columns got intermixed, yet encouraged by their officers, and especially by the example of General Robinson, an inexperienced man, but of a high and daring spirit, they renewed the charge, broke through the village, and even crossed the bridge.

One gun was captured, and the passage seemed to be won, when Reille suddenly turned twelve pieces upon the village, and La Martiniere rallying his division under cover of this cannonade, retook the bridge ; it was with difficulty the allied troops could even hold the village until they were reinforced.

Then a second British brigade came down, and, the Royals leading, the bridge was again carried, but again these new troops were driven back in the same manner as the others had been. Thus the bridge remained forbidden ground.

Graham had meanwhile attacked the village of Aluchuco, which covered the bridge of Ariaga, and it was carried at once by Colonel-Halket's Germans, who were supported by Bradford's Portuguese and by the fire of twelve guns; yet here, as at Gumara, the French maintained the bridge, and at both places the troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal fire of artillery and small arms.

Reille, though considerably inferior in numbers, continued to interdict the passage of the river, until the tumult of Wellington's battle coming up the Zadora reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut's rear. Didgeon's dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment; and some time before, Reille, seeing the retrograde movement of the King, had formed a reserve of infantry under General Fririon, at Betonia, which now proved his safety; for Sarrut was killed at the bridge of Ariaga, and General Menne, the next in command could scarcely draw off his troops while Didgeon's dragoons held the British cavalry at point; but with the

aid of Fririon's reserve, Reille covered the movement and rallied all his troops at Betonia.

He had now to make head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from Ariaga, from Durana, and from Vittoria ; yet he fought his way to Metanco on the Salvatierra road, covering the general retreat with some degree of order.

Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, and neither the resolute demeanour of the French cavalry, which was covered on the flanks by some light troops and made several vigorous charges, nor the night, which now fell, could stop their victorious career until the flying masses of the enemy had cleared all obstacles, and passing Metanco, got beyond the reach of further injury. Thus ended the battle of Vittoria ; the French escaped, indeed, with comparatively little loss of men ; but to use Gazan's words, " They lost all their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure, all their stores, all their papers, so that no man could prove how much pay was due to him ; generals and subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of them were barefooted."

## CHAPTER X.

## THE RETREAT INTO FRANCE.

NEVER was an army more hardly used by its commander, for the soldiers were not half-beaten, and never was a victory more complete. The trophies were innumerable. The French carried off but two pieces of artillery from the battle.

Jourdan's baton of command, a stand of colours, a hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred of which had been used in the fight, all the parks and depots from Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure, everything fell into the hands of the victors.

The loss in men did not, however, exceed

six thousand, exclusive of some hundred of prisoners; the loss of the allies was nearly as great, the gross numbers being five thousand one hundred and seventy-six, killed, wounded, and missing. Of these one thousand and forty-nine were Portuguese, and five hundred and fifty-three were Spanish; hence the loss of the English was more than double that of the Portuguese and Spaniards together, and yet both fought well, and especially the Portuguese; but British troops are the soldiers of battle.

Marshal Jourdan's baton was taken by the 87th regiment, and the spoil was immense; but to such extent was plunder carried, principally by the followers and non-combatants—for, with some exceptions, the fighting troops may be said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up—that of five millions and a half of dollars indicated by the French account to be in the money-chests, not one dollar came to the public; and Wellington sent fifteen officers with power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing the Ebro and the Douro, in hopes to recover the sums so shamefully carried off. Neither was this disgraceful conduct confined

to ignorant and vulgar people. Some officers were seen mixed up with the mob and contending for the disgraceful gain.

On the 22nd, the allies followed the retreating enemy, and Giron and Longa entered Guipuscoa, by the royal road, in pursuit of the convoy which had moved under Maucune, on the morning of the battle; the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese remained at Vittoria, and General Pakenham with the sixth division came up from Medina Pomar; the remainder of the army pursued Joseph towards Pampeluna, for he had continued his retreat up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night.

The weather was rainy, the roads heavy, and the French rear-guard having neither time nor materials to destroy the bridges, set fire to the villages behind them to delay the pursuit. At five o'clock in the morning of the 22nd, Reille had rallied his two divisions and all his cavalry in front of Salvatierra, where he halted until he was assured that all the French had passed, and then continued his march to Huerta, in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles from the field of battle.

Joseph was that day at Yrursun, a town

situated behind one of the sources of the Arga and from which roads branched off to Pampe-luna on one side, and to Tolosa and St. Estevan on the other. At this place he remained all the 23rd, sending orders to different points on the French frontier to prepare provisions and succours for his suffering army; and he directed Reille to proceed rapidly by St. Estevan to the Bidassoa with the infantry, six hundred select cavalry, the artillerymen and horses of the army of Portugal. Meanwhile, Gazan's and D'Erlon's army marched upon Pampeluna, intending to cross the frontier of St. Jean Pied de Port.

Joseph reached Pampeluna on the 24th, but the army bivouacked on the glacis of the fortress, and in such a state of destitution and insubordination that the Governor would not suffer them to enter the town. The magazines were indeed reduced very low by Mina's long blockade, and some writers assert that it was even proposed to blow up the works and abandon the place; however, by great exertions, additional provisions were obtained from the vicinity, the garrison was increased to three thousand men, and the army marched towards France, leaving a

rear-guard at a strong pass about two leagues off.

On the 23rd, Wellington having detached Graham's corps to Guipuscoa by the pass of Adrian, left the fifth division at Salvatierra, and pursued the King with the rest of the army.

On the 24th, the light division and Victor Alten's cavalry came up with the French rear-guard; two battalions of the riflemen immediately pushed the infantry back through the pass, and then Ross's horse-artillery galloping forward, killed several men and dismounted one of the only two pieces of cannon carried off from Vittoria.

On the 25th, the enemy, covered by the fortress of Pampeluna, went up the valley of Roncesvalles. He was followed by the light division, which turned the town as far as Vilalba, and he was harassed by the Spanish irregular troops now swarming on every side.

Meanwhile, Foy and Clauzel were placed on very difficult positions. The former had reached Bergara on the 21st, and the garrison of Bilboa and the Italian division of St. Paul, formerly Pa-



lombine's, had reached Durango ; the first convoy from Vittoria was that day at Bergara, and Maucune was with the second at Montdragon.

On the 22nd the garrison of Castro went off to Santona ; the same day, the fugitives from the battle spread such an alarm through the country that the forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, which commanded the passes into Guipuscoa, were abandoned, and Longa and Giron penetrated them without hindrance.

Foy, who had only one battalion of his division in hand, immediately rallied the fugitive garrisons, and marching upon Montdragon, made some prisoners, and acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he ordered the convoy to move day and night towards France, the troops of Durango to march upon Bergara, and the troops from all the other posts to unite at Tolosa, to which place the artillery, baggage, and sick men were now hastening from every side ; and to cover their concentration, Foy, reinforcing himself with Maucune's troops, gave battle to Giron and Longa, though three times his numbers, at Montdragon ; the Spaniards

had the advantage, and the French fell back, yet slowly and fighting, to Bergara, but they lost two hundred and fifty men and six guns.

On the 23rd, Foy marched to Villa Real de Guipuscoa, and that evening, the head of Graham's column having crossed the Mutiol mountain by the pass of Adrian, descended upon Segura. It was then as near to Tolosa as Foy was, and the latter's situation became critical; yet such were the difficulties of passing the mountain, that it was late on the 24th ere Graham, who had then only collected Anson's light cavalry, two Portuguese brigades of infantry, and Halket's Germans, could move towards Villa Franca.

The Italians and Maucune's divisions, which composed the French rear, were just entering Villa Franca, as Graham came in sight, and to cover that town they took post at the village of Vedsaya, on the right bank of the Orio river.

Halket's Germans, aided by Pack's Portuguese, immediately drove Maucune's people from the village, with the loss of two hundred men; and Bradford's brigade having engaged the Italians on the French right, killed or

wounded eighty, yet the Italians claimed the advantage; and the whole position was so strong, that Graham had recourse to flank operations, whereupon Foy retired to Tolosa.

Giron and Longa now came up by the great road; and Mendizabel, having quitted the blockade of Santona, arrived at Aspeytia on the Deba.

On the 25th, Foy again offered battle in front of Tolosa, but Graham turned his left with Longa's division, and Mendizabel turned his right from Aspeytia. While they were in march, Colonel Williams, with the grenadiers of the 1st regiment, and three companies of Pack's Portuguese, dislodged him from an advantageous hill in front; and the fight was then purposely prolonged by skirmishing, until six o'clock in the evening, when the Spaniards having reached their destination on the flanks, a general attack was made on all sides.

The French being cannonaded on the causeway, and strongly pushed by the infantry in front, while Longa, with equal vigour, drove their left from the heights, were soon forced beyond Tolosa on the flanks; but that town

was strongly entrenched as a field post, and they maintained it until Graham brought up his guns, and bursting one of the gates, opened a passage for his troops. Nevertheless, Foy, profiting from the darkness, made his retreat good with a loss of only four hundred men killed and wounded, and some prisoners were taken by Mendizabel and Longa.

These actions were very severe; the loss of the Spaniards was not known, but the Anglo-Portuguese had more than four hundred killed and wounded in the two days' operations, and Graham himself was hurt.

On the 26th and 27th, the allies halted to hear of Lord Wellington's progress. The enemy's convoys entered France in safety, and Foy occupied a position between Tolosa and Ernani, behind the Anezo.

His force was now increased by the successive arrival of the smaller garrisons, to sixteen thousand bayonets, four hundred sabres, and ten pieces of artillery; and on the 28th, he threw a garrison of two thousand six hundred good troops into St. Sebastian, and passed the Urumia. On the 29th he passed the Oyarsun,

and halted on the 30th, leaving a small garrison at Passages, which, however, surrendered the next day to Longa.

On the 1st of July, the garrison of Gueteria escaped by sea to St. Sebastian, and Foy passed the Bidassoa, his rear-guard fighting with Giron's Gallicians ; but Reille's troops were now at Vera and Viriatu—they had received ammunition and artillery from Bayonne. And thus twenty-five thousand men, of the army of Portugal, occupied a defensive line from Vera to the bridge of Bohobie, the approaches to which last were defended by a block-house. Graham immediately invested St. Sebastian, and Giron concentrating the fire of his own artillery, and that of the British battery, upon the block-house of Bohobie, obliged the French to blow it up, and destroy the bridge.

While these events were passing in Guipuscoa, Clauzel was in more imminent danger. On the evening of the 22nd, he had approached the field of battle at the head of fourteen thousand men, by a way which falls into the Estella road, at Araceta, and not far from Salvatierra.

Pakenham, with the sixth division, was then

at Vittoria ; and the French General, learning the state of affairs, soon retired to Logrono, where he halted until the evening of the 25th.

This delay was like to have proved fatal ; for on that day Wellington, who before thought he was at Tudela, discovered his real position, and leaving General Hill with the second division to form the siege of Pampeluna, marched himself by Tafalla, with two brigades of light cavalry, and the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry.

The fifth and sixth divisions, and the heavy cavalry, and D'Urban's Portuguese, marched at the same time from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon Logrono ; and Mina also, who had now collected all his scattered battalions near Estella, and was there joined by Julian Sauchez's cavalry, followed hard upon Clauzel's rear.

The French General, moving by Callaharra, reached Tudela on the evening of the 27th ; and thinking that by this forced march of sixty miles in forty hours, with scarcely a halt, he had outstripped all pursuers, would have made for France by Olite and Tafalla.

Wellington was already in possession of those

places, expecting him ; but an Alcalde gave Clauzel notice of the danger, whereupon, recrossing the Ebro, he marched upon Zaragoza in all haste, and arriving on the 1st of July, took post on the Gallego, gave out that he would there wait until Suchet, or the King, if the latter retook the offensive, should come up.

Wellington immediately made a flank movement to his own left as far as Caseda, and could still, with an exertion, have intercepted Clauzel by the route of Jacca ; but he feared to drive him back upon Suchet, and contented himself with letting Mina press the French General.

That chief acted with great ability, for he took three hundred prisoners ; and having everywhere declared that the whole allied army were close at hand in pursuit, he imposed upon Clauzel, who, being thus deceived, destroyed some of his artillery and heavy baggage, and leaving the rest at Zaragoza, retired to Jacca.

During this time Joseph, not being pressed, had sent the army of the south again into Spain to take possession of the valley of Bastan, which was very fertile, and full of strong positions.

But O'Donnel, Count of Abispal, had now reduced the forts at Pancorbo, partly by capitulation, partly by force, and was marching towards Pampeluna; wherefore General Hill, without abandoning the siege of that place, moved two British and two Portuguese brigades into the valley of Bastan, and on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, vigorously driving Guyon from all his positions, cleared the valley, with a loss of only one hundred and twenty men. The whole line of the Spanish frontier, from Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa river, was thus occupied by the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and St. Sebastian were invested.

Joseph's reign was over, the crown had fallen from his head; and after years of toils and combats which had been rather admired than understood, the English General, emerging from the chaos of the Peninsular struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrenees a recognised conqueror. On those lofty pinnacles the clangour of his trumpets pealed clear and loud, and the splendour of his genius appeared as a flaming beacon to warring nations.



## CHAPTER XI.

## O B S E R V A T I O N S.

1. IN this campaign of six weeks Wellington, with one hundred thousand men, marched six hundred miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove a hundred and twenty thousand veteran troops from Spain. This immense result could not have been obtained if Joseph had followed Napoleon's instructions; Wellington could not then have turned the line of the Douro.

It could not have been obtained if Joseph had acted with ordinary skill after the line of the Douro was passed. Time was to him most precious, yet when, contrary to his expectations,

he had concentrated his scattered armies behind the Carion, he made no effort to delay his enemy on that river. He judged it an unfit position—that is, unfit for a great battle; but he could have obliged Wellington to lose a day there, perhaps two or three, and behind the Upper Pisuerga he might have saved a day or two more.

Reille, who was with the army of Portugal on the right of the King's line, complained that he could find no officers of that army who knew the Pisuerga sufficiently to place the troops in position; the King then had cause to remember Napoleon's dictum, namely, that "to command an army well, a General must think of nothing else." For why was the course of the Pisuerga unknown, when the King's headquarters had been for several months within a day's journey of it?

2. The Carion and the Pisuerga being given up, the country about the Hormaya was occupied, and the three French armies were *en masse* between that stream and Burgos; yet Wellington's right wing only, that is to say, only twenty-three thousand infantry, and three

brigades of cavalry, drove Reille's troops over the Arlangun, and the castle of Burgos was abandoned.

This was on the 12th—the three French armies, not less than fifty thousand fighting men, had been in position since the 9th, and the King's letters prove that he desired to fight in that country, which was favourable for all arms.

Nothing then could be more opportune than Wellington's advance on the 12th, because a retrograde defensive system is unsuited to French soldiers, whose impatient courage leads them always to attack, and the news of Napoleon's victory at Bautzen had just arrived to excite their ardour.

Wherefore Joseph should have retaken the offensive on the 12th, at the moment when Wellington approached the Hormaya, and as the left and centre of the allies were at Villa Diego and Castroxeraz, the greatest part at the former, that is to say, one march distant, the twenty-six thousand men immediately under Wellington, would probably have been forced back over the Pisuerga, and the King would

have gained time for Sarrut, Foy and Clauzel to join him.

Did the English General then owe his success to fortune, to his adversary's fault rather than to his own skill? Not so. He had judged the King's military capacity, he had seen the haste, the confusion, the trouble of the army, and knowing well the moral power of rapidity and boldness in such circumstances, had acted, daringly indeed, but wisely, for such daring is admirable, it is the highest part of war.

3. The manner in which Wellington turned the line of the Ebro was a fine strategic illustration. It was by no means certain of success, yet failure would have still left great advantages. He was certain of gaining Santander, and fixing a new base of operations on the coast, and he would still have had the power of continually turning the King's right by operating between him and the coast; the errors of his adversary only gave him additional advantages, which he expected, and seized with promptness. But if Joseph, instead of spreading his army from Espejo on his right to the Logrono road on his left, had kept only cavalry on the latter

route, and on the main road in front of Pancorbo ; if he had massed his army to his right, pivoting upon Miranda, or Frias, and had scoured all the roads towards the sources of the Ebro with the utmost diligence, the allies could never have passed the defiles and descended upon Vittoria.

They would have marched then by Valmaceda upon Bilboa ; but Joseph could, by the road of Orduna, have met them there, and with his force increased by Foy's and Sarrut's divisions, and the Italians. Meanwhile Clauzel would have have come down to Vittoria, and the heaped convoys could have made their way to France in safety.

4. Having finally resolved to fight at Vittoria, the King should, on the 19th and 20th, have broken some of the bridges on the Zadora, and covered others with field-works, to enable him to sally forth upon the attacking army ; he should have entrenched the defile of Puebla, and occupied the heights above in strength ; his position on the Lower Zadora would then have been formidable.

But his greatest fault was in his choice of

his line of operation. His reasons for avoiding Guipuscoa were valid ; his true line was on the other side, down the Ebro. Zaragoza should have been his base, since Aragon was fertile and more friendly than any other province of Spain.

It is true that, by taking this new line of operations, he would have abandoned Foy ; but that General, reinforced with the reserve from Bayonne, would have had twenty thousand men and the fortress of St. Sebastian as a support, and Wellington must have left a strong corps of observation to watch him.

The King's army would have been immediately increased by Clauzel's troops, and ultimately by Suchet's, which would have given him one hundred thousand men to oppose the allied army, weakened as that would have been by the detachment left to watch Foy.

And there were political reasons, to be told hereafter ; for the reader must not imagine Wellington had got thus far without such trammels, which would have probably rendered this plan so efficacious, as to oblige the British army to abandon Spain altogether. Then new

combinations would have been made all over Europe, which it is useless to speculate upon.

5. In the battle, the operations of the French, with the exception of Reille's defence of the bridges of Gumara and Ariaga, were a series of errors; the most extraordinary being, the suffering Kempt's brigade of the light division, and the hussars, to pass the bridge of Tres Puentes, and establish themselves close to the King's line of battle, and upon the flank of his advanced posts at the bridges of Mendoza and Villados.

It is quite clear, from this alone, that he decided upon retreating the moment Graham's attack commenced against his right flank; and his position was, therefore, in his own view, untenable. The fitting thing then, was to have occupied the heights of Puebla strongly; but to have placed the bulk of his infantry, by corps, in succession, the right refused, towards Vittoria; while his cavalry and guns watched the bridges and the mouth of the Puebla defile. In this situation he could have succoured Reille, or marched to his front, according to

circumstances, and his retreat would have been secure.

6. The enormous fault of heaping up the baggage, and convoys, and parks, behind Vittoria, requires no comment; but the King added another and more extraordinary error, namely, the remaining to the last moment undecided as to the line of his retreat.

Nothing but misfortunes could attend upon such bad dispositions; and that the catastrophe was not more terrible, is owing entirely to an error which Wellington and Graham seem alike to have fallen into, namely, the belief, that Reille had two divisions in reserve behind the bridges on the Upper Zadora. They knew not that Maucune's division had marched with the convoy, and thought Clauzel had only one division of the army of Portugal with him, whereas he had two, Taupin's and Barbout's.

Reille's reserves were composed not of divisions, but of brigades drawn from La Martiniere's and Sarrut's divisions, which were defending the bridges; and his whole force, including the French Spaniards who were driven back from



Durana, did not exceed ten thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry.

Now Graham had, exclusive of Giron's Galicians, nearly twenty thousand of all arms ; and it is said that the river might have been passed both above and below the point of attack ; it is certain, also, that Longa's delay gave the French time to occupy Gumara Mayor in force, which was not the case at first. Had the passage been won in time, very few of the French army could have escaped from the field ; but the truth is, Reille fought most vigorously.

7. As the third and seventh divisions did not come to the point of attack at the time calculated upon, the battle was probably not fought after the original conception of Lord Wellington ; it is likely that his first project was to force the passage of the bridges, to break the right centre of the enemy from Aríñez to Margarita, and then to envelope the left centre with the second, fourth, and light divisions and the cavalry, while the third and seventh divisions pursued the others.

But notwithstanding the unavoidable delay,

which gave the French time to commence their retreat, it is not easy to understand how Guyon's left escaped from Subijana de Alava, seeing, that when Picton broke the centre at Aríñez, he was considerably nearer to Vittoria than the French left, which was cut off from the main road, and assailed in front by Hill and Cole.

The having no cavalry in hand to launch at this time and point of the battle has been already noticed ; Lord Wellington says, that the country was generally unfavourable for the action of that arm, and it is certain that neither side used it with much effect at any period of the battle ; nevertheless, there are always some suitable openings, some happy moments to make a charge, and this seems to have been one which was neglected.

8. Picton's sudden rush from the bridge of Tres Puentes to the village of Aríñez, with one brigade, has been much praised, and certainly nothing could be more prompt and daring ; but the merit of the conception belongs to the General-in-chief, who directed it in person.

It was suggested to him by the denuded state

of the hill in front of that village, and viewed as a stroke for the occasion, it is to be admired. Yet it had its disadvantages, for the brigade which thus crossed a part of the front of both armies to place itself in advance, not only drew a flank fire from the enemy, but was exposed, if the French cavalry had been prompt and daring, to a charge in flank : it also prevented the advance of the other troops in their proper arrangement, and thus crowded the centre for the rest of the action.

However, these sudden movements cannot be judged by rules, they are good or bad according to the result. This was entirely successful, and the hill thus carried was called the Englishman's Hill ; not, as some recent writers have supposed, in commemoration of a victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of a disaster which there befel a part of his army. His battle was fought between Navaretta and Najera, many leagues from Vittoria, and beyond the Ebro ; but on this hill the two gallant knights, Sir Thomas and Sir William Felton, took post with two hundred companions, and being surrounded

by Don Tello with six thousand, all died or were taken after a long, desperate, and heroic resistance.

9. It has been observed by French writers, and the opinion has been also entertained by many English officers, that after the battle, Wellington should have passed the frontier in mass, and marched upon Bayonne instead of chasing Clauzel and Foy on the right and left; and if, as the same authors assert, Bayonne was not in a state of defence, there can be little question that the criticism is just, because the fugitive French army, having lost all its guns and being without musket ammunition, could not have faced its pursuers for a moment.

But if Bayonne had resisted—and it was impossible for Wellington to suspect its real condition—much mischief might have accrued from such a hasty advance. Foy and Clauzel coming down upon the field of Vittoria, would have driven away, if they did not destroy, the sixth division; they would have recovered the trophies; the King's army returning by Jacca into Aragon, would have re-organized itself from Suchet's

depots, and that Marshal was actually coming up with his army from Valencia ; little would there have been gained by the battle.

This question can, however, be more profitably discussed when the great events which followed the battle of Vittoria have been described.\* .

\* Napier.

## CHAPTER XII.

## REMARKS ON THE BATTLE.\*

THE battle of Vittoria, the most decisive ever fought in the Peninsula by the Duke of Wellington, may be likened in many respects to the great battle of Austerlitz, fought by the Emperor Napoleon, some eight years before. The number of French combatants at Austerlitz, were nearly the same as Wellington's army at Vittoria ; the number of guns brought into action were nearly the same ; the number of guns used in the action were nearly the same ; the number of guns taken from the vanquished were nearly the same ; and the stake fought for—an empire

\* Author.

or a kingdom—the same. This was a strange coincidence ; but so it was.

At Austerlitz the French army counted about one hundred thousand men of all arms ; the number of guns in the field might be reckoned at two hundred and fifty ; and the number of guns taken from the Russians and Austrians amounted to one hundred and fifty pieces. The army of Wellington at Vittoria, was about the same in number as the army of Napoleon at Austerlitz, the number of guns was nearly the same, and the number of those captured were, within a very few, the same.

At Vittoria, one hundred and forty-three pieces of artillery were taken, most of them made use of during the battle. At Austerlitz one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon were captured : and Napoleon remarked after the battle, that it was without example, that in a single action one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon should be taken, one hundred of which were used in the battle. If Napoleon was astonished after Austerlitz—which battle he won—how much more must he have been

astonished when he read of Vittoria won by Wellington.

The marches of the Imperial army, before it reached Austerlitz, were long and severe. The weather was inclement, the roads deep, and a severe winter had set in; but those veteran troops surmounted all obstacles, and arrived on the heights of the plain of Olmutz (where the fate of Europe was to be decided) in the best possible array.

Wellington, before he fought the battle of Vittoria, with one hundred thousand men, marched, in six weeks, six hundred miles, passed six great rivers, and finally gained one great battle, and drove one hundred and twenty thousand veteran troops from Spain. But although the results of this great battle were manifest, the losses of the French, not only as to killed and wounded, but also as to prisoners, were far below what might have been expected. Six thousand was the outside of the French loss, and a few hundred prisoners. Wellington's loss was nearly as great; and it has been said that had our cavalry been more freely used, a different tale



of the French army would have been told; but there are many, I believe, who doubt this.

At Austerlitz, the French claim the capture of twenty thousand soldiers, fifteen generals, and count the dead at fifteen thousand. Their own loss is estimated at only nine hundred killed, and fifteen or sixteen hundred wounded. This, as to figures, appears a strange calculation, and one that I should very much doubt: but the statement may be true nevertheless. However, there were many points in those two great battles that resembled each other. The French at Vittoria seemed so confident of success, that no line of retreat, in case of disaster, had been marked out. No bridges on the Zadora were broken: and the entire baggage and convoys were heaped up behind Vittoria. In short, it would seem that no idea of a defeat entered the breast of King Joseph or his generals.

At Austerlitz, it was precisely the same. Nothing but self-confidence was observable in the demeanour of the Russian staff-officers. Napoleon sent his aide-de-camp, Savary, to

compliment the Emperor of Russia, as soon as he knew of the arrival of that Prince in the army. Savary returned at the moment the Emperor was reconnoitring the fires of the enemy's out-posts, and told him that he was warmly received by the Emperor Alexander, and even by the Grand Duke Constantine ; but that nothing but arrogance and presumption was distinguishable amongst the staff of the Emperor Alexander ; in short, that they looked upon the French army as already within their grasp.

Napoleon, well aware of the importance of this intelligence, immediately ordered his army to retreat that night, as if he had been defeated ; took up a position in the rear, and laboured, with much perseverance, in fortifying it and raising batteries. He proposed an interview to the Emperor of Russia, who sent him his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolghouriski. That officer might remark that everything breathed reserve and fear in the appearance of the French army : everything showed to the Russian officer an army half beaten. He could see at the out-posts none but decrepid men—for the able-bodied

soldiers which composed this splendid army, were kept out of his sight—and he seemed satisfied of an easy conquest.

The Emperor, contrary to his custom, went himself to the advanced-posts. The young Russian discussed everything with an impertinence difficult to be conceived. He spoke to the Emperor as he spoke to the Russian officers; but the Emperor repressed his indignation. One may be convinced, above all, of what the Emperor must have suffered, when it is known that, towards the close of the conversation, the Russian officer proposed to him to cede Belgium, and to place the iron crown upon the head of the most implacable enemies of France. The interview then terminated.

The envoy returned to his Emperor, and told him that victory was certain; and the whole Russian army thought the same. Napoleon, however, held a different opinion; and when he saw, with indescribable joy, the Russians beginning a flank movement (like Marmont at Salamanca) to turn his right, he said several times, as he struck his thigh: "Before to-morrow night, that army shall be in my power."

This must have been like the feelings of Wellington, at Vittoria. He saw an army before him so confident of success, that no line of retreat, in case of disaster, had been marked out. All the baggage, all the treasure, in short all the equipages of the French army, were huddled together in one narrow basin. Matters stood as I have described on the 20th of June, 1813, and on the following morning was fought the battle of Vittoria.

Brisbane had placed the 88th behind a fence, while he himself galloped away to the 74th, to direct the movement of that regiment, and at this moment Picton arrived in front of the 88th. Taking the command in person, he ordered Colonel McPherson of the 88th, to carry the hill in his front with the "Connaught Rangers," as also the village of Ariñez, situated at the base of the hill.

Picton's address to the "Rangers of Connaught," was very good, and quite in keeping with what he said to them, when the regiment was about to storm the grand breach at Ciudad Rodrigo, and which was to the following effect: "Rangers of Connaught, it is not my

intention to expend any *powder* this evening. We'll do this business with the *cowld* iron." On the présent occasion, he addressed them thus: "Rangers of Connaught, drive those French rascals into the village, and out of the village—you are the lads that know how to do it!"

A dangerous sort of address was this, and made to men too who well knew it would not be so delivered if they did not merit it. It is scarcely necessary to say that a shout answered the appeal, and that the hill and village were carried under the command of Colonel McPherson, a gallant soldier, at the point of the bayonet, but at a loss to the regiment of five officers and two hundred and thirty-two rank and file. The Imperial soldiers fought well, and defended the hill like men resolved to keep it; but after a short, though murderous struggle, the heroes of Austerlitz, Esling and Wagram, were hurled from the height by the "Rangers of Connaught."

Picton's style of addressing the "Connaught Rangers" might be likened to what Napoleon said to his army at Austerlitz, on the morning of the 2nd December, the day of that battle.

Napoleon said to his soldiers, in his general order :

“It is one year this day, since you placed the imperial crown on my head. Those barbarians yonder, want to take it from me ; *will you let them ?*”

To describe the burst of enthusiasm that followed this appeal to his army, would be difficult, indeed it would be impossible ; the clamour of eighty thousand voices at the same moment, for the order of the day was proclaimed by a salvo of artillery, was astounding ; the ground shook, and it has been said that a lake which flanked his army, and which was frozen, gave way from the concussion, and many portions of the ice were rent asunder in consequence. The Russian army heard the tremendous shout, but knew nothing of its meaning.

The battle commenced with fury, and six hundred pieces of cannon vomited forth destruction on every side ; the Russians, after a giant combat, were defeated at all points, and twenty thousand men, with forty pieces of artillery, rushed headlong towards the damaged

lake. Napoleon, posted on a height, saw what was passing, and anxiously looked for Soult's advance against the ill-formed mass of fugitives, but Soult made no movement. Twice did the Emperor send orders to him to advance, but the answer to each summons was, "Not yet."

Irritated at the delay, Napoleon came forward at a gallop, at the moment that Soult had seized the favourable opportunity, and his attack had developed itself. He was driving back the entire wing opposed to him, the bulk of which twenty thousand men, and forty pieces of artillery, ran to the lake for protection, but the ice, already damaged by the tremendous shout of the French soldiery, and the great weight of the fugitives, gave way in many places; and twenty pieces of cannon, directed by General Friant, opened their fire, not only against the Russian column, *but against the ice also*. Their cries were heart-rending, but they received no mercy, and in a few moments all perished; and when the lake was drained a few days afterwards several thousand bodies, with forty pieces of cannon, were found buried in its mud.

Napoleon, who witnessed this terrible scene, was delighted with the great generalship displayed by Soult. He rode up to the Marshal, and seizing him by the hand, said : " Marshal Soult, I look upon you as the ablest tactician in my empire." Soult took off his hat and said : " Sire, I believe it, as it is your Majesty who is so good as to say so."

After Austerlitz, Napoleon was firmly seated on his throne ; but he did not forget those men who were the means of placing him there ; he gave rank and decorations to all who merited them, even to the lowest soldier in his army. After Vittoria, Wellington was made a Field-Marshal and a Duke, but he asked nothing for the bulk of the men that were the main-spring of his elevation and his glory ! He took especial care of those immediately attached to his staff and to those in command, who, by their rank, were, according to the narrow-minded regulations in those days, alone entitled to notice and to favour.



## CHAPTER XIII.

## BATTLE OF ORTHES.

DURING the whole morning a slight skirmish, with now and then a cannon-shot, had been going on with the third division on the right, and the French cavalry at times pushed parties forward on each flank, but at nine o'clock Wellington commenced the real attack. The third and sixth division won without difficulty the lower part of the ridges opposed to them, and endeavoured to extend their left along the French front with a sharp fire of musketry, but the main battle was on the other flank.

There General Cole, keeping Anson's brigade of the fourth division in reserve, assailed St.

Boes, with Ross's British brigade, and Vasconcellos' Portuguese. This object was to get on to the open ground beyond it; but fierce and slaughtering was the struggle. Five times breaking through the scattered houses, did Ross carry his battle into the wider space beyond; yet ever as the troops issued forth, the French guns from the open hills smote them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax road swept through them with grape from flank to flank. And then Taupin's supporting masses rushed forwards with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on either hand, forced the shattered columns back into the village.

It was in vain that with desperate valour the allies, time after time, broke through the narrow way, and struggled to spread a front beyond, Ross fell, dangerously wounded, and Taupin, whose troops were clustered thickly and well supported, defied their utmost efforts. Nor was Soult less happy on the other side. The nature of the ground would not permit the third and sixth division to engage many men at once, so that no progress was made, and one

small detachment, which Picton extended to his left, having made an attempt to gain the smaller tongue jutting out from the central hill, was suddenly charged as it neared the summit by Foy, and driven down again in confusion, losing several prisoners.

When the combat had thus continued with unabated fury on the side of St. Boes for about three hours, Lord Wellington sent a caçadore regiment of the light division from the Roman Camp to protect the right flank of Ross's brigade against the French skirmishers ; but this was of no avail, for Vasconcellos' Portuguese, unable to sustain the violence of the enemy any longer, gave way in disorder, and the French pouring on, the British troops retreated through St. Boes with difficulty.

As this happened at the moment when the detachment on Picton's left was repulsed, victory seemed to declare for the French, and Soult, conspicuous on his commanding, open hill, the knot of all his combinations, seeing his enemies thus broken and thrown backwards on each side, put all his reserves in movement to complete the success. It is said that in the exultation of

the moment, he smote his thigh, exclaiming :  
“ At last I have him ! ”

Whether this be so or not, it was no vain-glorious speech, for the moment was most critical. There was, however, a small, black cloud rising just beneath him, unheeded at first amidst the thundering din and tumult that now shook the field of battle, but which soon burst with irresistible violence.

Wellington, seeing that St. Boes was impregnable, had suddenly changed his plan of battle. Supporting Ross with Anson's brigade, which had not hitherto been engaged, he backed both with the seventh division and Vivian's cavalry, now forming one heavy body towards the Dax road. Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions to be thrown in mass upon Foy's left flank, and, at the same time, sent the 52nd regiment down from the Roman Camp with instructions to cross the marsh in front, to mount the French ridge beyond, and to assail the flank and rear of the troops engaged with the fourth division at St. Boes.

Colonel Colborne so often distinguished in this war, immediately led the 52nd down and

crossed the marsh under fire ; the men sinking at every step above the knees, in some places to the middle ; but still pressing forwards with that stern resolution and order to be expected from the veterans of the light division—soldiers who had never yet met their match in the field.

They soon obtained footing on firm land, and ascended the heights in line at the moment that Taupin was pushing vigorously through St. Boes. Foy and D'Armagnac, hitherto more than masters of their positions, were at the same time seriously assailed on the other flank by the third and sixth division. With a mighty shout and a rolling fire, the 52nd soldiers dashed forwards between Foy and Taupin, beating down the French battalions in their course, and throwing everything before them into disorder.

General Bertrand was killed in Taupin's division ; Foy was dangerously wounded, and his troops, discouraged by his fall, and by this sudden burst from a quarter where no enemy was expected—for the march of the 52nd had been hardly perceived save by the skirmishers—got into confusion, and the disorder spreading to

Reille's wing, he also was forced to fall back and take a new position to restore his line of battle.

The narrow pass behind St. Boes was thus opened, and Wellington seizing the critical moment, thrust the fourth and seventh division, Vivian's cavalry, and two batteries of artillery through, and spread a front beyond.

The victory was thus secured, for the third and sixth divisions had now won D'Armagnac's position, and established a battery of guns on a knoll, from whence their shot ploughed through the French masses from one flank to another. Suddenly, a squadron of French chasseurs came at a hard gallop down the main-road of Orthes, to charge these guns, and sweeping to their right, they rode over some of the sixth division, which had advanced too far; but pushing this charge too madly, got into a hollow lane, and were nearly all destroyed.

The third and seventh divisions then continued to advance, and the wings of the army were united. The French General rallied all his forces on the open hills beyond the Dax road, and with Taupin's, Roquet's, Paris', and D'Ar-

magnac's divisions made strong battle to cover the re-formation of Foy's disordered troops ; but his foes were not all in front. This part of the battle was fought with only two thirds of the allied army.

Hill, who had remained with twelve thousand combatants, cavalry and infantry, before the bridge of Orthes, received orders, when Wellington changed his plan of attack, to force the passage of the Gave, partly in the view of preventing Harispe from falling upon the flank of the sixth division, partly in the hope of a successful issue to the attempt ; and so it happened. Hill, though unable to force the bridge, forded the river above, at Souars, and driving back the troops posted there, seized the heights above, cut off the French from the road to Pau, and turned the town of Orthes. He thus menaced Soult's only line of retreat by Saelspice, on the road to St. Sever, at the very moment when the 52nd, having opened the defile of St. Boes, the junction of the allies' wings was effected on the French position.

Clauzel immediately ordered Harispe to abandon Orthes and close towards Villatte on the

heights above Rontun, leaving, however, some conscript battalions on a rising point beyond the road of St. Sever, called the "Motte de Turenne." Meanwhile, in person, he endeavoured to keep General Hill in check by the menacing action of two cavalry regiments and a brigade of infantry ; but Soult arrived at the moment, and seeing that the loss of Souars had rendered his whole position untenable, gave orders for a general retreat.

This was a perilous matter. The heathy hills, upon which he was now fighting, although for a short distance they furnished a succession of parallel positions favourable enough for defence, soon resolved themselves into a low ridge running to the rear, on a line parallel with the road to St. Sever ; and on the opposite side of that road, about cannon-shot distance, was a corresponding ridge, along which General Hill, judging by the firing how matters went, was now rapidly advancing ; five miles distant was the Luy de Bearn, and four miles' beyond that the Lay de Bearn—two rivers, deep and with difficult banks ; behind these, the Lutz, the Gabers, and the Adour crossed the line, and though once



beyond the wooden bridge of Sault de Navailles, on the Lay de Bearn, these streams would necessarily cover the retreat, to carry off by one road and one bridge a defeated army still closely engaged in front, seemed impossible.

Nevertheless, Soult did so ; for Paris sustained the fight on the right, until Foy and Taupin's troops rallied ; and when the impetuous assault of the 52nd, and the rush of the fourth and seventh divisions, drove Paris back, D'Armagnac interposed to cover him, until the union of the allies' wings was completed, then both retired, being covered in turn by Villatte.

In this manner the French yielded step by step, and without confusion, the allies advancing with an incessant deafening musketry and cannonade, yet losing many men, especially on the right, where the third division were very strongly opposed. However, as the danger of being cut off at Saelspice, by Hill, became more imminent, the retrograde movements were more hurried and confused. Hill, seeing this, quickened his pace, until at last both sides began to run violently ; and so many men broke from the French ranks, making across the fields

towards the fords, and such a rush was necessarily made by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, that the whole country was covered with scattered bands.

Sir Stapleton Cotton then breaking with Lord Edward Somerset's hussars through a small covering-body opposed to him by Harispe, sabred two or three hundred men, and the 7th Hussars cut off about two thousand, who threw down their arms in an enclosed field; yet some confusion or mismanagement occurring, the greatest part recovering their weapons, escaped, and the pursuit ceased at the Luy of Bearn.

The French army appeared to be entirely dispersed; but it was more disordered in appearance than reality, for Soult passed the Luy of Bearn, and destroyed the bridge, with the loss of only six guns, and less than four thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners. Many thousands of conscripts, however, threw away their arms, and we shall find one month afterwards the stragglers still amounting to three thousand. Nor would the passage of the river have been effected so happily, if Lord

Wellington had not been struck by a musket-ball just above the thigh, which caused him to ride with difficulty, whereby the vigour and unity of the pursuit was necessarily abated.

The loss of the allies was two thousand three hundred, of which fifty with three officers were taken; but among the wounded were Lord Wellington, General Walker, General Ross, and the Duke of Richmond—then Lord March. He had served on Lord Wellington's personal staff during the whole war, without a hurt; but being made a Captain in the 52nd, like a good soldier, joined his regiment the night before the battle. He was shot through the chest a few hours afterwards; thus learning by experience the difference between the labours and dangers of staff and regimental officers, which are generally in the inverse ratio to their promotions.

General Berton, stationed between Pau and Orthes during the battle, had been cut off by Hill's movement; yet, skirting that General's march, he retreated by Mant and Samadet with his cavalry, picking up two battalions of conscripts on the road. Meanwhile Soult,

having no position to rally upon, continued his retreat in the night to St. Sever, breaking down all the bridges behind him.

Lord Wellington pursued at daylight in three columns, the right by Lacadee and St. Medard to Samadet, the centre by the main road, the left by St. Cricq. At St. Sever he hoped to find the enemy still in confusion; but he was too late. The French were across the river, the bridge was broken, and the army halted.

The result of the battle was, however, soon made known far and wide; and Darrican, who with a few hundred soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent levy at Dax, the works of which were incomplete and still unarmed, immediately destroyed part of the stores, (the rest had been removed to Mont Marsan,) and retreated through the Landes to Lanyon on the Garonne.

From St. Sever, which offered no position, Soult turned short to the right, and moved upon Barcelona higher up the Adour; but he left D'Erlon with two divisions of infantry, some cavalry, and four guns at Caceres, on

the right bank, and sent Clauzel to occupy Aire, on the other side of the river. He thus abandoned his magazines at Mont Marsan, and left open the direct road to Bordeaux; but holding Caceres with his right, he commanded another road by Rocquefort to that city; while his left, being at Aire, protected the magazines and artillery park at that place, and covered the road to Pau. Meanwhile, the main body at Barcelona equally supported Clauzel and D'Erlon, and covered the great roads leading to Agen and Toulouse, on the Garonne, and to the mountains, by Tarbes.

In this situation it was difficult to judge what line of operations he meant to adopt. Wellington, however, passed the Adour about one o'clock, partly by the repaired bridge of St. Sever, partly by a deep ford below, and immediately detached Beresford with the light division and Vivian's cavalry, to seize the magazines at Mont Marsan. At the same time, he pushed the head of a column towards Caceres, where a cannonade and charge of cavalry had taken place, and a few men and officers were hurt on both sides.

The next day Hill's corps, marching from Samadet, reached the Adour between St. Sever and Aire, and D'Erlon was again assailed on the right bank, and driven back skirmishing to Barcelona. This event proved that Soult had abandoned Bordeaux; but the English General could not push the pursuit more vigorously, because every bridge was broken, and a violent storm on the evening of the 1st had filled the smaller rivers and torrents, carried away the pontoon bridges, and cut off all communication between the troops and the supplies.

The bulk of the army was now necessarily halted on the right bank of the Adour, until the bridges could be repaired; but Hill, who was on the left bank, marched to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in two columns from St. Savin and St. Gillies, on the 2nd, he reached his destination about three o'clock, with two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and a battery of horse-artillery. He expected no serious opposition; but General Clauzel had arrived a few hours before, and was in order of battle, covering the town with Villatte's and Harispe's divi-

sions, and some guns. The French occupied a steep ridge in front of Aire, high and wooded on the right, where it overlooked the river, but merging on the left into a wide table-land, over which the great road led to Pau.

The position was strong for battle, yet it could be readily out-flanked on the left by the table-land; and was an uneasy one for retreat on the right, where the ridge was narrow, the ravine behind steep and rugged, with a mill-stream at the bottom, between it and the town. A branch of the Adour, also flowing behind Aire, cut it off from Barcelona: while behind the left wing was the Greater Lees—a river with steep banks, and only one bridge.\*

\* Napier.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## REMARKS.\*

COLONEL TAYLOR, an officer of much bravery, but of little or no experience as a commander of a regiment, brought the "Connaught Rangers" into action in a hasty and slovenly manner. He advanced at the head of his regiment, up a narrow and difficult road or lane, and at so rapid a pace, from over anxiety to engage, that the leading companies out-stripped their companions in the rear, and as the foremost platoons formed on the table-land before them, they were assailed by a fire from a battery

\* By the Author.



of eight-pounders in their front ; and a regiment of French cavalry, seeing what had taken place, galloped through the space that had intervened between the leading companies that were formed on the height, and those that were coming up the road to take part in the combat.

Many men were thus slain ; but the regiment, with that quickness and hardihood which none but old soldiers understand, ran up at each side of the road, and poured such a deadly fire on the horsemen, that only three or four of the latter escaped.

The contest was nevertheless a severe one. The “Connaught Rangers” lost three officers—Captain M'Dermot, Lieutenant Moriarty, and Ensign Reynolds—five serjeants, and thirty-six rank and file killed ; and eleven officers—Colonel Taylor, Captains Oates (the hero of La Picurina, who was promoted to a brevet majority, for his distinguished conduct on this day), and Bunworth, Lieutenants Fitzpatrick, Davern, Faris, Creswell, Holland, and Stewart, Ensign M'Intosh, Adjutant Mitchell, thirteen

serjeants, and two hundred and one rank and file wounded.

This was a pretty morning's quarter of an hour's work, and it was chiefly owing to the rashness of Colonel Taylor. It will scarcely be credited that he brought his regiment into action with *unloaded* firelocks.

However, at this moment Taylor fell wounded, and was carried off the field. The gallant Oates was shot through the thigh, and disabled; but Colonel M'Pherson, a tried and brave old soldier, galloping up at the moment, put himself at the head of the "Connaught Rangers," and drove the French column before him.

As has been seen, the loss of the "Connaught Rangers" at Orthes, was two hundred and seventy-seven. At Salamanca they lost less, because the number of men in the ranks were fewer, in consequence of their severe loss at Badajoz; but, nevertheless, they had their share in that glorious fight. There, we had but four captains in the field. One was killed, Captain Hogan; the others, Captains Adair and Tryon,

wounded ; Major Murphy, killed ; and Lieutenant Nickle, Lieutenant Meade, and the writer of these pages, wounded.

The fourth company, which I commanded, was one of the centre ones. It happened that we came in close contact with the French division of Thomiers—we were almost on their bayonets. The amount of rank and file in my company, was either fifty or fifty-two ; but at the first discharge of Thomiers' people, I lost forty-six men, my coat was pierced by seven bullets, and I was wounded myself, though slightly, in the leg ; half of my trowsers was shot away, and the right leg of my trowsers left me altogether. I did not think this was "right" on the part of the French.

Now, those matters are not told as anything wonderful, in the days I write of, at least : but is it not annoying to hear accounts of battles fought elsewhere, and medals granted to those officers and soldiers whose entire loss little exceeded that which was sustained on this day by the "Connaught Rangers?" However, this is a strange world, and we hear and

read of extraordinary events each day. But one of the most extraordinary I know of is, that I am, with a few of my old companions, in the land of the living, when nearly three hundred thousand of my comrades have been swept off the face of the earth, in this terrible six years' war in the Peninsula and south of France.

Historians, and many others besides historians, remark that the Irish soldier fights better abroad than at home; and they one and all say they cannot account for this. Now, in my opinion, it is very easy to solve the enigma.

The Irish soldier, generally speaking, is drafted from the lower order of the so-called "people." The moment he leaves his home, and above all his native land, he is placed in a very different position from what he had heretofore held. He is placed under the command of high-minded gentlemen, who make no distinction as to religion, or creed, or sect.

The best soldier is the man who is sure of

promotion, no matter what his tenets of religion may be. Several officers in our regiment are—or, at least, were—Roman Catholics: what of that? We neither knew nor cared about their religion, nor did we ever clash together on that point. The soldiers went to their place of worship, without any interference on the part of their officers; and they possessed that manly appearance of independence, that made the Irishman abroad so well-disposed to act as a *man*, that you in vain look for when in his own country.

Why is this? The secret has been already told. He is, when once placed in the ranks, as independent as any of his comrades. No religious distinction mars his advancement; promotion is open to all, and the best conducted man is sure of notice, according to his merits; and what is the consequence? Some of our best regiments are chiefly composed of Irishmen; and my own old corps, the “Connaught Rangers,” were Irishmen, almost to a man. And what description of persons were they when they joined their regiments? A parcel

of landlord-ridden, priest-ridden, half-starved creatures, without one free thought of action in their composition.\*

\* I may record an instance of the abject state of the Irish peasant, and the power that overawes him. A gentleman possessing a large property, and one of the best and most indulgent landlords in Ireland, or any other country, wished his tenants (although he did not in any way interfere with their privilege or inclinations as voters) to vote at a forthcoming election. The gentleman whom he wished to support, was one of rank and fortune, and uniformly in his place in Parliament supported the claims of his Roman Catholic countrymen.

What of all this? A radical gentleman, unknown as a resident in the part of the country I am speaking of, set up his claims; he was backed by the priests and the brawlers, and, as a matter of course, was the successful candidate. Of the entire tenantry belonging to the gentleman I have mentioned, *but one man had the courage to vote with his landlord*; and so persecuted has he been since (a period of several years), that on a fair-day which was annually held in a village close to his house, he was obliged to remain at home *well armed, in order to protect* his house and property! This is the secret of difference between an Irish peasant *at home*, and an Irish peasant *from home*.

Many members of Parliament, and many persons not in Parliament, will talk about the Irish people, and their rights to elective franchise, and other matters. "People!" Where are they? In what province, in what county, in what town, in what cabins are they to be found? I know of no "people" deserving the name in Ireland, if I except the Protestant portion of the inhabitants of that unfortunate country; for it would be worse than mockery to call the late forty-shilling freeholders the "people."

Those poor creatures were driven to tender their votes at an election, either by their priests, or their landlords, or by both; and in ninety-nine cases out of every hundred, vote they *should*, and *did* as they were *ordered*. A flock of sheep, driven by their owners into an inclosure at the fair at Ballinasloe, or any other place of public sale, might just as well be called "people," as our poor, degraded *freeholders*.

Well! This day was not to last for ever! The forty-shilling freeholders were done away

with, and those creatures were no longer of any use, as to their votes, to either their priest or their landlord. The latter, when they formed and incorporated this vast multitude, did so to gratify their own vanity, and to promote their own interests, their county influence, or the interests of their friends.

But when their votes and their voices were stifled—crushed—in short, when they became valueless, they were turned adrift on the wide world, and left to shift for themselves. Their former abodes were levelled, their holdings broken up, or turned into pasturage for cattle, while they themselves were like so many wanderers, seeking employment, and in default of that, soliciting alms from their less oppressed neighbours, or emigrating to a foreign clime.

The consequence of all this was, starvation in the first instance, illness caused by starvation in the second instance, and death soon followed in the train of the other two. If we add to this the awful visitation of late years in the failure of the potato crop, we shall be no longer surprised.



at the squalid appearance of our Irish *peasant* at home, or the robust frame of our Irish *soldier* and his independent bearing at home, but more particularly abroad.

A day of retribution has come at last. The landlords, who lorded it over these beggar-tenants, are now—many of them at least—nearly beggars themselves! The poor-rates have been so enormous, that half the estates of those landlords have been put up to auction and sold to pay their debts; but there is a debt they can never pay, and that is the debt they owe to their neglected tenants. It would be a difficult task to point out a class of men whose natures were so thoroughly mixed up with selfishness, arrogance, and a disregard of the *duty* they owed their tenantry (they seldom forgot or failed to exercise their *rights*) than were those of the Irish landlords. The frequent necessity for calling upon their agent for money, reminded them that human beings were their dependants, but beyond that refresher to their memories, the existence of those human beings was to them a matter of little moment. Their arrogance

towards the better or superior class of their tenants was intolerable, yet if a vote was required from any of them at an election, there was no want of a *personal* application to gain it. What meanness !

The lower classes detest, generally speaking, their landlords ; and so far from feeling sympathy in their downfall, they are indifferent to it. This is a sad picture ; but it is a true one, nevertheless. No men could be more audaciously insolent or intolerant than were the majority of the Irish landowners. They spent their money either abroad or at home, not much caring how it reached their pockets provided they got it. To speak mildly, I look upon such conduct to be the height of unprincipled folly, and so, I dare say, do the landlords *now*.

Nevertheless, there were, and are, many good ones amongst them, who are most kind to their tenants ; but owing to the feeling of detestation with which “ a landlord ” was looked upon (I speak generally), and the misconception which the very name was sure to create between the pro-

prietors of the soil and those who lived upon it, many a worthy man lost his life by the hand of the assassin.\*

\* “So far from regarding those placed above them in rank and station as their natural friends and protectors, the peasantry felt the great man as their oppressor; they knew him not as their comforter in sickness, their help in time of trouble; they only saw in him the rigid exactor of his rent, the merciless task-master who cared not for time or season, save those that brought round the period of repayment; and as year by year poverty and misery ate deeper into their natures, and hope died out, fearful thoughts of retribution flashed upon minds on which no prospect of better days shone; and in the gloomy desolation of their dark hours, they wished and prayed for any change, come in what shape, and surrounded by what danger it might, if only this bondage should cease.”—*Lever*.

## CHAPTER XV.

## COMBAT OF AIRE.

GENERAL HILL arriving about two o'clock, attacked, without hesitation ; General Stewart with British brigades, fell on the French right, a Portuguese brigade assailed their centre, and the other brigades followed in columns of march. The action was, however, very sudden, the Portuguese were pushed forward in a slovenly manner by General da Costa—a man of no ability—and the French, under Harispe, met them on the flat summit of the height with so rough a charge, that they gave way in flight.

The rear of the allies' column being still in march, the battle was like to be lost ; but General

Stewart having, by this time, won the heights on the French right, where Villatte, fearing to be enclosed, made but a feeble resistance, immediately detached General Barnes with the 15th and 92nd regiments to the aid of the Portuguese.

The vehement charge of those troops turned the stream of battle ; the French were broken in turn, and thrown back on their reserves, yet they rallied and renewed the action with great courage, fighting obstinately until General Byng's British brigade came up, when Harispe was driven towards the river Lees, and Villatte quite through the town of Aire into the space between the two branches of the Adour behind.

General Reille, who was at Barcelona when the action began, brought up Roquet's division to support Villatte ; the combat was thus continued until night, at that point. Meanwhile, Harispe crossed the Lees, and broke the bridges ; but the French lost many men. Two Generals, Dauture and Gasquet, were wounded ; a Colonel of Engineers was killed ; a hundred prisoners were taken ; many of Harispe's conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their houses ; and the magazines fell into the conquerors' hands.

The loss of the British troops was one hundred and fifty. General Barnes was wounded, and Colonel Hood killed. The loss of the Portuguese was never officially stated, yet it could not have been less than that of the British ; and the vigour of the action proved that the French courage was very little abated by the battle of Orthes. Soult immediately retreated up the Adour, by both banks, towards Maubourget and Marciac, and he was not followed, for new combinations were now opened to the General on both sides.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1. On the 14th of February, the passage of the Gaves was commenced by Hill's attack on Harispe at Hellette ; on the 2nd of March, the first series of operations was terminated by the combat at Aire. In these sixteen days Lord Wellington traversed with his right wing eighty miles, passed five large and several small rivers, forced the enemy to abandon two fortified bridge-heads and many minor works, gained one great battle and two combats, captured six guns and

about a thousand prisoners, seized the magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and Aire, forced Soult to abandon Bayonne and cut him off from Bordeaux. And in this time he also threw his stupendous bridge below Bayonne, and closely invested that fortress after a sharp and bloody action.

Success in war, like charity in religion, covers a multitude of sins ; but success often belongs to fortune as well as skill, and the combinations of Wellington—profound and sagacious—might, in this manner, be confounded with the lucky operations of the allies on the other side of France, where the presumption and the vacillation of ignorance alternately predominated.

2. Soult attributed the loss of his positions to the superior forces of the allies. Is this well-founded ? The French General's numbers cannot be determined exactly, but after all his losses in December, after the detachments made by the Emperor's order in January, and after completing the garrison of Bayonne to fourteen thousand men, he informed the Minister of War that thirty thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery were in line.

This did not include the conscripts of the new levy—all youths indeed, and hastily sent to the army by battalions, as they could be armed, but brave—and about eight thousand of them might have joined before the battle of Orthes ; wherefore, deducting the detachments of cavalry and infantry under Berton, on the side of Pau, and under Darrican on the side of Dax, it may be said that forty thousand combatants of all arms were engaged in that action.

Thirty-five thousand were very excellent soldiers, for the conscripts of the old levy who joined before the battle of the Nivelle, were stout men, their vigorous fighting at Garro and Aire proved it, for of them was Harispe's division composed.

Now Lord Wellington commenced his operations with the second, third, fourth and seventh British divisions, the independent Portuguese division under Le Cor, Morillo's Spaniards, forty-eight pieces of artillery, and only four brigades of light cavalry ; for Vandeleur's brigade remained with Hope, and all the heavy cavalry and the Portuguese were left in Spain. Following the morning states of the army, this would furnish, exclusive of Morillo's Spaniards, some-



thing more than forty thousand fighting men and officers of all arms, of which four thousand were horsemen ; but five regiments of infantry, and amongst them two of the strongest British regiments of the light division, were absent to receive their clothing : deduct these, and we have about thirty-seven thousand Anglo-Portuguese combatants.

It is true that Mina's battalions and Morillo's aided in the commencement of the operations ; but the first immediately invested St. Jean Pied de Port and the latter invested Navarrens. Lord Wellington was, therefore, in the battle, superior by a thousand horsemen and eight guns ; but Soult out-numbered him in infantry by four or five thousand—conscripts, it is true, yet useful. Why, then, was the passage of the Gaves so feebly disputed ? Because the French General remained entirely on the defensive, in positions too extended for his numbers.

3. Offensive operations must be the basis of a good defensive system. Let Soult's operations be tried by this rule. On the 12th, he knew that the allies were in motion for some great operation, and he judged rightly that it was to

drive him from the Gaves. From the 14th to the 18th his left was continually assailed by very superior numbers; but during part of that time, Beresford could only oppose to his right and centre, the fourth and a portion of the seventh divisions, with some cavalry; and those not in a body and at once, but parcelled and extended; for it was not until the 16th, that the fourth, seventh, and light division were so closed towards the Bidouze as to act in one mass.

On the 15th, Lord Wellington admitted that his troops were too extended. Villatte's, Taupin's, and Foy's divisions were never menaced until the 18th, and there was nothing to prevent D'Erlon's divisions, which only crossed the Adour on the 17th, from being on the Bidouze on the 15th; Soult might, therefore, by rapid and well-digested combinations, have united four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry to attack Beresford on the 15th or 16th between the Nive and the Adour.

If successful, the defeated troops pushed back upon the sixth division, must have fought for life, with the rivers on their flanks, Soult in front, and the garrison of Bayonne issuing from

the works of Mousserolles on their rear ; if unsuccessful, the French retreat behind the Gave of Oleron could not have been prevented.

It is however to be pleaded, that Soult was not exactly informed of the numbers and situation of his opponents. He thought Beresford had the first division also on the Lower Bedonne ; he knew that Wellington had large reserves to employ ; and that General's design of passing the Adour below Bayonne being unknown to him, he naturally supposed they would be used to support the operations on the Gaves ; he therefore remained on the defensive. It might possibly, also, have been difficult to bring D'Erlon's division across the Adour, by the Port de Launes before the 17th, because the regular bridge had been carried away, and the communication interrupted a few days before by the floods. In fine, there are many matters of detail in war, known only to a General-in-chief, which forbid the best combinations, and this it is that makes the art so difficult and uncertain. Great captains worship fortune.

On the 24th the passage of the Gave

d'Oleron was effected; Soult then recognised his error, and concentrated his troops at Orthes, to retake the offensive. It was a fine movement, and effected with ability; but he suffered another favourable opportunity of giving a counter-blow, to escape him.

The infantry, under Villatte, Harispe, and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, were about Sauveterre—that is to say, four miles from Montfort, and only seven from Villenave, where the principal passage was effected, where the ford was deep, the stream rapid, and the left bank, although favourable for the passage, not entirely commanding the right bank. How then did it happen that the operation was effected without opposition? Amongst the allies it was rumoured at the time that Soult complained of the negligence of a General, who had orders to march against the passing troops.

The position of Harispe's division at Monstrueig, forming a reserve at equal distances from Sauveterre and Villenave, would seem to have been adopted with that view; but I find no confirmation of the report in Soult's correspondence,

and it is certain he thought Picton's demonstration at Sauveterre was a real attack.

4. The position adopted by the French General at Orthes, was excellent for offence. It was not so for defence. When Beresford and Picton had crossed the Gave below in force, Lord Wellington could then throw his whole army on that side, and secure his communication with Hope; after which, outflanking the right of the French, he could seize the defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from their magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and Aire, and force them to retreat by the Pau road, leaving open the way to Bordeaux.

To await this attack was therefore an error; but Soult's original design was to assail the head of the first column which should come near him; and Beresford's approach to Baigts, on the 26th, furnished the opportunity. It is true that the French light cavalry gave intelligence of that General's march too late, and marred the combination, but there was still time to fall on the head of the column, while the third division was in the act of passing the river, and entangled in the narrow

way leading from the ford to the Peyrehorade road.

It is said the French Marshal appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally took a defensive position, in which to receive battle.

However, when the morning came, he neglected another opportunity. For two hours the third division and the hussars remained close to him, covering the march of the sixth and light divisions through the narrow ways, leading from the bridge of Bereuse up to the main road. The infantry had no defined position, the cavalry had no room to extend, and there were no troops between them and Beresford, who was then in march by the heights of Baights to the Dax road.

If the French General had pushed a column across the marsh, to seize the Roman Camp, he would then have separated the wings of the allies, then pouring down the Peyrehorade road, with Foy's, D'Armagnac's, and Villatte's divisions, he would probably have overwhelmed the third division before the other two could have extricated themselves from the defiles. Picton, therefore, had grounds for uneasiness.

With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of battle at Orthes; fiercely and strongly did he fight, and wonderfully did he effect his retreat across the Luy of Bearn. But twice, in twenty-four hours, he had neglected those happy occasions which, in war, take birth and flight at the same instant; and as the value of his position, essentially an offensive one, was thereby lost, a slowness to strike may be objected to his generalship.

Yet there is no commander, unless a Hannibal or a Napoleon, surpassing the human proportions, but will abate something of his confidence, and hesitate after repeated defeats. Soult, in this campaign as in many others, proved himself a hardy captain, full of resources.

5. Lord Wellington, with a vastness of conception, and a capacity for arrangement and combination equal to his opponent, possessed in a high degree that daring promptness of action, that faculty of inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole campaigns, with which Napoleon was endowed beyond all mankind. It is this which especially constitutes military genius; for so vast, so complicated

are the combinations of war—so easily, and by such slight causes are they affected, that the best generals do but grope in the dark; and they acknowledge the humiliating truth. By the number and extent of their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors, the merit of commanders is to be measured.

In this campaign, Lord Wellington designed to penetrate France, not with a hasty incursion, but solidly to force Soult over the Garonne, and, if possible, in the direction of Bordeaux; because it was the direct line, because the citizens were inimical to the Emperor, and the town, lying on the left bank of the river, could not be defended, because also a junction with Suchet would then be prevented. Finally, if by operating against Soult's left, he could throw the French army into the Landes, where his own superior cavalry could act, it would probably be destroyed.

To operate against Soult's left, in the direction of Pau, was the most obvious method of preventing a junction with Suchet, and rendering the position which the French General had fortified on the Gave, useless. But the



investment of Bayonne required a large force, which was yet weak, against an outer attack, because it was separated in three parts by the rivers. Hence, if Lord Wellington had made a wide movement on Pau, Soult might have placed the Adour between him and the main army, and then fallen upon Hope's troops on the right side of the river. The English General was thus reduced to act upon a more contracted line, and to cross all the Gaves. To effect this, he collected his principal mass on his right, by the help of the great road leading to St. Jean Pied de Port. Then by rapid marches and reiterated attacks, he forced the passage of the rivers above the points which Soult had fortified for defence, and so turned that General's left, with the view of finally cutting him off from Suchet, and driving him into the wilderness of the Landes.

During these marches, he left Beresford on the lower parts of the rivers, to occupy the enemy's attention and cover the troops blockading Mousserolles. Meanwhile, by the collection of boats at Urt, and other demonstrations indicating a design of throwing a bridge over

the Adour above Bayonne, he diverted attention from the point chosen below the fortress for that operation, and at the same time provided the means of throwing another bridge at the Port de Lannes, to secure the communication with Hope by the right bank, whenever Soult should be obliged to abandon the Gaves—these were fine combinations.

I have shown that Beresford's corps was so weak at first, that Soult might have struck a counter-blow. Lord Wellington admitted the error; writing on the 15th, he says, "If the enemy stand upon the Bidouze, I am not so strong as I ought to be," and he ordered up the fourth and light divisions; but this excepted, his movements were conformable to the principles of war; he chose the best strategic line of operations, his main attack was made with heavy masses, against the enemy's weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and daring; his conduct was conformable also to his peculiar situation—he had two distinct operations in hand, namely, to throw his bridge below Bayonne and to force the Gaves; he had the numbers required to obtain these objects, but

dared not use them, lest he should put the Spanish troops into contact with the French people.

Yet he could not entirely dispense with them, wherefore, bringing Freyre up to Bayonne, Morillo to Navarrens, and Mina to St. Jean Pied de Port, he seemed to put his whole army in motion ; thus gaining the appearance of military strength with as little political danger as possible. Nevertheless, so terrible had the Spaniards already made themselves by their cruel, lawless habits, that their mere return across the frontier threw the whole country into consternation.

6. When in front of Orthes, it would at first sight appear as if Lord Wellington had changed his plan of driving the enemy upon the Landes, but it was not so ; he did not expect a battle on the 27th. This is proved by his letter to Sir John Hope, in which he tells that General that he anticipated no difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau ; that on the evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring, and that he designed to visit the position at Bayonne, to pass the Gave in the quickest and surest manner ; to re-establish the direct communication

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with Hope, and to unite with Beresford, were his immediate objects ; if he finally worked by his left, it was a sudden act, and extraneous to the general design, which was certainly to operate with Hill's corps and the light division by the right.

It was after passing the Gave at Bereux, on the morning of the 27th, Lord Wellington first discovered Soult's intention to fight ; and that, consequently, he was himself in a false position. Had he shown any hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured to take a defensive position with either Beresford or Picton's troops, he would inevitably have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous situation.

Instead of this, judging that Soult would not on the instant change from defensive to offensive, he confidently pushed Picton's skirmishers forward as if to assail the left of the French position, and put Beresford in movement against their right ; and this, with all the coolness imaginable—the success was complete.

Soult, who supposed the allies stronger than they really were, naturally imagined the wings would not be so bold, unless well supported in

the centre, where the Roman Camp could hide a multitude, he therefore held fast to his position until the movement was more developed, and in two hours the sixth and light division were up, and the battle commenced. It was well fought on both sides ; but the crisis was decided by the 52nd, and when that regiment was put in movement, only a single Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the Roman Camp. Upon such nice combinations of time and place does the fate of battles turn.

7. Soult certainly committed an error in receiving battle at Orthes ; and it has been said that Lord Wellington's wound, at the most critical period of the retreat, alone saved the hostile army ; nevertheless, the clear manner in which the French General carried his troops away, his prompt judgment shown in the sudden change of his line of retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which he halted and showed front again at Caceres, Barcelonne, and Aire, were all proofs of no common ability.

It was Wellington's aim to drive the French on to the Landes, Soult's to avoid this ; he therefore shifted from the Bordeaux line to that of

Toulouse—not in confusion, but with the resolution of a man ready to dispute every foot of ground. The loss of the magazines at Mont Marsan was no fault of his ; he had given orders for transporting them towards the Toulouse side fifteen days before ; but the matter depending upon the civil authorities, was neglected.

He was blamed by some of his officers for fighting at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover the magazines there, and essential to his design of keeping up the courage of the soldiers under the adverse circumstances which he anticipated ; and here the palm of generalship remained with him, for certainly the battle of Orthes was less decisive than it should have been.

I speak not of the next day's march upon St. Sever, but of Hill's march on the right. That General halted near Samude on the 28th, reached St. Savin on the Adour on the 1st, and fought the battle of Aire on the evening of the 2nd of March ; but from Samadet to Aire, not longer than from Samadet to St. Savin, where he was on the 1st ; he could, therefore, if his orders had prescribed it so, have seized Aire on

the 1st, before Clauzel arrived, and thus spared the obstinate combat at that place.

It may also be observed, that his attack did not receive a right direction ; it should have been towards the French left, because they were more weakly posted there, and the ridge held by their right was so difficult to retire from, that no troops would stay on it if any progress was made on the left.

This was, however, an accident of war. General Hill had no time to examine the ground—his orders were to attack ; and to fall without hesitation upon a retiring enemy after such a defeat as Orthes, was undoubtedly the right thing to do ; but it cannot be said that Lord Wellington pushed the pursuit with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm on the evening of the 1st, he could have reinforced Hill, and should not have given the French army time to recover from their recent defeat. The secret of war, says Napoleon, “ is to march twelve leagues, fight a battle, and march twelve more in pursuit.”

## CHAPTER XVI.

## SOUTH OF FRANCE.

WHILE Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux, Soult and Wellington remained in observation, each thinking the other stronger than himself—for the English General, having intelligence of Beurman's march, believed that his troops were intended to reinforce and had actually joined Soult. On the other hand, that Marshal, who knew not of Beresford's march until the 13th, concluded Wellington still had the twelve thousand men detached to Bordeaux.

The numbers on each side were, however, nearly equal. The French army was thirty-one thousand infantry and cavalry; yet three thousand



being stragglers, detained by the Generals of the military districts, Soult could only put into line, exclusive of conscripts without arms, twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty-eight pieces of artillery ; on the allies' side, twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets were under arms, with forty-two guns ; but from this number, detachments had been sent to Pau on one side, to Roquefort on the other, and the cavalry scouts were pushed into the Landes and to the Upper Garonne.

Lord Wellington expecting Soult would retreat upon Auch, and designing to follow him, had caused Beresford to keep the bulk of his troops towards the Upper Garonne, that he might the sooner rejoin the army ; but the French General having early fixed his line of retreat by St. Guadens, was only prevented from retaking the offensive on the 9th or 10th, by the loss of his magazines, which forced him first to organize a system of requisition for the subsistence of his army.

Meanwhile, his equality of force passed away, for on the 13th Freyre came up with eight thousand infantry, and the next day Ponsonby's

heavy cavalry arrived. Lord Wellington was then the strongest, yet he still awaited Beresford's troops, and was uneasy about his own situation ; he dreaded the junction of Suchet's army, for it was at this time the Spanish Regency referred the Convention proposed by that Marshal for the evacuation of the fortresses to his decision ; he gave a peremptory negative, observing that it would furnish twenty thousand veterans for Soult, while the retention of Rosas and Figueras would bar the action of the Spanish armies of Catalonia in his favour ; but his anxiety was great, because he foresaw that Ferdinand's return, and his engagement with Suchet already related, together with the evident desire of Copons that the garrisons should be admitted to a convention, would finally render that measure inevitable.

Meanwhile, the number of his own army was likely to decrease. The English Cabinet, less considerate even than the Spanish Government, had sent the militia permitted by the recent Act of Parliament to volunteer for foreign service, to Holland, and with them the other reinforcements originally promised for the army in

France ; two or three regiments of militia only came to the Garonne.

When the war was over, to make amends, the Ministers proposed that Lord William Bentinck should send four thousand men from Sicily to land at Rosas, or some point in France, and so join Lord Wellington, who was thus expected to extend his weakened force from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, in order to cover the junction of this uncertain reinforcement. In fine, experience had taught the English statesmen so little, that we find their General thus addressing them, only one week previous to the termination of the war.

Having before declared that he should be, contrary to his wishes, forced to bring more Spaniards into France, he says :

“ There are limits to the numbers with which this army can contend ; and I am convinced your Lordship would not wish to see the safety and honour of this handful of brave men, depend upon the doubtful exertions and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish troops. The service in Holland may doubtless be more important to the national interest than that in

this country ; but I hope it will be considered that that which is most important of all, is not to lose the brave army which has struggled through its difficulties for nearly six years."

The French infantry was now reorganized in six divisions, commanded by Darrican D'Armagnac, Taupin, Maransin, Villatte and Harispe. General Paris's troops, hitherto acting as an unattached body, were thus absorbed ; the cavalry, composed of Berton's and Vial's brigades, was commanded by Pierre Soult ; and there was a reserve division of seven thousand conscripts, infantry, under General Travot.

The division, into wings and a centre, each commanded by a lieutenant-general, continued ; yet this distinction was not attended to in the movements. Reille, though commanding the right wing, was at Maubourget, on the left of the line of battle ; D'Erlon, commanding the centre, was at Marsiac, on the right, covering the road to Auch ; Clauzel was at Rabastens, forming a reserve to both. The advanced guards were towards Plaisance, on the right ; Maderan, in the centre ; and Lembege, on the left. Soult thus covered Tarbes, and could

move on a direct line, by good roads, either to Auch or Pau.

Lord Wellington, driven by necessity, now sent orders to Giron's Andalusians and Del Parque's troops, to enter France from the Bastan—although Freyre's soldiers had by their outrages already created a wide-spread consternation—his head-quarters were fixed at Aire ; his army was in position on each side of the Adour ; he had repaired all the bridges behind him ; restored that over the Lees in his front, and dispersed some small bands which had appeared upon his left flank and rear.

Soult had, however, organized a more powerful system of partizans towards the mountains, and only wanted money to put them in activity. The main bodies of the two armies were a long day's march asunder ; but their advanced posts were not very distant. The regular cavalry had frequent encounters, and both generals claimed the superiority, though neither made any particular report.

On the night of the 7th, Soult thinking to find only some weak parties at Pau, sent a strong detachment there to arrest the nobles

who had assembled to welcome the Duke of Angoulême; but General Fane getting there before him with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, the stroke failed; however, the French, returning by another road, made prisoners of an officer and four or five English dragoons.

Meanwhile, a second detachment, penetrating between Pau and Aire, carried off a post of correspondence; and two days after, when Fane had quitted Pau, a French officer, accompanied by only four hussars, captured there thirty-four Portuguese, with their commander, and ten loaded mules.

The French General having, by these excursions, obtained exact intelligence of Beresford's march to Bordeaux, resolved to attack the allies; and the more readily, that Napoleon had recently sent him instructions to draw the war to the side of Pau, keeping his left resting on the Pyrenees, which accorded with his own design.

Lord Wellington's main body was now concentrated round Aire and Barcelona, yet divided by the Adour, and the advanced guards were

pushed to Garlin, Conchez, Viella Riscle, and Pouydraguin ; that is to say, on a semi-circle to the front, and about half a march in advance.

Soult, therefore, thought to strike a good blow, and gathering his divisions on the side of Maubourget, the 12th March, on the 13th, designing to throw himself upon the high table-land, between Pau and Aire, and then act according to circumstances.

The country was suited to the action of all arms, offering a number of long and nearly parallel ridges of moderate height, the sides of which were sometimes covered with vineyards, but the summits commonly so open, that troops could move along them without much difficulty; and between these ranges, a number of small rivers and muddy fords descended from the Pyrenees to the Adour.

This conformation determined the order of the French General's march, which followed the courses of these rivers. Leaving one regiment of cavalry to watch the valley of the Adour, he moved with the rest of his army by Lembege, upon Conchez, down the smaller Lees: Clauzel thus seized the high land of

Daisse, and pushed troops to Portet. Reille supported him at Conchez; D'Erlon remained behind that place in reserve. In this position, the head of the columns, pointing direct upon Aire, separated Viella from Garlen, which was the right of General Hill's position, and menaced that General's posts on the Great Lees.

Meanwhile, Pierre Soult, marching with three regiments of cavalry along the high land between the two Lees, reached Mascaras and the Castle of Sault; he thus covered the left flank of the French army, and pushed Fane's cavalry posts back with the loss of two officers taken, and a few men wounded.

During this movement, Berton, advancing from Maderan with two regiments of cavalry, towards Viella, on the right flank of the French army, endeavoured to cross the Saye river at a difficult muddy ford, near the broken bridge.

Sir John Campbell, leading a squadron of the 4th Portuguese cavalry, overthrew the head of his column; but the Portuguese horsemen were too few to dispute the passage, and Berton, finally getting a regiment over



higher up, gained the table-land above, and charging the rear of the retiring troops in a narrow way leading to the Aire road, killed several, and took some prisoners; amongst them Bernardo de Sa, the since well-known Count of Bandeira.

This terminated the French operation for the day, and Lord Wellington, imagining the arrival of Suchet's troops, had made Soult thus bold, resolved to keep on the defensive until his reinforcement and detachments could come up. Hill, however, passed the Greater Lees, partly to support his posts, partly to make out the force and true direction of the French movement; but he recrossed that river during the night, and finally occupied the strong platform between Aire and Garlin, which Soult had designed to seize.

Lord Wellington immediately brought the third and sixth division, and the heavy cavalry, over the Adour, to his support, leaving the light division with the hussar brigade, still on the right bank.

The bulk of the army thus occupied a strong position, parallel with the Pau road. The right

was at Garlin, the left at Aire, the front covered by the Greater Lees, a river difficult to pass. Fane's cavalry was extended along the Pau road, as far as Boelho ; and on the left of the Adour, the hussars pushed the French cavalry regiment left there, back upon Plaisance.

On the morning of the 14th, Soult, intending to fall on Hill, whose columns he had seen the evening before on the right of the Lees, drove in the advanced posts which had been left to cover the retrograde movement, and then examine the allies' new position ; but these operations wasted the day, and towards evening he disposed his army on the heights between the two Lees, placing Clauzel and D'Erlon at Castle Pugon, opposite Garlin, and Reille in reserve at Portet.

Meanwhile, Pierre Soult carried three regiments of cavalry to Clarac, on the Pau road, to intercept the communications with that town, and to menace the right flank of the allies, against which the whole French army was now pointing. Fane's outposts being thus assailed, retired with some loss at first, but they were soon supported, and drove the

French horsemen in disorder clear off the Pau road, to Carere.

Soult now seeing the strength of the position above Aire, and hearing from the peasants that forty or fifty thousand men were concentrated there, feared to attack; but changing his plan, resolved to hover about the right flank of the allies, in the hopes of enticing them from their vantage ground.

Lord Wellington, on the other hand, drew his cavalry posts down the valley of the Adour, and keeping close on that side, massed his forces on the right, in expectation of an attack. In fine, each General, acting upon false intelligence of the other's strength, was afraid to strike.

The English commander's error, as to the junction of Suchet's troops, was encouraged by Soult, who had formed his battalions upon two ranks instead of three, to give himself an appearance of strength, and in the same view had caused his reserve of conscripts to move in rear of his line of battle. And he also judged the allies' strength by what it might have been, rather than by what it was; for though Freyre's Spaniards and Ponsonby's

dragoons were now up, the whole force did not exceed thirty-six thousand men, including the light division and the hussars, who were on the right bank of the Adour. This number was, however, increasing every hour, by the arrival of detachments and reserves; and it behoved Soult, who was entangled in a country extremely difficult if rain should fall, to watch that Wellington, while holding the French in check with his right wing, did not strike with his left by Maubourget and Tarbes, and thus cast them upon the mountains about Lourdis.

This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of the fall of Bordeaux, induced the French general to retire before day on the 15th, to Lembege and Sinacourbe, where he occupied both sides of the two branches of the Lees, and the heights between them. However, his out-posts remained at Conchez; and Pierre Soult, again getting upon the Pau road, detached a hundred chosen troopers against the allies' communication with Orthes. Captain Dania, commanding these men, making a forced march, reached Hagetnau at nightfall, surprized six officers and eight medical men,

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with their baggage, made a number of other prisoners, and returned on the evening of the 18th.

This enterprise, extended to such a distance from the army, was supposed to be executed by the bands, and seemed to indicate a disposition for insurrection, wherefore Lord Wellington, to check it, seized the civil authorities at Hagetnau, and declared that he would hang all the peasants caught in arms, and burn their villages.

The offensive movement of the French general had now terminated ; he sent his conscripts at once to Toulouse, and prepared for a rapid retreat on that place. His recent operations had been commenced too late, he should have been on the Lees the 10th or 11th, when there were not more than twenty thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry to oppose him between Aire and Garlin.

On the other hand, the passive state of Wellington, which had been too much prolonged, was now also at an end ; all his reinforcements and detachments were either up or close at hand, and he could put in motion

six Anglo-Portuguese and three Spanish divisions of infantry, furnishing forty thousand bayonets, with five brigades of cavalry furnishing nearly six thousand sabres, and from fifty to sixty pieces of artillery.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

THE 10th of April, at two o'clock in the morning, the light division passed the Garonne by bridge at the Seilh ; and about six o'clock the whole army moved forwards in the order assigned for the different columns. Picton and Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced posts behind the works at the bridge, over the canal ; Freyre's columns marching along the Alby road, were cannonaded by St. Pol with two guns, until they had passed a small stream, by the help of some temporary bridges ; when the French general, following his instructions, retired to the horn-work, on the Calvinet plat-

form. The Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese guns, under Major Arentschild, opened a heavy cannonade against Calvinet.

Meanwhile, Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix d'Orade in three columns abreast. Passing behind the brigade, through the village of Mont Blanc, he entered the marshy ground, between the Ers river and the Mont Rave; but he left his artillery at Mont Blanc, fearing to engage it in that deep and difficult country, under the fire of the enemy.

Beyond the Ers on his left, Vivian's cavalry, now under Colonel Arentschild, drove Berton's horsemen back with loss; and nearly seized the bridge of Bordes, which the French general passed and destroyed with difficulty at the last moment. However, the German hussars succeeded in gaining the bridge of Montaudran higher up, though it was barricaded and defended by a detachment of cavalry sent by Berton, who remained himself in position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.

While these operations were in progress,



General Freyre, who had asked as a favour to lead the battle at Calvinet, whether from error or impatience, assailed the horn-work on that platform about eleven o'clock, and while Beresford was still in march. The Spaniards, nine thousand strong, moved in two lines, and a reserve, and advanced with great resolution; at first throwing forwards their flanks, so as to embrace the end of the Calvinet hill.

The French musketry and great guns thinned the ranks at every step, yet closing upon their centre, they still ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were exposed to increasing in violence, until their right wing, which was also raked from the bridge of Matabiau, unable to endure the torment, wavered. The leading ranks rushing madly onwards, jumped for shelter into a hollow road twenty-five feet deep in parts, and covering this part of the French entrenchments; but the left-wing and the second line run back in great disorder—the Cantabrian fusileers, under Colonel Leon de Sicilia, alone maintaining their ground, under cover of a bank which protected them.

Then the French came leaping out of their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road, poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds entangled in the gulph below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau, constructed to rake this opening, sent its bullets from flank to flank, hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones.

The Spanish generals, rallying the troops who had fled, led them back again to the brink of the fatal hollow ; but the frightful carnage below, and the unmitigated fire in front, filled them with horror. Again they fled, and again the French, bounding from their trenches, pursued ; while several battalions, sallying from the bridge of Matabiau and from behind the Calvinet, followed hard along the road of Alby.

The country was now covered with fugitives, whose headlong flight could not be restrained, and with pursuers, whose numbers and vehemence increased ; until Lord Wellington, who was at that point, covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby's cavalry and the reserve artillery, which opened with great vigour.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a brigade of the light division wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the victorious French, who immediately retired to their entrenchments on Calvinet; but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or wounded, and their defeat was not the only misfortune.

General Picton, regardless of his orders, which—his temper on such occasions being known—were especially given, had turned his false attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux; and the enemy, fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders, and approachable only along an open flat, repulsed him with a loss of nearly four hundred men and officers. Amongst the latter, Colonel Forbes, of the 45th, was killed; and General Brisbane, who commanded the brigade, was wounded.\*

\* Although only three companies of the "Connaught Rangers" were engaged on this occasion, they had the good fortune to perform a critical and important service in supporting the 45th and 74th regiments, which formed a portion of Brisbane's brigade. The light infantry company, in particular, suffered; and its cap-

Thus, from the hill of Pugade to the Garonne, the French had completely vindicated their position, the allies had suffered enormously; and beyond the Garonne, although

tain, Robert Nickle, was severely wounded. The loss of the three companies in killed, was equal to that of the whole battalion at Vittoria, amounting to one serjeant and twenty-nine men; the wounded were Captain Nickle and Lieutenant Poole, one serjeant, and fifty-three rank and file.

Captain Nickle, as was usual with him, much distinguished himself; and amongst the many instances of injustice which the officers of the "Connaught Rangers" experienced at the hands of Sir Thomas Picton—many of which have been mentioned by me, in the first series of these "Adventures"—none were more flagrant (Lieutenant William Mackie's gross ill-treatment excepted) than those relating to Captain, now Major-general, Sir Robert Nickle. At the battle of the Pyrenees his gallantry was of the highest order; and in the second volume of the first series of these "Adventures" (page 77) I have borne my testimony to his distinguished conduct on that trying day: and the shameful neglect with which his services were passed over on that occasion—so far from being atoned, or made amends for afterwards—was only followed up by similar treatment at the battles of Orthes and Toulouse.

General Hill had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering St. Cyprien, and was menacing the second line, the latter being much more contracted, and very strongly fortified,

The following statement, relating to a part of the systematic injury inflicted by Sir Thomas Picton on this distinguished officer, is given in his own words ("United Service Journal," December 1836), and was forced from him in consequence of the assertion made by the biographer of Sir Thomas Picton, that Sir Thomas "gave the 88th regiment the most unqualified praise—and this was often."

"At the battle of Orthes, the light infantry of the division were formed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Greenwell, of the 45th; Captain Hilton, of the 45th, was the senior captain of the light infantry of the light brigade, though my junior. During the action, Lieutenant-colonel Greenwell was severely wounded, which placed Captain Hilton in command of the light infantry of the division, and myself in command of the light infantry of the right brigade.

"To place the matter beyond dispute, I send Sir Thomas Brisbane's and Colonel Greenwell's certificates. I naturally expected that I should, as it was considered a matter of course, get the medal, in succession, as was always customary in other divisions.

"Colonel Greenwell obtained the medal; Captain Hilton also got it, as succeeding to the command of the

could not be stormed. The musketry battle, therefore, subsided for a time ; but a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line ; and on the allies' side, from

division, and Captain Elliott, of the 83rd, not only got the medal, but the brevet ; but I belonged to the 88th, and was not noticed. We know, from experience, that when names were forwarded through the proper channel for honours, they were invariably attended to by the Duke of Wellington. When in command of the 88th, in the year 1813, I had repeatedly the honour of meeting the approbation of the late Sir Edward Pakenham, who succeeded to the command of the third division in the absence of Sir Thomas Picton. Immediately after the battle of Toulouse, Sir Edward rode up to the present Major-general Sir John Taylor, then Lieutenant-colonel of the 88th, and observed that he understood he had lost a great many men, and particularly in the light infantry. General Sir John Taylor replied that the light infantry were nearly all cut to pieces, having lost forty-six rank and file, killed and wounded, and that he regretted to say Captain Nickle was severely wounded. Sir Edward observed : ' Colonel Taylor, while I think of it, go with my compliments to Sir Thomas Picton, and say I shall feel obliged if he will give in Captain Nickle's name for the brevet, and I will speak to Lord Wellington and secure his promotion, he being one of the oldest officers in the division.'

St. Cyprien to Mont Blanc, where the artillery, left by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the Portuguese guns on the Pugade, poured its shot incessantly against the works on the Calvinet platform, injudiciously it has been said ; because the ammunition thus used for a secondary object, was afterwards wanted, when a vital advantage might have been gained.

It was now evident that the victory must be won or lost by Beresford ; and yet, from

Sir Thomas Picton's answer was : ' My compliments to Sir Edward, and say I have recommended a senior officer to Captain Nickle.' Now, with the exception of six months, when ordered to England on duty, I had served in the third division from the passage of the Douro down to Toulouse, was in nine general actions, and a siege, and in many affairs of light infantry and pickets ; independent of active services before the enemy in other parts of the globe, while the officer he recommended had not served three weeks with the division. This act of injustice was long spoken of, and was only explicable on the grounds of his feeling towards the 88th. For had I obtained the medal for Busaco and Orthes, I should now have, probably, that distinguished order, the third class of the Bath, worn by almost every one of my old contemporaries of the third division.'—*Author's Note.*

Picton's error, Lord Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy cavalry only remained in hand; and these troops were necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and to protect the artillery employed to keep the enemy in check.

The crisis therefore approached with all happy promise to the French general. The repulse of Picton, the utter dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first Taupin's whole division, and then one of Maransin's brigades from that quarter, to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave.

Thus three divisions and his cavalry, that is to say, nearly fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement, without in any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave, or on the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, whose force, originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced as it made slow and difficult way, for two miles, through a deep marshy country, crossed and tangled with water-courses.



For, sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French musquetry, and always under the fire of their artillery from the Mont Rave, without a gun to reply, the length of the column had augmented so much at every step, from the difficulty of the way, that frequent halts were necessary to close up the ranks.

The flat miry ground between the river and the heights, became narrower and deeper as the troops advanced. Berton's cavalry was a-head, an impassable river was on the left, and three French divisions, supported by artillery and horsemen, overshadowed the right flank. Fortune came to their aid.

Soult, always eyeing their march, had, when the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin's division to the platform of St. Sypiere, and supporting it with a brigade of D'Armagnac's division, dispersed the whole about the redoubts from thence. After a short exhortative to act vigorously, he ordered Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the same time directing a regiment of Vial's cavalry to descend the heights by the Lavaur road, and intercept the line of retreat, while Berton's horsemen assailed

the other flank from the side of the bridge of Bordes. But this was not half of the force which the French general might have employed. Taupin's artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets of Toulouse; and that general, instead of attacking at once, took ground to his right, waiting until Beresford, having completed his flank march, had wheeled into lines at the foot of the heights.

Taupin's infantry, unskillfully arranged for action, it is said, at last poured down the hill; but some rockets, discharged in good time, ravaged their ranks, and with their noise and terrible appearance, unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers. Then the British skirmishers, running forwards, plied them with a biting fire; and Lambert's brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson's brigade, and some provisional battalions of the fourth division (for it is an error to say the sixth division alone repulsed this attack); Lambert's brigade, I say, rushed forwards with a terrible shout, and the French, turning, fled back to the upper ground.

Vial's horsemen, trotting down the Lavour

road, now charged on the right flank ; but the second and third lines of the sixth division being thrown into squares, repulsed them ; and, on the other flank, General Cole had been so sudden in his advance up the heights, that Berton's cavalry had no opportunity to charge. Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry in his front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a check won the summit of the platform, his skirmishers even descended in pursuit on the reverse slope. Meanwhile, on his left, General Cole, meeting with less resistance, had still more rapidly gained the heights.

At that side, so complete was the rout, that the two redoubts were abandoned from panic ; and the French, with the utmost disorder, sought shelter in the works of Sacarin and Cambon.

Soult, astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected so much, and who had but just before given him assurance of their resolution and confidence, was in fear that Beresford, pushing his success, would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles, on the canal ; where-

fore, covering the flight, as he could, with the remainder of Vial's cavalry, he hastily led D'Armagnac's reserve brigade to the works of Sacarin, checked the foremost of the British skirmishers and rallied the fugitives.

Taupin's guns arrived from the town at the same moment, and the mischief being stayed, a part of Travot's reserve immediately moved to defend the bridge of the Demoiselles. A fresh order of battle was thus organized, but the indomitable courage of the British soldiers, overcoming all obstacles, and all opposition, had deceived the first great crisis of the fight.

Lambert's brigade immediately wheeled to its right across the platform, on the line of the Lavour road, menacing the flank of the French, on the Calvinet platform, while Pack's Scotch brigade, and Douglas's Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the sixth division, were disposed on the right, with a view to march against the Colombette redoubts, on the original front of the enemy.

Now, also, the eighteenth and German Hussars having forced the bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, came round the

south end of the Mont Rave, where, in conjunction with the skirmishers of the fourth division, they menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles, from whence, and from the works of Cambon and Sacarin, the enemy's guns played incessantly.

The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely changed. The French, thrown entirely on the defensive, occupied three sides of a square; their right extending from the works of Sacarin to the red aulets of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced by Lambert, who was solidly posted on the platform of St. Sypiere, while the redoubts themselves were menaced by Pack and Douglas.

The French left, thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau, awaited the renewed attack of the Spaniards; and the whole position was very strong, not exceeding a thousand yards on each side, with the angles all defended by formidable works; the canal and city of Toulouse, its walls and entrenched suburbs, offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured the power of retreat.

In this contracted space were concentrated Vial's cavalry, the whole of Villatte's division, one brigade of Maransin's, another of D'Armagnac's, and with the exception of the regiment driven from the St. Sypiere redoubt, the whole of Harispe's division. On the allies' side, therefore, defeat had been staved off, but victory was still to be contended for, and with apparently inadequate means; for Picton being successfully opposed by Darricau was so far paralyzed; the Spaniards, rallying slowly, were not to be depended upon for another attack, and there remained only the heavy cavalry and the light division, which Lord Wellington could not venture to thrust into the action, under pain of being left without any reserve in the event of a repulse.

The final stroke, therefore, was still to be made on the left, and with a very small force—seeing that Lambert's brigade and the fourth division were necessarily employed to keep in check the French troops at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon and Sacarin. This heavy mass, comprising one brigade of Travot's reserve, the half of D'Armagnac's division,

and all of Taupin's, together with the regiment belonging to Harispe, which had abandoned the forts of St. Sypiere, was commanded by General Clauzel, who disposed the greater part in advance of the trenches, as if to retake the offensive.

Such was the state of affairs about half-past two o'clock, when Beresford renewed the action with Pack's Scotch brigade, and the Portuguese of the sixth division, under Colonel Douglas. These troops, ensconced in the hollow Lavour Road, on Lambert's right, had been hitherto well protected from the fire of the French works; but now, scrambling up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to their left by wings of regiments as they could get out, and ascending the heights by the slope facing the Ers, under a wasting fire of cannon and musketry, carried all the French breastworks, and the Colombette and Calvinet redoubts.

It was a surprising action, when the loose, disorderly nature of the attack, imposed by the difficulty of the ground, is considered; but the French, although they yielded at first to

the thronging rush of the British troops, soon rallied, and came back with a reflux. Their cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible; for Harispe, who commanded in person at this part, and under whom the French seemed always to fight with redoubled vigour, brought up fresh men, and surrounding the two redoubts with a surging multitude, absolutely broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths of the 42nd, and drove the rest out.

The British troops were, however, supported by the 71st and 91st, and the whole, clinging to the brow of the hill, fought with a wonderful courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen, that their order of battle was reduced to a thin line of skirmishers. Some of the British cavalry then rode up from the low ground, and attempted a charge; but they were stopped by a deep, hollow road, of which there were many; and some of the foremost troopers tumbling headlong in, perished.

Meanwhile, the combat about the redoubts



continued fiercely—the French, from their numbers, had certainly the advantage, but they never retook the Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents down from the brow of the hill. At last, when the whole of the sixth division had rallied, and again assailed them flank and front; when their Generals—Harispe and Baurot—had fallen, dangerously wounded, and the Colom-bette was retaken by the 79th, the battle turned; and the French finally abandoned the platform, falling back partly by their right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the bridge of Matabiau.

It was now about four o'clock. The Spaniards, during this contest, had once more partially attacked; but they were again put to flight, and the French thus remained masters of their entrenchments in that quarter; for the sixth division had been very hardly handled; and Beresford halted to re-form his order of battle, and receive his artillery: it came to him, indeed, about this time, yet with great difficulty, and with little ammunition, in consequence of the heavy

cannonade it had previously furnished from Mont Blanc.

However, Soult, seeing that the Spaniards, supported by the light division, had rallied a fourth time; that Picton again menaced the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime Convent; while Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now advancing along the summit, deemed further resistance useless, and relinquished the northern end of the Calvinet platform. Also, about five o'clock, he withdrew his whole army behind the canal.

Still, however, holding the advanced works of Sacarin and Cambon, Lord Wellington then established the Spaniards in the abandoned works, and so became master of the Mont Rave, in all its extent.

Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The French had five generals, and perhaps three thousand men, killed or wounded, and they lost one piece of artillery. The Allies lost four generals, and four thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men and officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards—a la-

mentable spilling of blood, and a useless ; for, before this period, Napoleon had abdicated the throne of France, and a Provisional Government was constituted at Paris.

During the night, the French general, defeated, but undismayed, replaced the ammunition expended in the action, reorganized and augmented his field-artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal ; yet, looking to the final necessity of a retreat, he wrote to Suchet, to inform him of the result of the contest ; and proposed a combined plan of operations, illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his temper.

“ March,” said he, “ with the whole of your forces, by Quillan, upon Carcassonne : I will meet you there with my army : we can then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the Upper Garonne, and, holding on by the mountains, oblige the enemy to recall his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that city, and make a diversion in our favour.”

On the morning of the 11th, he was again ready to fight; but the English general was not. The French position—within musket-shot of the walls of Toulouse—was still inexpugnable on the northern and eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave, was only a preliminary step to the passage of the canal at the Bridge of the Demoiselles, and other points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon with the view of throwing the army, as originally designed, on to the south side of the town. But this was a great affair, requiring fresh dispositions, and a fresh provision of ammunition, only to be obtained from the park on the other side of the Garonne. Hence, to accelerate the preparations, to ascertain the state of General Hill's position, and to give that general farther instructions, Lord Wellington repaired, on the 11th, to St. Cyprien; but though he had shortened his communications, by removing the pontoon-bridge from Grenade to Seilh, the day was spent before the ammunition arrived, and the final arrangements for the passage of the canal could be

completed. The attack was, therefore, deferred until daylight on the 12th.

Meanwhile, all the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet, and menace Soult's retreat by the road leading to Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen on the heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together with the preparations in his front, taught Soult that he could no longer delay, if he would not be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated all his arrangements, he left eight pieces of heavy artillery, two Generals—the gallant Harispe being one—and sixteen hundred men, whose wounds were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors. Then, filing out of the city with surprising order and ability, he made a forced march of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. On the same day, General Hill's troops were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit, and the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, beat the French, with the loss of

twenty-five men, and cut off a like number of gendarmes, on the side of Revel.

Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was displayed, and as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon colours; but the Mayor, faithful to his Sovereign, had retired with the French army. The British general, true to his honest line of policy, did not fail to warn the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk; but in the afternoon, two officers, the English Colonel, Cooke, and the French Colonel, St. Simon, arrived from Paris, charged to make known to the armies the Abdication of Napoleon. They had been detained near Blois, by the officiousness of the police attending the Court of the Empress Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence; nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to the war. When St. Simon, in pursuance of his mission, reached Soult's quarters on the 13th, that Marshal, not without just cause, demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities until

authentic information could be obtained from the Ministers of the Emperor. Then, sending all his encumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnaudery, and awaited the progress of events.

Lord Wellington refused to accede to his proposal; and as General Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, acknowledged the authority of the provincial government, and readily concluded an armistice, he judged that Soult designed to make a civil war, and, therefore, marched against him on the 17th. The outposts were on the point of engaging, when the Duke of Dalmatia, who had now received official information from the chief of the Emperor's staff, notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France, and with this honourable distinction—that he had faithfully sustained the cause of his great monarch until the very last moment.

A convention, which included Suchet's army, was immediately agreed upon; but that Marshal had previously adopted the white colours of his own nation, and Lord Wellington in-

stantly transmitted the intelligence to General Clinton, in Catalonia, and to the troops at Bayonne. Too late it came for both, and useless battles were fought. That at Barcelona has been already described; but at Bayonne, misfortune and suffering had fallen upon one of the brightest soldiers of the British Army.\*

\* Napier.



## CHAPTER XVIII.

## SALLY FROM BAYONNE.

DURING the progress of the main army in the interior, Sir John Hope conducted the investment of Bayonne with all the zeal, the intelligence, and unremitting vigilance and activity which the difficult nature of the operation required. He had gathered great stores of gabions, and fascines, and platforms, and was ready to attack the citadel, when rumours of the events at Paris reached him : yet indirectly, and without any official character to warrant a formal communication to the garrison without

Lord Wellington's authority. These rumours were, however, made known at the outposts, and perhaps lulled the vigilance of the besiegers; but to such irregular communications, which might be intended to deceive, the Governor naturally paid little attention.

The picquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were at this time furnished by a brigade of the fifth division; but from thence to the extreme right the guards had charge of the line, and they had also one company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber's German brigade was encamped as a support to the left; the remainder of the first division was encamped in the rear towards Boucaut.

In this state, about one o'clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter, coming over to General Hay, who commanded the outposts that night, gave an exact account of the projected sally. The General, not able to speak French, sent him to General Hinuber, who, immediately interpreting the man's story to General Hay, assembled his own troops under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to Sir John Hope. It would appear that Hay,

perhaps disbelieving the man's story, took no additional precautions ; and it is probable, that neither the German brigade, nor the reserves of the guards, would have been put under arms but for the activity of General Hinuber.

However, at three o'clock, the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three thousand combatants. They surprised the picquets, and, with loud shouts, breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with one rush the church and the whole of the village of St. Etienne, with exception of a fortified house, which was defended by Captain Forster of the 38th regiment. Masters of every other part, and overthrowing all who stood before them, they drove the picquets and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, killed General Hay, took Colonel Townsend of the guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing troops, and, passing in rear of the right, threw the whole line into confusion.

Then it was that Hinuber, having his Germans well in hand, moved up on the side of

St. Etienne, rallied some of the fifth division, and, being joined by a battalion of General Bradford's Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit, bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy, and regained the village and church.

The combat on the right was at first even more disastrous than in the centre : neither the picquets nor the reserves were able to sustain the fury of the assault ; and the battle was most confused and terrible, for on both sides the troops, broken into small parties by the enclosures, and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet ; and sometimes friends encountered, sometimes foes.

All was tumult and horror ; the guns of the citadel vaguely guided by the flashes of the musketry, sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of fight ; and the gun-boats, dropping down the river, opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns, which, being put in motion by Sir John Hope on the first alarm, were now coming

up from the side of Boucaut. Thus nearly one hundred pieces of artillery were in full play at once ; and the shells having set fire to the fascine depots and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the striving masses.

Amidst this confusion, Sir John Hope, suddenly disappeared, none knew how or wherefore at the time ; but it afterwards appeared that, having brought up the reserves on the right to stem the torrent in that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road which led close behind the line of picquets.

The French had, however, lined both banks ; and when he endeavoured to return, a shot struck him in the arm ; while his horse—a large one, as was necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior—received eight bullets, and fell upon his leg. His followers had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of them, Captain Herries and Mr. Moore—a nephew of Sir John Moore—seeing his helpless state, turned back, and, alighting, endeavoured, amidst the heavy fire of the enemy, to draw

him from beneath the horse. While thus engaged, they were both struck down with dangerous wounds. The French carried them all off, and Sir John Hope was again severely hurt in the foot by an English bullet before they gained the citadel.

The day was now beginning to break, and the allies were enabled to act with more unity and effect. The Germans were in possession of St. Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards being properly disposed by General Howard, who had succeeded to the command, suddenly raised a loud shout, and running in upon the French, drove them back into the works with such slaughter, that their own writers admit a loss of one General and more than nine hundred men ; but, on the British side, General Stopford was wounded, and the whole loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers. Of these, more than two hundred were taken, besides the Commander-in-chief ; and it is generally acknowledged, that Captain Forster's firm defence of the fortified house first—and next, the readiness and gallantry with

which General Hinuber and his Germans retook St. Etienne, saved the allies from a very terrible disaster.

A few days after this piteous event, the convention made with Soult became known, and hostilities ceased.

All the French troops in the south were now reorganized in one body under the command of Suchet; but they were so little inclined to acquiesce in the Revolution, that Prince Polignac, acting for the Duke of Angoulême, applied to the British Commissary-General, Kennedy, for a sum of money to acquit them.

The Portuguese army returned to Portugal, the Spanish army to Spain; the Generals being, it is said, inclined at first to declare for the Cortes against the King, but they were diverted from their purpose by the influence and authority of Lord Wellington.

The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England; and the cavalry, marching through France, took shipping at Boulogne.

Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veterans' services !

The "Connaught Rangers" had a good passage from Bordeaux to Quebec ; had plenty of fishing on their voyage, and in less than six weeks were established in their quarters at Sorelle.



## CHAPTER XIX.

CIUDAD RODRIGO—THE LATE COLONEL GURWOOD OF THE 52ND, AND THE LATE MAJOR MACKIE OF THE 88TH.

So much has been written regarding these two distinguished officers, and their respective claim to the honour of the capture of the Governor of Rodrigo (General Barrié), that I subjoin the following correspondence submitted by both ; and in placing both statements side by side, the reader will be enabled to form his own judgment on the matter more easily than he could by reading one version of the affair at a different

period from the other. As for myself, I shall offer no opinion on their claim to the honour in question, never having seen Colonel Gurwood, or ever having had any conversation with Major Mackie on the subject.

These interesting narratives belong to military history, and should be recorded for the benefit of the army; for they show how one man, by a proper activity, pushed forward his claim and that which he considered his *right*, while the other kept back, and, *until it was too late*, made no claim at all.

In my account of the storming of Rodrigo,\* I gave Mackie all the praise I thought he was entitled to; but I could not, and did not say, that it was he who took the Governor prisoner. It had been said amongst some of the soldiers who were Mackie's immediate companions, and it was the generally received belief in the regiment, that he was the first officer who entered the citadel and captured the Governor.

\* "Adventures of the Connaught Rangers," Vol. i. — *First Series*.

He has said so himself, and I would be the last man in the world who would doubt anything uttered by him; but it may be asked, *and has been asked, why* he gave up his prize to Gurwood? He never told me *anything* on the subject, and I therefore did not mention the circumstance in the first series of my work, the more so, as his memorial to the Duke of Wellington, in May, 1812, four months after the event had taken place (in which, though directly mentioning his having led the forlorn-hope on the night of the storming of Rodrigo, and putting that service forward as grounds for promotion, but not even alluding in the remotest degree to the capture of the Governor) appears in the Appendix to that work. I advert to this contested point now, because I think it should be held up to the army as a guide, and as a lesson to those who may follow in the footsteps of those two gallant officers.

The following extracts form the particular portions of Colonel Gurwood's statement:—

“On the 8th of January, the light division and Pack's Portuguese brigade forded the Agueda, near Caridad, three miles above the fortress, and

making a circuit, took post beyond the Great Teson, where they remained quiet during the day ; and as there was no regular investment, the enemy believed not that the siege was commenced. But in the evening the troops stood to their arms, and Colonel Colborne, commanding the 52nd, having assembled two companies from each of the British regiments of the light division stormed the redoubt of Francisco. This he did with so much fury, that the assailants appeared to be, at one and the same time, in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting on the top of the rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, when the explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate open.

“ Three hundred volunteers, led by Major George Napier, of the 52nd, with a forlorn-hope of twenty-five men, under Mr. Gurwood, of the same regiment, composed the storming-party of the light division. All the troops reached their different posts without seeming to attract the attention of the enemy ; but before the signal was given, and while Lord Wellington, who in person had been pointing out the lesser breach to Major Napier, was still at the

Convent of Francisco, the attack on the right commenced, and was instantly taken up by the whole line. \* \* \* \* Meanwhile, the stormers of the light division, who had three hundred yards to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags ; but with extraordinary swiftness, running to the crest of the glacis, jumped down the scarp, a depth of eleven feet, and rushed up the *fausse-braie*, under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry.\*

“ The bottom of the ditch was dark and intricate, and the forlorn-hope took too much to their left ; but the storming party went straight to the breach, which was so contracted that a gun placed lengthways across the top blocked up the opening. Here the forlorn-hope rejoined the stormers ; but when two-thirds of the ascent were gained, the leading men, crushed together by the narrowness of the place, staggered under the weight of the enemy’s fire ; and such is the instinct of self-defence, that, although no man had been allowed to load, every musket in the crowd was snapped.

\* Colonel Gurwood’s Pamphlet, p. 383.

“The commander, Major Napier, was at this moment stricken to the earth by a grape-shot, which shattered his arm ; but he called on his men to trust to their bayonets, and all the officers simultaneously sprang to the front, when the charge was renewed with a furious shout, and the entrance was gained. The supporting regiments coming up in sections abreast, then reached the rampart ; the 52nd wheeled to the left, the 43rd to the right, and the place was won.

“During this contest, which lasted only a few minutes after the *fausse-braie* was passed, the fighting had continued at the great breach with unabated violence ; but when the 43rd and the stormers of the light division came pouring down upon the right flank of the French, the latter bent before the storm ; at the same moment, the explosion of three wall-magazines destroyed many persons, and the third division, with a mighty effort, broke through the intrenchments. The garrison, indeed, still fought for a moment in the streets, but finally fled to the castle, where Mr. Gurwood, who though wounded, had been amongst the foremost at

the lesser breach, received the Governor's sword.

"The allies now plunged into the streets from all quarters, for O'Toole's attack was also successful; and at the other side of the town Pack's Portuguese, meeting no resistance, had entered the place, and the reserve also came in. Then throwing off the restraints of discipline, the troops committed the most frightful excesses.

"The town was fired in three or four places; the soldiers menaced their officers, and shot each other; many were killed in the market-place. Intoxication soon increased the tumult; disorder everywhere prevailed; and at last the fury rising to an absolute madness, a fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of a great magazine, when the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms but for the energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses." \* \* \*

"The whole loss of the allies was about twelve hundred soldiers, and ninety officers, and of these, above six hundred and fifty men and

sixty officers had been slain or hurt at the breaches."

"The Duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the convent of Francisco, pointed out to Colonel Colborne and to Major Napier (brother to the author of 'The War in the Peninsula') commanding the storming party of the light division, the spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said: 'Now do you understand exactly the way you are to take, so as to arrive at the breach without noise or confusion?'

"He was answered, 'Yes, perfectly.'

"Some one of the staff then said to Major Napier, 'Why don't you load?'

"He answered, 'No, if we can't do the business without loading, we shall not do it at all.'

"The Duke of Wellington immediately said, 'Leave him alone.' " \* \* \*

"The Caçadores, under Colonel Elder, were to carry hay-bags to throw into the ditch; but the signal of attack having been given, and the fire commencing at the great breach, the



stormers would not wait for the hay-bags, which, from some confusion in the orders delivered, had not yet arrived, but from no fault of Colonel Elder or his gallant regiment; they were always ready for, and equal to, anything they were ordered to do. The troops jumped into the ditch; the *fausse-braie* was faced with stone, so as to form a perpendicular wall about the centre of the ditch; it was scaled, and the foot of the breach was gained."

Lieutenant Gurwood had gone too far to his left with the *Forlorn-hope*, and missed the entrance of the breach; he was struck down with a wound on the head, but sprang up again and joined Major Napier, Captain Jones, 52nd regiment, Mitchell, 95th, Fergusson, 43rd, and some other officers who, at the head of the stormers, were all going up the breach together.

\* \* \* "Colonel Colborne, although very badly wounded in the shoulder, formed the 52nd on the top of the rampart, and led them against the enemy.

"The great breach was so strongly barri-

caded, so fiercely defended, that the third division had not carried it, and were still bravely exerting every effort to force their way through the obstacles, when Colonel M'Leod, of the 43rd, poured a heavy flank fire upon the enemy defending it.

"The third division having commenced firing, we were obliged to hurry on the attack. The Forlorn-hope led, we advanced rapidly across the glacis, and descended into the ditch near the ravelin under a heavy fire. We found the Forlorn-hope placing the ladders against the face of the work, and our party turned towards them, when the engineer-officer called out, 'You are wrong; this is the way to the breach of the *fausse-braie*, which leads to the breach you are to attack.' "

\* \* \* "We ascended the breach in the *fausse-braie*, and then the breach of the body of the place without the aid of ladders." \* \* \*  
"We were for a short time on the breach before we found the entrance. A gun was stretched across the entrance, but did not impede our march. Near it some of the enemy were bayoneted, amongst the number some

deserters who were found in arms defending the breach."

\* \* \* "Major Napier was wounded at the moment when the men were checked by the heavy fire and determined resistance of the enemy, about two-thirds up the ascent. It was then that the soldiers, forgetting they were not loaded, as the Major had not permitted them, snapped all their firelocks."

\* \* \* "No individual could claim being the first that entered the breach; it was a simultaneous rush of about twenty or thirty. The Forlorn-hope was thrown in some degree behind, being engaged in fixing ladders against the face of the work, which they mistook for the point of attack."

\* \* \* "Upon carrying the breach, the parties moved as before directed by Major Napier; that is, the 52nd to the left, the 43rd to the right. The 43rd cleared the ramparts to the right, and drove the enemy from the places they attempted to defend, until it arrived near the great breach, at a spot where the enemy's defences were overlooked. At this time the great breach had not been carried, and

was powerfully defended by the enemy. The houses bearing directly upon it, the flanks of the breach were cut off, and the descent into the town from the ramparts at the top of it appeared considerable, so as to render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to force it without some other aid than a front attack."

In the eighth volume of the Duke of Wellington's Dispatches,\* Colonel Gurwood has inserted the following note :

" Lieutenant Gurwood, 52nd regiment, led the Forlorn-hope of the light division in the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards took the French Governor, General Barrié, in the citadel; and from the hands of Lord Wellington, on the breach of which he had entered, he received the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by the Duke of Wellington to compile this work has, doubtless been one of the distinguished consequences resulting from this service; and Lieutenant Gurwood feels pride, as a soldier

\* Page 531 in the new edition, Vol. V, p. 475.

of fortune, in here offering himself as an encouraging example to the subaltern in future wars." \* \* \*

The detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the lesser breach is of too little importance, except to those who served in it, to become a matter of history. The compiler, however, takes this opportunity of observing, that Colonel W. Napier has been misinformed respecting the conduct of the Forlorn-hope, in the account given of it by him in the appendix to the fourth volume of his 'History of the Peninsular War.' A correct statement, and proofs of it have since been furnished to Colonel W. Napier, for any future edition of his book, which will render any further notice of it here unnecessary.

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## CHAPTER XX.

EXTRACTS FROM A MEMOIR, ADDRESSED BY  
THE LATE MAJOR MACKIE TO COLONEL W.  
NAPIER, OCTOBER, 1838.

“THE troops being immediately ordered to advance, were soon across the ditch and upon the breach at the same instant with the 94th, who had advanced along the ditch. To mount under the fire of the defenders was the work of a moment ; but when there, difficulties of a formidable nature presented themselves. On each flank, a deep trench was cut across the rampart, isolating the breach, which was enfiladed with cannon and

musketry, while in front, from the rampart into the streets of the town, was a perpendicular fall of ten or twelve feet; the whole preventing the soldiers from making that bold and rapid onset, so effective in facilitating the success of such an enterprise.

“The great body of the fire of defence being from the houses, and from an open space in front of the breach, in the first impulse of the moment I dropped from the rampart into the town.\* Finding myself here quite alone, and no one following, I discovered that the trench upon the right of the breach was cut across the whole length of the ramparts, thereby opening a free access to our troops, and rendering, what was intended by the enemy as a defence, completely the reverse.

“By this opening I again mounted to the

\* “Sixteen feet in depth, at the foot of which had been ranged a variety of impediments, such as crows-feet, chevaux-de-frize, iron spikes, &c., the whole being encircled with the means of maintaining a barrier of burning combustibles.”—See *Journals of Sieges*, Vol. I, p. 145, by Colonel J. T. Jones.

top of the breach, and led the men down into the town. The enemy's fire, which I have stated had been, after we gained the summit of the wall, confined to the houses and open space alluded to, now began to slacken, and ultimately they abandoned the defence. Being at this moment in advance of the whole of the third division,\* I led what men I could collect along the street, leading in a direct line from the great breach into the centre of the town, by which street the great body of the enemy were precipitately retiring. Having advanced considerably, and passed across a

\* Not confirmed by the D. O. of the third division, published in the "United Service Journal," September, 1843, long after I had written these notes.—*J. G.*

"Colonel Gurwood is perfectly correct in this assertion. The disgraceful Division Order to which he alludes will be found at page 222, Vol. I. First Series 'Adventures of the Connaught Rangers.' This Division Order would alone affix an indelible stain on the memory of Sir Thomas Picton, and it gives a much truer insight into the character of the General than his biographer has been able to accomplish in the eight hundred and thirty-five pages he has written on the subject."—*Author's Note.*



street running to the left, a body of the enemy came suddenly from that street, rushed through our ranks and escaped. In pursuit of this body, which, after passing us, held their course to the right, I urged the party forwards in that direction, until we reached the citadel, where were the Governor and garrison.\*

“The outer gate of the enclosure being open,† I entered at the head of the party composed of men of different regiments, who by this time had joined the advance. Immediately on entering, I was hailed by a French officer, asking for an English General, to whom they might surrender.‡ Pointing to my epaulettes, in token of their security, the door of the keep or stronghold of the place was opened, and a sword presented to me in token of surrender, which sword I accordingly received.

\* I did not see any troops in the “square tower,” Major Mackie must have meant “some officers” of the garrison.—*J. G.*

† This gate was closed when I first arrived at the square tower.—*J. G.*

‡ Major Mackie did not understand French.—*J. G.*

“This I had scarcely done, when two of their officers laid hold of me for protection, one on each arm; and it was while I was thus situated, that Lieutenant Gurwood came up and obtained the sword of the Governor.\*

“In this way the Governor, with Lieutenant Gurwood, and the two officers I have mentioned still clinging to my arms, the whole party moved towards the rampart. Having found, when there, that in the confusion incident to such a scene, I had lost as it were by accident, that prize which was actually within my reach, and which I had justly considered as my own, in the chagrin of the moment I turned upon my heel and left the spot.

“The following day, in company with Captain Lindsay of the 88th regiment, I waited upon Colonel Pakenham, then Acting-adjutant General to the 3rd division, to know if my name had been mentioned by General Picton, as having led the advance of the right bri-

\* When I entered the square tower, Corporal MacIntyre and Lowe, and the French officer who had accompanied me, were the only persons present.—*J. G.*

gade.\* He told me that it had; and I therefore took no further notice of the circumstance, feeling assured that I should be mentioned in the way of which all officers, in similar circumstances, must be so ambitious. My chagrin and disappointment may be easily imagined, when Lord Wellington's dispatches reached the army from England, to find my name altogether omitted, and the right brigade deprived of their just meed of praise.\* \* \*

"Sir, it is evident that the tendency of this note† is—unavoidably, though I do him the justice to believe by no means intentionally, upon Colonel Gurwood's part—to impress the public with the belief that he was himself the first British officer that entered the citadel of Ciudad Rodrigo, consequently the one to whom its garrison surrendered.

"This impression, the language he employs is the more likely to convey, inasmuch as to

\* It has been proved that the left brigade of the third division preceded the attack of the right brigade in the great breach. See D. O., p. 83.—J. G.

† Colonel Gurwood's note, quoted from the "Dispatches."

his exertions and good fortune in this particular instance he refers the whole of his professional success; to which he points the attention of the future aspirant, as a pledge of the rewards to be expected from similar efforts to deserve them. To obviate this impression, and in bare justice to the right brigade of the third division, and as a member of it, to myself, I feel called on to declare, that though I do not claim for that brigade exclusively the credit of forcing the defences of the great breach, the left brigade having joined in it contrary to the intention of Lord Wellington, under the circumstances stated. Yet I do declare, on the word of a man of honour, that I was the first individual who effected the descent from the main breach into the streets of the town; that I preceded the advance into the body of the place, that I was the first who entered the citadel, and that the enemy there assembled had surrendered to myself and party, before Lieutenant Gurwood came up!

“Referring to the inference which Colonel Gurwood has been pleased to draw from his own good fortune, as to the certainty and value

of the rewards awaiting the exertions of the British soldier. Permit me, Sir, in bare justice to myself, to say, that at the time I volunteered the Forlorn-hope on this occasion, I was senior Lieutenant of my own regiment, consequently, the first for promotion.

“ Having as such, succeeded so immediately after to a company, I could scarcely expect, nor did I expect further promotion at the time ; but after many years of additional service, I did still conceive, and do still maintain, that I was entitled to bring forward my services on that day, as a ground for asking that step of rank which every officer leading a Forlorn-hope had received with the exception of myself.\*

\* In the year 1819, when quartered with my regiment, the 10th Hussars, at Edinburgh—the present General Sir Alexander Duff, who had formerly commanded the 88th, spoke to me respecting Captain Mackie, and his disappointment in not obtaining further promotion. I wrote to Major-General Sir H. Torrens, pointing out the invidious position in which this want of promotion of Captain Mackie had placed me. At the review of the 51st regiment at Hampton Court, in the year 1820, I brought the conduct of Lieutenant Dyas, of the 51st regiment, also under the consideration

“ May I, Sir, appeal to your sense of justice in lending me your aid to prevent my being deprived of the only reward I had hitherto enjoyed, in the satisfaction of thinking that the service which I am now compelled most reluctantly to bring in some way to the notice of the public, had, during the period that has since elapsed, never once been called in question.

“ It was certainly hard enough that a service of this nature should have been productive of no advantage to me in my military life. I feel it, however, infinitely more annoying that I should now find myself in danger of being stripped of my credit to which it might entitle me, by the looseness of the manner in which Colonel Gurwood words his statement. I need not say that this danger is only the more imminent, from his statement appearing in a

of Sir H. Torrens. He had led the unsuccessful attack at San Cristoval, in May, 1811, and had not been promoted. I was more fortunate in this application than in that in favour of Captain Mackie; for, in consequence of my representation, Lieutenant Dyas was promoted to a company.—*J. G.*

work which, as being published under the auspices of the Duke of Wellington, as well as of the Horse-Guards, has at least the appearance of coming in the guise of an official authority.

“I agree most cordially with Colonel Gurwood in the opinion he has expressed in his note, that he is himself an instance where reward and merit have gone hand in hand. I feel compelled, however, for the reasons given, to differ from him materially as to the precise ground on which he considers the honours and advantages that have followed his deserts to be not only the distinguished, but the just and natural consequences of his achievements on that day. I allude to the claim advanced by Colonel Gurwood, to be considered the individual by whom the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo was made prisoner of war.\*

\* I was in the same garrison at Portsmouth, in 1834, with Major Mackie, then in the 94th, subsequent to the publication of the fourth volume of Colonel W. Napier's "History," which stated (see p. 6) that the garrison fled to the castle, where Mr. Gurwood, who,

“It could scarcely be expected, that at such a moment I could be aware that the sword which I received was not the Governor’s, being in fact that of one of his aides-de-camp.\*

“I repeat, however, that before Lieutenant Gurwood and his party came up, the enemy had expressed their wish to surrender; that a sword was presented by them in token of submission, and received by me as a pledge, on the honour of a British officer, that, according to the laws of war, I held myself responsible for their safety as prisoners under the protection of the British arms. Not a shadow of resistance was afterwards made; and I appeal to every impartial mind in the least degree acquainted with the rules of modern warfare, if, under these circumstances, I am not justified in asserting,

though wounded, had been amongst the foremost at the lesser breach, received the Governor’s sword. I always wore the sword; but neither that circumstance, nor the statement of Colonel Napier, produced any remark at the time from Major Mackie.—*J. G.*

\* Major Mackie must have been mistaken; the governor had no aide-de-camp.—*J. G.*



that before, and at the time Lieutenant Gurwood arrived, the whole of the enemy's garrison within the walls of the citadel, Governor included, were both *de jure* and *de facto* prisoners to myself. In so far, therefore, as he being the individual who made its owner captive, could give either of us a claim to receive that sword to which Colonel Gurwood ascribes such magic influence in the furthering of his after fortunes, I do maintain that at the time it became *de facto* his, it was *de jure* mine."

*Extract of a Letter from Major-general Sir E. Gibbs, K.C.B., to Colonel Gurwood.*

"Government House, Jersey, April 14, 1843.

"As Ciudad Rodrigo was gained by the little breach, you must have been the first in the town; consequently, the Governor surrendered to you, and not to Major Mackie."

## CHAPTER XXI.

MEMORANDUM ON THE SIEGE AND ASSAULT  
OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

“ London, April, 1843.

“ COLONEL W. NAPIER has related particulars of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, in the 4th volume of his ‘ History of the War in the Peninsula,’ and given authorities for the details of it in the appendix of that volume. I wrote a letter, in June, 1843, to Colonel W. Napier, pointing out the misstatements and inaccuracies in them. In 1840, Colonel W. Napier published the 6th volume of his

‘History,’ and added several justificatory notes of his authorities to substantiate what he had previously written. I have, therefore, now thought it proper to write a memorandum of all I recollect relating to the siege and assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, trusting to my endeavours to obtain corroborative proofs of the statement in my letter to Colonel W. Napier.

“The deeds of subaltern officers and of private soldiers are very rarely of sufficient importance to find place in the pages of history. Newspapers, reviews, and such ephemeral publications, are sufficient records of the personal vanity of individuals; but history does not, and particularly the ‘History of the War in the Peninsula’ did not, require the recapitulation of them. I shall, therefore, print this memorandum for my friends only, and for the commanding officer of my old regiment, the 52nd, who will decide whether he may consider it worthy of a place in the ‘Records’ of its services.

“After a lapse of so many years, it is difficult to obtain the testimony of those living at the

time; and even their memories may not be the most satisfactory in elucidating facts relating to personal conduct, which must, in cases of this kind, depend much upon circumstantial, rather than upon direct evidence, and the reputation for veracity of the narrators. The testimony of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, who may be under the influence of personal obligations, renders the difficulty of proof still greater.

“ Lord Wellington commenced the operations of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, by the attack of Fort Renaud, situated on the Teso Grande; and, on the 8th January, 1812, a detachment of the light division, formed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Colborne, of the 52nd, and consisting of four companies, one from each of the four battalions of the divisions; viz., of the 43rd, first and second battalions, 52nd and 95th, or Rifle Brigade, with a proportion of Portuguese caçadores, was assembled when it became dark, on the reverse of the Teso Grande, on which Fort Renaud was situated. Lieutenant-colonel Colborne called the officers together, and explained his mode

of attack ; viz., two companies to march up to face the two sides of the fort, to keep up the fire on the parapets, and to prevent any one showing his head above them, whilst the storming party, headed by Captain Mein, of the 52nd, should pass the ditch at the salient angle.

“The fourth party was divided, one part of it being detached between the redoubt and the town to cover the operation, whilst the other part of it was employed with crow-bars to force the gate at the gorge. I had the command of the crow-bar party. On the challenge, ‘*qui vive ?*’ each party proceeded to its destined point of attack. Lieutenant-colonel Colborne’s letter explains how the redoubt was carried.”

*Lieutenant-colonel Colborne to Major-general  
R. Crauford.*

“El Bodon, January 9, 1812.

“I have the honour to report to you the proceedings of the detachment of the light division ordered to attack the outwork in front of

Ciudad Rodrigo. The two hundred men conducted by Major Gibbs, advanced so rapidly to the attack that the enemy had but little time to annoy them with his fire. Captain Crampton of the 95th regiment, first formed upon the crest of the glacis, followed by the companies under the command of Captain Travers and Lieutenant M'Namara of the 95th regiment, and Captain Merry of the 52nd regiment, and fired on the enemy; whilst Captain Duffy of the 43rd, Captain Mein of the 52nd, with their companies, and Lieutenant Woodgate, who had charge of the ladders, leaped into the ditch and escalated the work.

“Major Gibbs moved round the gate and prevented the enemy's escape. Two officers and forty-seven rank and file, were made prisoners by the detachment. I beg leave to mention that the intrepidity and exertions of Captain Mein and Lieutenant Woodgate could not be exceeded. Captain Mein, Lieutenant Woodgate, and Lieutenant Hawkesly, of the 95th, were wounded; the two latter severely.

“In my attempt to force the gate at the gorge, we were interrupted by the enemy throwing over lighted grenades; but as I saw the gate was low, I went round the angle of the fort, where I told Lieutenant-colonel Colborne, that I thought, if I had a few ladders, I could get in at the gorge. The ladders, however, which I carried, by his orders, from the point of attack at the salient angle to the gorge, were of no use to us, for the gate was suddenly blown open. I rushed into the fort, accompanied by Lieutenant Anderson, 52nd, and the men at the gorge, and we met the storming party coming over the angle. The storming party alone suffered.

“My recollections respecting the assault of the lesser breach, which afterwards took place, having been doubted, I wrote in the beginning of this year (1843), to Lord Seaton (Lieutenant-colonel Colborne), to request he would be so good as to send me a statement of my conduct in the occurrences of the night of the 8th.”

*Lord Seaton to Colonel Gurwood.*

“ Ketley, February 27, 1843.

“ My dear Gurwood,

“ With reference to your letter of the 23rd instant, I have great pleasure in complying with your request, in respect to the statement which you require of the occurrences on the night of the attack on the redoubt of San Francisco, on the 8th January, 1812, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo. The four companies of the light division, which had been ordered by me to move up to the crest of the glacis of the redoubt, and to direct their fire towards the superior slope of the parapet, had filed out, and each taken their respective posts; and while I was giving orders to the party in charge of the scaling ladders, at the angle of the redoubt nearest our communications, you came to me from the gorge, and informed me that you thought you could get in at the gorge, if you had ladders. I desired you to take two or three of them with you as quick as possible.

“ In the meantime, ladders having been laid



across the palisades and placed against the work, we succeeded in mounting and entering the redoubt about the same time that the company at the gorge entered. Captain Mein, of the 52nd regiment, who was wounded as he was entering the redoubt, and Captain Duffy (43rd), and Lieutenant Woodgate (52nd), senior officers of their rank, were the officers recommended by me in my report to General Craufurd; and I mentioned your exertions and conduct to the commanding officer of the second battalion, 52nd. I had every reason to be fully satisfied with the gallant and steady conduct of all the officers in command of detachments on that occasion; I, therefore, considered it my duty to bring under the notice of the General commanding the light division, the seniors of each rank employed with the storming party."

"Lieutenant-colonel Colborne gave orders immediately to evacuate the fort, and directed me, although I belonged to the second battalion to take the command of Captain Mein's company, Lieutenant Woodgate, as well as Captain

Mein, being wounded, and the other officer of the company, Ensign W. Moore (now Colonel Moore, nephew of the late Sir John Moore), having but lately joined the 52nd. Lieutenant-colonel Colborne's detachment then proceeded to the drain at the bottom of the Teso Grande, to cover the working parties ordered to break ground on the redoubt being taken, and we remained in the drain for that purpose until twelve o'clock, when we were relieved.

"After the fort was taken, the enemy kept up a heavy fire from the town, and threw out great numbers of fireballs, to show them where to direct it.

"On our return to camp (which in those days was only the bare ground, for it was before we were supplied with tents, and there was no wood to make huts, and hardly a twig to make a fire with), I went to a shed in the rear, where Captain Mein and Lieutenant Woodgate had been carried for the night, as also where the prisoners were lodged until daylight; and it was there, in conversation with the French officer of artillery, that I learned the cause of the gate at the gorge being blown open, which

had appeared so extraordinary to Lieutenant Anderson and myself. He told me that a serjeant of artillery, in the act of throwing a live shell upon the storming party in the ditch was shot dead, the lighted shell falling within the fort ; and that fearing the explosion of the shell among the men who were defending the parapet, he had kicked it towards the gorge, where, stopped by the bottom of the gate, it exploded, and blew the gate open.

“The light division were in the trenches three times during the siege ; viz., the eighth, the twelfth, and the seventeenth, being relieved alternately by the first, fourth, and third divisions. On the days not on duty in the trenches, the divisions were put up, under cover, in the ruined villages in the neighbourhood.

“On the night of the 17th, I was on duty on the midnight relief, and employed in pushing the sap across the drain to the Teso Basco, and in the return of the sap.\* At the end of the four hours (four A. M. of the 18th),

\* See “Jones’s Sieges,” plate iii, *d* and *e*, and cc.

while anxiously waiting the hour of relief from the striking of the clock of the cathedral, not the two hundred yards from us, thought of the probable assault of the town flashed on my mind.

“When relieved, instead of returning to the ground of encampment, being very much fatigued, I stopped in the zigzag leading from the sap to the batteries (at about *b* in the plan), and under an epaulement I slept until day-break. I then quitted the trenches, and returned to my battalion. The thought, however, of the assault still absorbed me ; so much so, that I asked Major Gibbs (Major-general Sir E. Gibbs, K.C.B.), who commanded the battalion to which I belonged, for leave to proceed alone to El Bodon, the cantonment of the 52nd. El Bodon was between two and three leagues from the besieging ground, and we had to ford the Agueda near the convent of La Caridad ; the river, from two to three feet deep, not being frozen sufficiently to bear.

“Major Gibbs granted me the permission I had asked, and I passed my lonely walk in

reflections upon the chances of death and distinction, in the event of Ciudad Rodrigo not surrendering, but standing an assault; and the probability of the light division being ordered for such service. I ruminated upon the chances of there being danger as much in the main body of the column of attack as at the head of it, exposed, as the whole would be, to the fire from all parts of the ramparts, and that, if I led the column, I might have the chance of personal distinction, which I should not obtain in the column. I decided to volunteer.

“On the arrival of the two battalions near to El Bodon, I went out to meet my old friend, Major G. Napier, my former Captain in the first battalion, he having been promoted in the previous year, and I communicated to him my intentions. Without a moment’s hesitation, he said :

“‘Well, if you go, I will go,’ or some words to that effect; and we decided to consult Lieutenant-colonel Colborne, to whose opinion and judgment we submitted our proposition. It was approved of, but also decided

that we should say nothing upon the subject to any other person ; and in the evening, Major G. Napier and myself went to Lieutenant-colonel Colborne's quarters, when the resolution being fixed and approved of, a paper was written out :

“ ‘ In the event of Ciudad Rodrigo standing an assault, and that the light division should be employed it, the following officers of the 52nd are desirous of offering their services :

“ ‘ Major G. Napier to command the storming party.

“ ‘ Lieutenant Gurwood to command the forlorn-hope.’\* ”

\* “ This arrangement mentioned by Colonel Gurwood, had reference to the light division, only. Nothing of the kind took place as regarded Picton's—for that corps was ignorant whether or not it was to take a part in the contest about to be decided. In fact so late in the evening as five o'clock, and after a portion of the light division (the 43rd regiment), had passed the bivouac of Picton's people, the third division had not received any intimation that it was to storm the grand breach.

“ However, the 43rd regiment had scarcely passed us, on its way to the lesser breach, when all doubts were

“I think this paper was signed, or recommended, by Lieutenant-colonel Colborne. We took the letter to General Crauford’s quarters, and sent it up to his room by the orderly in waiting, who shortly returned, saying: ‘No answer.’ This was on the evening of the 18th. Early in the morning of the 19th, orders were received for the march of the division to the besieging ground. Not being its turn of duty for the trenches, the supposition was that the light division was ordered there for the assault, and various surmises were made upon whom the service would fall.

“After passing the ford, the division assembled, as usual, at La Caridad, where Lord March (the Duke of Richmond, aide-de-camp

set at rest by the word of command: ‘Stand to your arms.’ Lieutenant W. Mackie, of the “Connaught Rangers,” and Major Russel Manners, of the 74th, —the former leading the forlorn-hope, the latter the storming party—led the way, and in a few minutes Picton’s men were engaged in the great breach.”

See “Adventures of the Connaught Rangers,” Vol. I, pages 192—95. First Series.—*Author’s Note.*

to Lord Wellington) arrived from head-quarters with an order that the light division was to storm the little breach; and that three hundred volunteers, with a proportion of officers, would be required for the storming party to head the column of attack; but that Major Napier and Lieutenant Gurwood, of the 52nd, had their posts already allotted.

“I never knew whether it was Lord Wellington, or General Crauford only, who had signified this latter announcement; but Lord March knew of it, and came to me and shook me by the hand. I therefore presume that our design had been communicated by General Crauford to head-quarters.

“When it became known that I had previously volunteered to lead the storming party of the division, I found that, by so doing, I had placed myself in an invidious position with my brother officers, who deemed it to be a tour of duty, and not an occasion for which volunteers were required. I was Lieutenant only in the second battalion, and, of course, very junior to them. The rivalry between the 43rd and 52nd was likely also



to become a difficulty, a Lieutenant of the 43rd having also volunteered to lead the forlorn-hope; but on reference to the Army List, I was found to be senior to him as a Lieutenant, and my lot was confirmed.

"During these arrangements, which required trouble and occupied time (for three times the number of men required had volunteered, and it was difficult to get rid of their pretensions), I was under the influence of great excitement. I kept on eating, principally bread; but I carefully controlled my thirst, knowing how insatiable it becomes under nervous excitement. The men having dined, the volunteers from the division assembled at the head of the column, and we proceeded from the ruined convent of La Caridad round the town, at a distance, to the besieging ground. Many were the anxious looks that I cast towards the *drapeau tricolor*, still flying on the square bastion, in which the little breach was made. The striking of that flag would have put an end to my ambitious pretensions.

"The light division halted short of the

besieging ground, occupied by the third division doing duty in the trenches, and being ordered to assault, the great breach having been allotted to the light division. After the receipt of the order by General Crauford, for the light division to storm the lesser breach, that officer remonstrated with Lord Wellington, and claimed for it, as it had broken ground, the honour of assaulting the great breach from the trenches.

“Lord Wellington told General Crauford that he could not insult the third division by turning them out of the trenches, to make room for the light division; and that as to privileges, he had experience in sieges, and knew of none but obedience to orders. The Duke of Wellington mentioned this to me, many years afterwards, when speaking of General Crauford.

“The light division was halted on the ground near a road, leading to the suburb and convent of San Francisco, from San Felices; and I went with Major G. Napier to the convent of San Francisco, where Lieutenant-colonel

Colborne, General Crauford, Lord Wellington, &c., had already assembled.

“I mounted the tower of the convent; Lord Wellington, General Crauford, Major G. Napier, and Lieutenant-colonel Colborne, reconnoitred the breach from it; and I have some indistinct recollection of having spoken to Major Sturgeon. There might have been other officers present. I was directed to examine the ground well, so as to be able, when it became dark, to lead the column to the breach.

“I saw that the glacis, opposite to the breaches in the *fausse-braie*, and in the wall of the tower, was ploughed up by the fire from our batteries; and that I must keep to the left to avoid the enemy's fire, which no doubt would be directed opposite the breaches, as soon as our approach would be discovered. I particularly remarked a gutter, or drain, which led direct to the convent wall, from the glacis covering the salient angle of that part of the *fausse-braie* which embraced and covered the breach in the wall of the town.

“Lord March had brought a turkey-pie from

head-quarters to Major G. Napier, of which, with others, I recollect eating a great deal, to fill my craving stomach. In discussing the turkey-pie, under cover of the wall of the convent, which concealed us from the town, from the ramparts of which there was now an increased fire, we talked of the plunder of the place. Some talked of horses, others of other things; but, in joke, I said to Lord March: 'I will bring you the Governor.'"

## CHAPTER XXII.

## MEMORANDUM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

“THE following were the arrangements for the assault of the lesser breach.\*

“Another column, consisting of Major-general Vandeleur’s brigade, will issue out from the left of the main breach. This column must have twelve ladders, each twelve feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch at a point which will be shown them by Captain Ellicombe. On arriving in the ditch, they are to turn to their left of the small ravelin, and

\* See “Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,” new edition, Vol. V. p. 471.

thence to the breach in the tower of the body of the place. As soon as this body will have reached the top of the breach in the *fausse-braie* wall, a detachment of five companies are to be sent to the right, to cover the attack of Major-general Mackinnon's brigade, by the principal breach; and as soon as they have reached the top of the tower, they are to turn to their right, and communicate with the rampart of the main breach. As soon as this communication can be established, endeavour should be made to open the gate of Salamanca.

“The Portuguese brigade in the third division, will be formed in the communication to the first parallel, and behind the hill of San Francisco (Upper Teson), and will move up to the entrance of the second parallel, ready to support Major-general Mackinnon's brigade.

“Colonel Bernard's brigade will be formed behind the convent of San Francisco, ready to support Major-general Vandeleur's brigade. All these columns will have detached parties, especially appointed to keep up a fire on the defences during the above.

“The men with ladders, and axes, and bags must not have their arms: those who are to storm must not fire.

“As soon as it grew dark, the light division, with the three hundred volunteers at its head, came to the rear of the convent wall. The column, formed left in front, brought the hundred men of the 52nd, as the leading corps of the storming party, then the hundred men of the 43rd, the hundred men of the 95th covering their advance to the glacis. I therefore asked Major G. Napier, and Lieutenant-colonel Colborne, what number of men I was to take with me as the forlorn-hope. On their consulting with General Crauford, I was directed to take neither too many nor too few—about twenty or thirty—as all that I was required to do was to make a lodgment in the breach, and direct the column to it.

“I moved off thirteen file from the left of the hundred men of the 52nd, with the non-commissioned officers — Serjeants Douglas, Ramsay, and Sloss, of the companies to which the thirteen file belonged. I told them that they were the forlorn-hope, and that all

they had to do was to follow me. Serjeant M'Currie had always been the orderly serjeant of the first battalion when I was acting adjutant of it, and continued to perform that duty; he was appointed to take charge of the hay-bags, to be carried by the Portuguese Caçadores, and thrown by them into the ditch for us to jump on. Knowing his quickness and intrepidity, I was too glad not to avail myself of his services.

“On the concerted signal for the assault—three guns from the batteries—my heart beat double quick, and I applied my mouth to the calabash of Jack Jones (Captain Jones, 52nd, commanding the remainder of the hundred men of the 52nd storming party), from which I swallowed a gulp of aguardiente. It will not do to have the mind dwell too long upon the execution of what has been decided upon. It is previous to action that consequences are to be feared from delay. Once in action, the mind is under an influence which carries one forward.

“Had this anxious moment lasted much longer, I might have again had recourse to



my friend Jack Jones's calabash; but on the word 'off,' we started; the hay-bags and ladder-bearers being under Serjeant M'Currie; and running direct to the point which the gutter led from, and which I had previously fixed upon, I soon arrived at the crest of the glacis. The 95th, as the covering party to the assault, spread themselves on the glacis, but did not fire until the enemy within the *fausse-braie* had discovered our approach. Either we outstripped the party carrying the hay-bags, or from some other cause they did not arrive, and we let ourselves down into the ditch at the angle, as I had intended.

"The ladder-bearers having thrown the ladders into the ditch, where Serjeant M'Currie joined me, I soon saw the intention of the enemy within the *fausse-braie*. I went to the other face of the angle, and with the assistance of Serjeant M'Currie, placed the ladders against the wall, and, unobserved, mounted with all my party, by which means I got in the rear of the guard defending the breach in the *fausse-braie*.

"I have always considered this act as the

cleverest thing I ever did as a soldier. It has, however, been brought against me by Colonel W. Napier and his authorities, as having missed the breach. I did infinitely better, as the result proved; for, in consequence, the breach in the *fausse-braie* being turned, was instantly abandoned by those who had defended it, and who immediately went up the breach of the wall of the town, I and my party following by the light of a fireball thrown from the town into the space between the foot of the breach and the *fausse-braie*.

“In the middle of the breach I struck down a French soldier. Having thus made a lodgement in the breach of the town, as ordered, I sent a man to the breach in the *fausse-braie*, to direct the column to that part, and we gave a shout to direct the column also to the breach in the town. After this shout we scrambled up the breach in the wall of the town, which was not very accessible, although quite practicable, as I had seen several of the guards of the *fausse-braie* get up it. Not seeing any more French, I thought the breach had been abandoned;

but on arriving near a disabled gun at the top, I found the bastion crowded with troops crying: *Vive l'Empereur, ils ne monteront pas !* A round-shot or stone, thrown at me, toppled me over ; the breach being steep, and my footing not secure, I carried down with me some of my party nearly to the bottom.

“ Seeing the improbability of now carrying the breach by the bayonet, according to order, I directed the men to load, and posted some of them on each side, to fire up to the top, whilst I went up the centre. There was no immediate danger in the breach, as those who defended it above, being exposed to the fire from below, did not come forward to fire down it.

“ At this time the storming party arrived, whether by the ladders, or by the breach in the *fausse-braie*, I do not know. I again got to the top, and whilst in the act of getting over the disabled gun, to strike a French officer who was crying ‘*Vive l'Empereur,*’ I saw a musket levelled not far from my head, and the Frenchman in the act of pulling the

trigger. I bobbed my head in time, but was wounded and stunned by the fire. I found myself at the bottom of the breach. I cannot tell how long I was there; but on putting my hand to the back of my head where I felt that I had been wounded, I found that the skull was not fractured. Corporal Wise lay dead close by me.

“The first person I saw among those at the foot of the breach, was Major G. Napier, wounded in the elbow. He told me that the breach had not yet been carried. He spoke to the men, who were clustering as thick as bees at the foot of the breach. I recollect seeing Captain Jones of the 52nd, and Lieutenant Uniacke of the 95th. We again set up a shout, scrambled up the breach, and gained the rampart of the bastion. I cannot pretend to say what other officers were present on this occasion, but I saw none but Captain Jones and Lieutenant Uniacke; and on the bastion Uniacke told me that his orders were to go to the right. My orders were to go to the left, and open the Salamanca gate.

“On leaving the bastion, to go along the rampart to the left, at a short distance, my attention was called by a cry, and I saw some soldiers of my party, one of whom was Pat Lowe, in the act of bayoneting a French officer, who resisted being plundered. Having lost my sword in the breach, when stunned, I picked up on the rampart part of a French musket which had been broken, and with it knocked over Lowe, and saved the French officer, who complained to me of being robbed of his epaulette, or something else. I told him that he might think himself lucky in thus having his life saved after an assault, but that I would protect him; and I told him to accompany me to the Salamanca gate, which I knew to be close by.

“He said that it was useless to attempt to open it, as it was *murée*, that is blocked up with stones. I went down, however, by one of the slopes from the rampart to see it, and found it blocked up. I immediately re-ascended the rampart, accompanied by Corporal McIntyre and Pat Lowe, whom I ordered to remain with me, although they wished to go into the town.

On questioning the French officer where he thought the Governor might be, he told me that, previously to the assault, he had seen him going in the direction of the great breach ; but that, if not killed, he would no doubt either be in his house, or in La Tour Carrée, near the Almeida gate.

“As I knew Ciudad Rodrigo very well, having been there often during the time of the Spaniards, in 1810 ;\* and having frequently accompanied the Governor, Don Andres Herrasti, Don Julian Sanchez, and his Lieutenant, Strenuwitz, round the ramparts, I proceeded along them in the direction of La Tour Carrée, or citadel. The ramparts were filling with men of the light division, descending into the town. On passing over the gate of San Pelayo, I saw from the wall a large party of French in the ravelin of the *fausse-braie* outside, crying out that they had surrendered, but we could not get at them.

“We then heard an explosion, and saw

\* See p. 64, No. 1.

from the smoke that it was in the direction of the great breach. This explosion was followed by a silence for some moments, which was afterwards interrupted by the bugles of the regiments of the light division sounding 'cease firing.' Being thus assured that all was now safe in that direction, I continued along the rampart (neither overtaking nor meeting any one) until we arrived at the square tower, *La Tour Carrée*, commanding the bridge over the river.

"The gate in the outside wall which surrounded the tower was closed. One of the men with me (*Mac Intyre*, as it appears by a letter I have since received from him) proposed blowing the gate open by firing into the lock; but on seeing some people on the top of the turrets of the tower, and at the recommendation of the French officer with me, I went round from the gate to the rampart, from whence I called out to them to surrender, or they would be put to death, as the town was taken.

"The answer being 'to return to the gate, which would be opened,' I did so, and found it open, and I proceeded with the person who had

opened it to the square tower inside, the door of which was closed. The officer who had opened the outside gate, told me that the Governor and other officers were within the tower. I repeated the threat, that they would be certainly put to death if they did not surrender, and that I would protect them. I was answered from within, '*Je ne me rendrai qu'au Général-en-chef.*' I replied that the '*Général-en-chef*' would not take the trouble to come there, and and that if the door were not immediately opened, it would be blown open, *qu'ils périront tous.*'"

"After some hesitation the door was unbarred, and I forced my way in, with Corporal Macintyre and Lowe behind me. It was a square chamber, and, as I saw by the light of a lantern which was held up by one of them, filled with officers. The lantern was immediately knocked down by a musket from behind me, and Lowe, who did it, cried out, 'Dear Mr. Gurwood, they will murder you.' All was now dark, excepting from the light of the moon, then rising and shining through the open door.



“I was seized round the neck, and I fully expected a sword in my body; but my alarm ceased immediately on the person kissing me, saying, ‘*Je suis le Gouverneur de la place, le Général Barrié; Je suis votre prisonnier.*’ He then took off his sword and gave it to me. I received it, telling him that I would take him to the *Général-en-chef*, to whom he should surrender his sword.

“I then conducted him out of the tower, saying that I would protect any of the officers who chose to accompany me. I told Macintyre and Lowe, that I no longer required them, and I descended from the tower into the town with my prisoners, and proceeded by the main street leading from the bridge to the Plaza Mayor.

“There was still some firing, but chiefly from plunderers blowing open the doors of the houses by applying their muskets to the locks. I proceeded, at the request of the Governor, to his house on the Plaza. The troops were pouring into the Plaza on all sides, most of them of the 3rd division. I called out for ‘Lord Wellington,’ when a gruff and imperious voice,

which I knew to be that of General Picton, said, 'What do you want with Lord Wellington, Sir? you had better join your regiment.'

"I made no reply, fearing to lose my prisoners; but having been informed in the Governor's house, by Captain Rice Jones, of the Engineers, that Lord Wellington was coming into town from the suburb of San Francisco, by the little breach, I proceeded in that direction.

"After leaving the Plaza Mayor, and out of hearing of General Picton, I continued crying out 'Lord Wellington! Lord Wellington!' In the care and protection of my prisoners, I necessarily abandoned many things, and heeded not the excesses I witnessed in my passage through the town, and I arrived at that part of the rampart near to which was the little breach. I still cried out 'Lord Wellington!' when a voice, which I recognised, replied, 'Who wants me?' I immediately proceeded up the slope, partly cut off at the top near the rampart. I crossed the trench with the Governor, the officer commanding the artillery, and three or four other officers; and, on the rampart I presented

to Lord Wellington the Governor, to whom I gave back the sword, which I had carried since his surrender to me.

“Lord Wellington immediately said to me, ‘Did you take him?’ I replied, ‘Yes, Sir ; I took him in the citadel above the Almeida gate.’ Upon which, giving the sword to me, his Lordship said, ‘Take it ; you are the proper person to wear it.’

“Some houses on fire near the little breach, and the rising moon now made everything visible. Lord Wellington, turning to Colonel Barnard, said, ‘Barnard, as Generals Crauford and Vandeleur are wounded, you command the light division ; you will command in the town ; have it evacuated immediately.’ Whilst Lord Wellington was giving further directions, and speaking to the Governor and the officer of French artillery respecting the gates, magazines, &c., Marshal Beresford asked me what was going on in the town ; and on my telling him of the plunder and excesses I had seen in my passage through it, which he repeated to Lord Wellington, General Barrié interrupted them ; upon which Lord Wellington turned round to

Lord Clinton, one of his aides-de-camp, and said, 'Lord Clinton, take him away.' Seeing the Governor look very sorrowful, I was in the act of giving him back his sword, when either the Prince of Orange or Lord March pulled me back by the skirt of the jacket, and one of them, I believe Lord March, said, 'Don't be such a —— fool.'

"General R. Crauford died of his wounds two or three days after the assault. The shot had entered his shoulder and driven two of his ribs into his lungs. He was buried on the 25th January, at the foot of the little breach. Lord Wellington, the Head Quarters' Staff, the officers of the light division, and the whole of fifth division off duty, attended the funeral. It was the most impressive scene I ever witnessed. The Adjutant-general, the Hon. C. Stewart (Marquis of Londonderry), an early and intimate friend of the late General R. Crauford, was much affected. The minute-guns from the ramparts, the firing over the grave on the spot of our recent success gave a solemnity to a scene unique in itself, that can never be forgotten by those who witnessed it.

“I rode over to Gallegos to see Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne and Major G. Napier, and received their congratulations on my success. I had a great regard for both. Having been a ward in Chancery, and having become of age, I was anxious to obtain leave to go to England, and I was given to understand that leave would be granted if I made application; but I was refused. I therefore renewed my application, with the tender of my resignation, and I wrote to Major G. Napier that I had done so. He answered me in the kindest manner, beseeching me not to take such a step after the service I had performed, as I should thus throw away all the advantages of it, for he knew that my name had been mentioned, as it deserved to be, in Lord Wellington’s dispatch. I had, however, sent in my letter.

“General Vandeleur, although wounded in the shoulder, continued to command the light division at Fuente Guinaldo, where the two battalions of the 52nd were quartered. He sent for me to tell me that he had forwarded my application, with my resignation; but at the same time, that an officer of my rank ought to be

very proud of the distinction conferred upon me by Lord Wellington, who had mentioned my name in the dispatch, which he gave me to read in the Portuguese newspaper, the 'Correo de Lisbon.' I had been in some measure prepared for this, by Major G. Napier, at Gallegos ; but the realization was a great satisfaction to me.

"Two days after the assault, I think on the 1st January, the French garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo passed outside the village of El Bodon, on their way to Lisbon. On their approach, I went out to see them. The officers were at the head of the column, when one of them no sooner saw me than he ran towards me. He was the young officer whose life I had saved near the little breach. He recognised me from the wound in my head, as I then wore a linen bandage with a woollen cap which Lord March had given to me.

"Whilst the column halted outside the town, I took this officer to my quarters and gave him something to eat, and also a paper addressed as a recommendation to the different officers who would be relieved in the escort to Lisbon. This officer wished to give me some

letters which he requested me to endeavour to have sent to the outposts to let his friends in France know that he was alive and well. I told him that I feared there would be no opportunity of doing so, as Marshal Marmont was coming down from Salamanca, and I thought there would not be any communication permitted. During the short time this officer had remained with me, the column of prisoners had proceeded to Fuente Guinaldo; and as several Spaniards had assembled round the door of my quarter, I went on with him some distance, and conducted him in safety to the column."

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## MEMORANDUM CONTINUED.

“WHEN I arrived at Lisbon, about three weeks afterwards, I heard of my promotion to a company from Colonel Campbell (Lieutenant-general Sir Colin Campbell). I was lodged with Woodgate of the 52nd, (who was gazetted also at the same time to a company), very near the Palacio de Pombal, the residence of the minister, Mr. Stuart.\* The packet was detained by contrary winds, and during my stay in Lisbon, I received great kindness

\* Lord Stuart de Rothesay.



from Mr. Stuart, Admiral and Lady Emily Berkeley, &c.

“I went to the castle the day before I left Lisbon to see two officers of the 58th, Lieutenant James, and my old schoolfellow, Frank Pyner. They told me that one of the French officers, prisoners in the castle, had mentioned to them that the English officer who had taken the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo prisoner, and to whom Lord Wellington had given his sword, had saved his life.

“On sending for him, it was reported by the other French officers that he had gone into the town, under escort, to purchase provisions, and I therefore could not then see him; but Lieutenant James invited me to dinner, when he would take care that the French officer should meet me at the mess. I went back to Mr. Stuart, who informed me that as the packet would sail early the next morning, I must dine with him. I told him that I was engaged to meet my French officer at the castle; he said: ‘Oh,

bah! throw over your Frenchman!' I did so, and sailed for England the following day.

"I always regretted not having inquired the name and regiment of this officer, as I had felt an interest about him, having saved his life; and I had told him, when I last saw him at El Bodon, that I would endeavour to obtain his exchange, or at all events, some advantages in point of abode, if he remained a prisoner, as he had a horror of being kept on board the pontoons, or prison ships.

"However, on my arrival in England, I was very much occupied in my own affairs, having been a ward in Chancery, and become of age; and in effecting my exchange from the African corps, which I had been ordered to join. I had negociated an exchange with a Lieutenant of the 1st regiment of Foot Guards, but the Duke of York would not permit it; Horace Churchill being the senior ensign, and his Royal Highness would not allow any officer being brought in above him,

and I then exchanged to cavalry, paying the difference.

“I was also laid up by illness; and when I recovered I applied to Lord Wellington to be permitted to rejoin the army under his command. I quite forgot my Frenchman. I had no chance afterwards of discovering him, although I had frequently the wish so to do; but I never, until the publication of Colonel W. Napier’s ‘History,’ had it in contemplation that, after a lapse of twenty-eight years, I should stand in need of the testimony of this officer, in the justification of my conduct. I have since paid severely for this neglect in the fruitless search I have made for him.

“Lord Charles Somerset, on my arrival in England, had appointed me his aide-de-camp. He showed me a letter from his brother, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, stating, ‘The gallant conduct and success of your young *protégé* Gurwood, of the 52nd, are the envy and admiration of the army; and I have no doubt that, from the recommendation of Lord Wellington, he

will obtain the promotion he has so well earned.'

"Previous to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, I had been employed in observation in the country between the two armies, in valleys of the Sierras de Francia and Gata, and in the Vera de Plasencia. I was frequently at Cadalso at the house of Don Antonio Gamonal, a rich Spaniard, who had always been very civil to me and obtained news for me from Plasencia, then the head quarters of the French 'Armée de Portugal.' The house of Don Antonio was my house whenever I was in that part of the country. I purchased of him two very handsome double-nosed Aragonese pointers, plum-pudding spotted, bitch and puppy, which I intended to present to Lord Charles Somerset.

"On the night of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, the baggage of the third division, and that of the light division, had been stationed at the same place. On our return to El Bodon, the day after the assault, my batman told me that the bitch, 'Garga,' was missing. On inquiry of the cavalry staff corps

attending the baggage, I was told that a dog of that description, as she was remarkable for her beauty, had been seen with the baggage of the third division returning to Albergueria.

“I rode over the following morning, and on inquiry, traced the bitch to the grenadier company of the 88th; and I waited on the officer commanding the company, Lieutenant Mackie, who told me that his batman had found such a dog; but on sending for him, he told us that she had been claimed by the servant of the acting paymaster of the second battalion, light infantry, K.G.L., in the seventh division, which had returned that morning to Penamacor.

“On my way to Lisbon, three weeks afterwards, passing through Penamacor, where I lodged a night, I saw the bitch in the street, and I recovered her immediately from the officer, on showing him the dog, her puppy. On my arrival in London, I presented them to Lord Charles Somerset, who gave them to his cousin the Duke of Rut-

land, at Cheveley. I have never since inquired if this breed still exists at Cheveley or Belvoir.

“The extraordinary part of this otherwise insignificant story is, that I should have had this interview with Lieutenant Mackie of the 88th, at Albergueria. He was very civil to me, and I partook of some refreshment at his quarters; but he never said a word to me about the Governor’s sword, which I then wore; nor afterwards at Portsmouth, when I was major of brigade, and he was brevet-major of the new 94th, then (1833 and 1834) in garrison there for more than a year. Major Mackie must have seen the sword, for I always wore it, walked frequently with him, and also talked of former days in the Peninsula; but at no time did he ever mention to me, nor did I ever hear that he mentioned to others, that he laid claim to the sword, or that he had taken the Governor prisoner, or any other officer in the citadel of Ciudad Rodrigo. The first time I heard of such a claim was from my attention having been

directed to it in the 'Justificatory Notes,'\* in which a paper of Major Mackie was introduced.

"It will be as well here to state, that the Marquis of Douro wrote to inform me in August, 1840, that on his way to Scotland, on board a steam-boat, he had been in company with a gentleman of the name of Maxwell, who had told him of his intention of publishing a statement of the right of the late Major Mackie, to have received the sword of the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

"I replied to Lord Douro, that I was indifferent to what any person might write on that subject; that I had been advised not to notice the statement of the late Major Mackie, recently published in the last volume of General W. Napier's 'History of the War in the Peninsula;' and that although, after **such** a lapse of time, I possibly could not **produce** any satisfactory evidence in corroboration of what

\* Colonel W. Napier's "History," Vol. VI, published in 1840.

I had always stated to be the history of the sword given to me by Lord Wellington, I was satisfied of the truth of it. I did not read Mr. Maxwell's 'Life of the Duke of Wellington,' which contained a repetition of the paper of the late Major Mackie, with some invidious remarks respecting me, until the latter end of July, 1842, when my attention was directed to it by a friend who had read extracts from it, then published in the "Times" newspaper.

"After thirty years, it became difficult for me to obtain corroboration of what I had always stated to have been my conduct in the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, and I never dreamt of the necessity of such corroboration. Major Mackie having previously died in Gambia, of which he had been Governor, I had no opportunity of proving my right, or of disproving his error in support of his claim. His statement is without proofs; but had Major Mackie made his claim at Albergueria, I should have had no difficulty in obtaining proofs, or even at Portsmouth, more than twenty years afterwards, I think I could have convinced him that he must



have been mistaken. The following note, to a certain extent, confirms what I have just stated :

*Colonel J. Sydney North to Colonel Gurwood.*

“ Putney Hill, April 6, 1843.

“ My dear Gurwood,

“ Referring to our conversation yesterday, I have no hesitation in assuring you that I do not recollect, in any conversation I had with Major Mackie of the 94th regiment, during the time that I was with you and him in the same garrison at Portsmouth, that he ever mentioned that he was the person entitled to the honours you gained at the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo. To the best of my belief, the first I ever heard of his claim was upon reading Napier’s ‘ History of the Peninsular War.’

“ In the autumn of 1842, a curious chance led me to the discovery of Colonel Husson, a French officer, who had commanded the artillery at Ciudad Rodrigo. I had a corres-

pondence with him, and in consequence of my request that he would condense all that he had written to me, combined with his answer to the inquiries I had made of him, he wrote to me a letter (17th January, 1843), a copy of which I sent to Major-general W. Napier."

"This letter, and the correspondence with Major-general W. Napier, respecting Ciudad Rodrigo and Sabugal, to which the reader is referred, will be placed after this memorandum.

"After reading Mr. Maxwell's book, I fell indignant at being held up to the world as a cheat and an impostor; and I inclosed to Mr. Maxwell's publishers, Messrs. Bailey, the letter of Colonel Husson, my letter to Major-general W. Napier, and Major-general W. Napier's answer. In giving them, I made use of very strong expressions respecting the conduct of Mr. Maxwell, who wrote to me on the subject. I placed the affair in the hands of Lieutenant-general Sir A. Barnard.

"Sir Andrew informed me, that Mr. Maxwell being a member of the Church, and I having

indiscreetly made use of improper expressions, he recommended me to withdraw them; which I did in a letter to Sir Andrew, shown to Mr. Ouseley Higgins, the friend of Mr. Maxwell, who was satisfied with this acknowledgement.

“An *ex parte* statement of what had passed was forthwith published in the “Globe” newspaper, which, however, Mr. Ouseley Higgins immediately repudiated in the “Globe” of the next evening. This produced the following notes :

*Colonel Gurwood to G. G. Ouseley  
Higgins, Esq.*

“April 11, 1843, 5 P.M.

“Sir,

“In the absence from town of Lieutenant-general Sir A. Barnard, I take the liberty to thank you for the prompt and handsome manner in which you have contradicted the statement which appeared last night in the ‘Globe’ newspaper, copied in all the papers of this day; and I have written to Sir A. Barnard, at Bushy Park, to inform him that I have done so.”

*Mr. G. G. Ouseley Higgins to Colonel  
Gurwood.*

“ April 12, 1843.

“ Mr. Ouseley Higgins presents his compliments to Colonel Gurwood, and begs to acknowledge the receipt of his note of yesterday evening. Mr. Ouseley Higgins learns with much pleasure that the letter which he addressed to the Editor of the ‘Globe,’ was satisfactory to Colonel Gurwood. His writing such a letter was, under the circumstances, a mere act of justice to Colonel Gurwood; but it was one in the performance of which Mr. Ouseley Higgins felt much satisfaction.”

“ In consequence, however, of the publicity given to the affair, I was recommended to forward a paper to the Editor of the ‘United Service Magazine,’ containing the copy of a letter which I wrote to my mother after the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the letter of Colonel Husson to me, of the 11th January,

1843. This paper was followed by another, written, as I afterwards learned, by Lieutenant Thornton, of the old 94th, and published in the 'United Service Magazine,' of September, 1843. These papers also will be placed after this memorandum.

"I was still anxious, however, if possible, to discover other authorities than the testimony of Serjeant M'Currie and Corporal Macintyre, who had written to me, but at my own request, and also Serjeant Donald M'Donald; but as they were under obligations to me, their testimony might be received with suspicion, although it will be seen by the following dates that my efforts to serve them could not possibly have been in anticipation of what Colonel W. Napier subsequently published in 1834 and 1840."

END OF VOL. I.

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